Beyond the mathematics and the jurisprudence, the chief political trends in this material are as follows.

The main game is being played out with respect to the group of politicians that at some point belonged to the secular Iraqiyya but have signalled independent tendencies. All the other units seem to remain more or less stable, i.e. the Shiite alliance, the Kurds and the minorities.

But Iraqiyya has changed. First it lost around 8 deputies when White Iraqiyya (later White) defected in March 2011. Then it won 10 deputies when Wasat (Unity of Iraq plus Tawafuq) joined them in summer 2011. Then it suffered a string of defections after the start of its parliamentary boycott in December 2011, leading to the creation of the Wataniyun group as well as the emergence of Iskandar Witwit as an independent deputy. Additionally, in this period Jamal al-Batikh of White returned to a seat that Iraqiyya had sought to take themselves, and Ali al-Sajri was also given back his seat despite the objections of the Iraqiyya leadership, again emphasizing that his nominal affiliation to Iraqiyya is no longer meaningful.

Compared with the situation at the time of the formation of the second Maliki government in December 2010, Maliki now has a slightly larger pool to play with of secular and Sunni deputies interested in cooperating with him than last time (now 13 versus 10 back then, and that included Tawafuq deputies with whom Maliki had a somewhat poisonous relationship anyway.) In theory, Maliki might use this to build a more narrow coalition without Iraqiyya. It is however not enough to enable him to rid himself at the same time of the two coalition partners that tend to make the most taxing demands, i.e. the Kurds and the Sadrists. Even the alternative with a Shiite alliance plus Iraqiyya breakaway factions (without the Kurds) is looking a little vulnerable since at least parts of ISCI (10 seats) would probably shy away from this kind of “political majority” alternative, making it harder for Maliki to reach the critical absolute majority mark of 163.

The bigger question is whether Maliki really cares. Many of his latest moves have indicated aloof confidence, with a preference for meeting with Sunni tribal leaders and oil-hungry Asian ambassadors instead of having troublesome national conferences or even receiving the Turkish ambassador. Recently Maliki saw delivery of 131 Abrams tanks from the United States (with a promise of the remaining order of 9 being right around the corner), arriving on time apparently quite regardless of what he was up to politically.

Maliki still needs the annual budget to pass, though. In that struggle the Iraqi parliamentarians can still make an impact and their numbers and affiliations remain relevant.