National Overview

The total number of officially reported hostile incidents nationally was 126 last week, consistent with the number of incidents recorded during the last reporting period. The number of incidents in the west rose by a quarter this week and incidents in Baghdad also rose significantly. The south east saw a very minor rise in the number of incidents. Incidents in the south central, north and north central areas decreased this week.

Although incident levels have remained consistent over this fortnight, the incidents occurring last week affected far fewer casualties and caused less damage. Insurgents operating in the north central and western areas appear to be benefiting from increased freedom of movement brought about by the fall in number of U.S. Forces.

There were further attacks on infrastructure during the reporting period, including Improvised Explosive Device attacks against electrical pylons in Hillah, power generators in Baghdad and a water tower in Anbar. These attacks are assessed to have been the work of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) or their associated movements seeking to undermine local and national Government.

The resilient militant networks who undertook the 25 August attacks will be difficult to uproot and we can expect further synchronized attacks to come, probably to correspond with future religious festivals or indeed new government formation. The Ramadan / Eid religious ceremonial period provides a unique opportunity for insurgents to attack when the security forces and civilians’ defences are low. This year the Eid festival will coincide with the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which is potentially an irresistible coincidence for Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQIZ) and their associated movements to launch large scale attacks.

The most likely culprits were neo-Baathist insurgents, probably with assistance from Islamist elements such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (branded as the Islamic State of Iraq). Though almost all the mass casualty bombings were remote-controlled car bombs, at least two of the thirteen devices were suicide-detonated, indicating an Islamist element. According to Olive’s contacts in the U.S. government, key former regime leaders such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri are floating to the top of the boiled-down insurgency. These figures are able to bridge the divide between nationalist and Islamist wings of the insurgency and even to cross sectarian and ethnic lines to some extent. The objective of such movements is to maintain resistance and foster a state of chaos until such time as the Iraqi people call for a stronger nationalist government. At that point, it is posited by U.S. intelligence analysts, elements of the old Baath will seek to gain power through election, running on a platform of experience in security and governance, technocratic competence, and toughness vis-à-vis Iran.

Baghdad

Reported incidents in Baghdad rose from 34 to 47 last week. The International Zone was targeted for three days in a row during the reporting period. This is a continuation of Shia’a militants’ harassment campaign to coincide with the draw down of US Forces. One of the attacks was seemingly conducted to coincide with the visit of US Vice President Joe Biden. Shia’a insurgents were also responsible for the IDF attack against Victory Base Camp – none of the attacks resulted in death or serious injury.

An electricity generator was targeted with an Improvised Explosive Device in the Shia’a area of west Rasid. This may have been carried out by Sunni insurgents to stoke up anger and provoke a response. Such attacks are often conducted to undermine faith in the ability of the GoI to provide basic essential services.

Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices remained the most prevalent form of assassination in the City in this reporting period. An Iraqi Police Services member working at the passport office in Kadimiyah was killed by an Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device on 31 August and an Iraqi Security Forces Colonel was injured by device on 02 September; several civilians (probably with links to Government of Iraq or Iraqi Security Forces) were also targeted during the review period. However, the most significant Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device attack was aimed at Hussein al Mir’ibi, a leading figure in the Shia’a Fadhila party and member of the Iraqi National Alliance, who did not sustain any injuries from the attack.

Basra

There was only one significant hostile incident in Basra last week which took the form of an Improvised Explosive Device attack against a Private Security Company vehicle as it transited south west of Az Zubayr on route Tampa. The Improvised Explosive Device damaged the vehicle but did not result in any injuries. The area in which the attack took place has been targeted several times in the recently as insurgents know that there is a large volume of United States Forces – Iraq, Iraqi Security Forces and Private Security Company traffic in the area.

The discovery of two Improvised Explosive Devices and an Explosively Formed Projectile around the province indicates that Shia’a insurgent intent remains high. The Explosively Formed Projectile discovery was made in the vicinity of route Tampa in Umm Qasr and was likely designed to target a passing United States Forces – Iraq or Private Security Company convoy as there are an increasing number transporting United States Military equipment out of Iraq via Umm Qasr port.

Atmospherics in Basra were tainted by more demonstrations in the City protesting against the lack of electricity in the province. According to open sources, authorities in Muthana province took action against illegal electricity lines enabling them to increase the electricity supply. Further civil demonstrations in the south east region can be expected.

