In other events across the country insurgents have been responsible for numerous successful high impact attacks that have killed many, mainly in central belt. The ISF have come in for particular scrutiny. A suicide bomber in northern Iraq blew himself up at a funeral procession on Sunday, killing at least 10 people and wounding 25. The bombing took place in Muqdadya, 80 km northeast of Baghdad, among mourners in a cemetery as they were escorting the body of a prominent Sunni tribal sheikh, Mudhher Ali al-Shalal, who was killed on Saturday by gunmen. On Tuesday insurgents launched a series of well-planned attacks against key government locations north of Baghdad. In total 12 people were killed. In the first assault, nine people were killed and 17 wounded in a suicide and mortar attack on a government compound in the northern Iraqi town of Tarmiya. The attack started when an initial break-in attack was launched by an insurgent wearing an explosive belt who blew himself up at the structure, which held the mayor’s office, the town’s police station and other government organizations, Reuters reported. This break-in assault was followed up by a ground attack involving heavy and light arms and mortars, which killed a number of security guards. In a separate yet possibly coordinated attack four members of the security services were killed in an attack on a police administrative building in the northern city of Tikrit when a car bomb exploded near the main gate. Some 19 people were wounded, including civilians.
In line with this al Qaeda in Iraq is reportedly adopting a strategic plan aimed are forcing the ISF to commit and overstretch. What we are seeing more and more of is large volume attacks in large cities aimed at drawing the ISF into these locales and away from key areas of support in the insecure north western hinterlands along the Syria / Iraq border. In turn al Qaeda is then reacting in these hinterlands and once again forcing the ISF to deploy in a classic game of push me-pull you, which the ISF does not have the capacity or capability to cover, especially given the lack of a coherent counter insurgency policy and intelligence gathering strategy.