Political Dynamics Behind the Downfall Court Chief

By Reidar Visser.

The following article was published by Reidar Visser, an historian of Iraq educated at the University of Oxford and currently based at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. It is reproduced here with the author’s permission. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

News out of Iraq indicates that the country’s de-Baathification committee has decided to remove the supreme court chief, Midhat al-Mahmud, because of his ties to the previous Baath regime.

In some ways, the ruling is not really controversial: It is widely agreed that Mahmud’s leading positions under the former regime are in conflict with the requirements of the de-Baathification law from 2008 which are particularly strict when it comes to leadership of judicial institutions. Everyone knew that Mahmud had those ties to the former regime; his tenure at the supreme court was simply seen as one of many exceptions to the rule in the new Iraq whereby some Baathists were granted permission to stay on if they proved useful to people in positions of power – and in particular to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Additionally, Mahmud’s continued tenure as an octogenarian seems to be a conflict with a law still in force stipulating age limits for retirement of Iraqi judges at 68.

Thus, rather than reflecting new legal realities or path-breaking judicial interpretations, the new situation regarding Mahmud has to do with a changing political dynamic in Iraq. Ever since the Shiite Islamist Sadrists and ISCI with Iranian support pushed the de-Baathification issue to the forefront in Iraqi politics ahead of the March 2010 parliamentary elections, there has been a shift of power towards Sadrist dominance of appointments to the de-Baathification committee and other legal institutions involved in the de-Baathification process. This was seen not only in the appointment of a new de-Baathification committee in May 2012. Also the composition of the appeals court for de-Baathification cases (to which Judge Midhat may now appeal) was influenced by Sadrist pressure in parliament. Finally, the recent passage by the Iraqi parliament of the law for the higher judicial council, which to some extent prepared the ground for the elimination of Judge Midhat, was seen as a bid by the Sadrists along with the Kurds and the secular and Sunni-dominated Iraqiyya to put pressure on Maliki.

It is hard to overestimate the significance of this move against Prime Minister Maliki. Since 2008, the Iraqi federal supreme court has increasingly been seen as an ally of Maliki, often issuing rulings that strengthened the executive in ways that seemed in conflict with the constitution or even the court’s own past decisions. Tareq Harb, a lawyer close to Maliki, often prevailed with his arguments before the supreme court. Maliki, emboldened by judicial support, appeared to pay ever less attention to the fact that his parliamentary support base is in fact very limited. During the no confidence crisis of spring 2012 he failed to build bridges to disaffected factions of Iraqiyya and had to rely on support from Iran and the Sadrists to avoid getting unseated. To some extent then, this latest move is parliament paying back for Maliki’s arrogant approach to them.

2 Responses to Political Dynamics Behind the Downfall Court Chief

  1. Sermid Al-Sarraf March 2, 2013 at 4:45 am #

    While I agree that the debaathification decision against Chief Justice Al-Mahmood was entirely political, the author’s irresponsible statements about him such as:

    “It is widely agreed that Mahmud’s leading positions under the former regime are in conflict with the requirements of the de-Baathification law from 2008 which are particularly strict when it comes to leadership of judicial institutions”

    are in direct contradiction with the appeals panel’s ruling quashing that decision. After reviewing the decision and all of the evidence presented (including Al-Mahmood’s service record), the Cassation panel (which has the final say) concluded that there was absolutely no evidence that Al-Mahmood held any position in the Baath Party, nor any other position that would be barred under the 2008 Accountability and Justice Law.

    Prior to making these unfounded statements, the author should do his research and be responsible about his statements.

    A full apology is warranted here.

  2. Editor March 3, 2013 at 12:50 pm #

    The author of the article, Reidar Visser, has issued the following comment:

    The appeals board for de-Baathification reversed the ruling and reinstated Midhat. The Sadrist head of the de-Baathification committee withdrew and the Sadrists were given another post. The reinstatement does seem like a whitewash when you look at the CV of Judge Midhat http://iraqja.iq/minister.php It is hard to imagine he could have achieved all that without being a high-ranking member of the Baath. It is also dubious whether the PM had the right to intervene in the de-Baathification committee structure. I will see if I can find something more specific on these issues later.