National Overview

The total number of hostile incidents reported nationally was 125 this week, down from 132 incidents during the last reporting period. There was a significant rise in the number of recorded incidents in the north central region with slight rises in the west, south central and south east regions. The north dropped slightly, but of note is the reduction in incidents in Baghdad that fell from 51 officially reported incidents to just 34.

The holy month of Ramadan, in its third week, has seen once of the most well coordinated country wide attacks ever in Iraq. On 25 Aug approximately 13 cities were targeted with various forms attack from suicide attacks to Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices and complex attacks. This resulted in between 50 – 75 deaths across the country; Ramadan is still thought to offer an excellent opportunity for insurgents to exploit due to the lax security across the country.

The last US combat brigade pulled out of Iraq on 19 Aug, a key milestone in the withdrawal of American forces more than seven years in Iraq and earlier than the advertised date of 31 Aug. Since this withdrawal there has been much speculation as to whether this withdrawal was undertaken too early, and whether the Iraqi Security Forces are in a position to secure the country robustly. The President of the U.S., Barack Obama, announced this on 31 Aug and reiterated that Iraq was now a ‘sovereign’ state.

On 22 Aug three 107mm rounds landed with in the Basra Contingency Operating Base killing one U.S. soldier. This was the first U.S. casualty since the withdrawal from Iraq of the last U.S. combat troops.

25 August – Iraq wide attacks

Iraqi insurgents carried out what seems to be a very well coordinated chain of attacks across Iraq that targeted a large number of Iraqi cities. It has been reported that approximately 75 people have been killed along with an estimated 400 being wounded. Most of the attacks targeted the Iraqi Police and Army contingents and it is thought that 27 of the dead are actually Iraqi Security Forces.

Iraq country-wide attack locations – 25 August 2010

The majority of the attacks appear to have taken place between 0615hrs and 1200hrs with further sporadic attacks continuing throughout the day.

The purpose of these attacks could have been to send a message that the insurgents can still strike anywhere in Iraq. While many of the targets were relatively soft, casualties appear to have been fairly limited in almost all cases. Most of the attacks killed fewer than 10 people; the only attack that registered a high casualty rate was a car bomb in Kut, which killed approximately 30.

Various tactics were used in the string of attacks, including suicide bombers, Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, other Improvised Explosive Devices, armed raids and, in at least one case, a follow-on attack after an explosion likely targeting first responders. Insurgents have carried out coordinated attacks before but never on so many cities simultaneously.

Attacking such large number of locations in a coordinated manner could show that a number of different cells were involved and communicated with each other across Iraq. Although the extent of planning and coordination is unknown, it does show that a significant amount of prior planning and communication must have been involved. Even though these attacks seem well coordinated it does not mean that there is an insurgent capability in Iraq that reflects a very close-knit ‘unit’ of smaller cells. It does, however, serve as a reminder that a broad insurgent base is still very much active across Iraq and can almost flex their muscles at will.

Baghdad

Reported incidents in Baghdad have decreased this week from 51 to 34. For the last three weeks the number of incidents had climbed, this is the lowest number of incidents for six weeks.

The International Zone was targeted on two occasions this month. The majority of attacks this week took the form of an Improvised Explosive Devices with half of the incidents being of this nature.

Of note is the attack that took place on 25 Aug when five different areas of Baghdad were attacked during the 25 Aug coordinated country-wide attacks. A suicide truck bomber killed 15 people and wounded at least 56 others in an attack on a police station and parts of a police station in Baghdad’s northern Qahira district also collapsed and surrounding houses were severely damaged when another device exploded nearby.

Although there has bee a reduction in the number of Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices reported this week, there have still bee seven attacks this week in the city with one attack resulting in the death of two civilians and two separate attacks on the Iraqi Security Forces on 28 Aug

Basra

It has been a relatively quiet week this week in terms of the number of incidents in Basra.

There have been just four incidents this reporting period, one attack from Indirect Fire against the COB, an Explosively Formed Projectile attack against a U.S. Forces convoy, and two Improvised Explosive Device attacks. Of particular note is the attack that took place on 25 Aug in Basra city involving what is thought to have been a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device. This was part of what seem to be a well coordinated attack across the country. Casualty figures in the Basra attack are thought to be no dead but up to a dozen wounded. The last attack of similar magnitude took place on 10 May of this year when a number of cities were again attacked by insurgents in another coordinated attack resulting in approximately 100 dead.

The last Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device attack in Basra took place on 07 Aug and that came just three months after the 10 May attack that also used the same kind Improvised Explosive Devices. Between 13 and 17 July there was a heightened threat around the Basra COB from this form of attack, but nothing actually materialised. The Iraqi Security Forces have suspected that an AQIZ cell has been operating in the province; the Iraqi Police Service reported on 22 Aug that Basra police forces had seized two vehicles which have been improvised as car bombs to be detonated in a local market in central Basra. No further information has been received since, regarding this discovery.

Earlier in the month on 01 Aug an Iraqi Army search operation uncovered a large weapons cache at a property south of Az Zubayr. Amongst other weaponry and equipment, the cache consisted of Improvised Explosive Device magnets, 200 cables with detonation devices and 75 Improvised Explosive Device detonators. This equipment could easily have been used for the production of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices; the fact more have detonated and been found since this cache was located suggests the devices used in the 07 Aug attack were already built or there is much more equipment out there for the manufacture of this kind of device.

On 22 Aug at 0550hrs the Basra Contingency Operating Base was targeted by three rounds of 107mm Indirect Fire. The three Points of Impact (POI) were reported, resulting in the death of a U.S. soldier,

This was the fourth Indirect Fire attack so far on the Basra Contingency Operating Base during August and the third since 15 Aug, July has seen the busiest month in 2010 in terms of Indirect Fire with five separate attacks.

National Overview

The total number of hostile incidents reported nationally increased for the third week in a row, seeing a significant rise in the number of recorded incidents in Baghdad and slight rises in the north and north central regions. The west and south east regions remained the same, in terms of numbers of incidents, with the south central region decreasing slightly.

The holy month of Ramadan, now in to its second week and could be responsible for the increase in activity across parts of the country as it is generally agreed that Ramadan is thought to offer an excellent opportunity for insurgents to exploit due to the potentially lax security across the country.

The last US combat brigade pulled out of Iraq at dawn on 19 Aug, a key milestone in the withdrawal of American forces more than seven years in Iraq. At this point the US mission in Iraq was re-christened “Operation New Dawn”, from “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. This pullout coincided with the arrival of James Jeffrey, the new US ambassador to Iraq; his arrival comes during a political deadlock in Iraq.

Iraqi politics is still in turmoil with no real end in sight. American and Iraqi officials have publicly said that the reason an Iraqi government has not been formed is due to Iranian interference. There are a number of Shiite politicians who are close to Tehran and, for a range of reasons, may take their orders from there. There are not enough of these politicians to create a government, but there are enough to block a government from being established. This is of great importance to the security of Iraq; no new government being formed after elections in March and at a time, in the middle of the month of Ramadan, when insurgent attacks have been known to peak in the past is causing much instability.

On 15, 16 and 22 Aug the Basra Contingency Operating Base was targeted by Indirect Fire; of interest is the improving accuracy of the rounds landing in the area, suggesting that the insurgent teams carrying out the attack are becoming more effective. The Indirect Fire attack that took place in the early morning of the 22 Aug, when three 107mm rounds landed with in the Basra Contingency Operating Base, resulted in the death of one U.S. soldier. No further details are known at this time, but this is the first U.S. death since the 4th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division crossed the border in to Kuwait ahead of the planned declaration of an end to US combat operations in Iraq by the August 31 deadline.

The reliability of an 18 Aug 10 report by Asharq al-Awsat stating that a prominent Iraqi Shiite militant leader has returned to Iraq from his refuge in Iran has been confirmed. Ismail al-Lami, commonly known as Abu Deraa, has been high up on the U.S. military’s targeting list since 2004, when he and his aides in Muqtada al Sadr’s Shiite Mehdi Army spent the most violent years of the war carrying out a series of attacks against Iraqi Sunnis under Iranian guidance.

US Forces remain the primary target of insurgents with Private Security Companies an acceptable alternative even though Iraqi Security Forces generally present a much easier target than US Forces. Insurgents will continue to attack US Forces and Private Security Companies with Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Projectiles on the main routes around the. The operational tempo stepped up in July and looks as though this will continue through August.

Baghdad

Officially reported incidents in Baghdad have increased again for the third week in succession to 51 incidents compared to 41 last week. This is now the highest level of incidents in the capital since 06 – 12 Jun 10 and a worry to the Iraqi Security Forces.

The International Zone was targeted on only one occasion this month and this was classed as an ineffective Indirect Fire attack. The majority of attacks this week took the form of an Improvised Explosive Devices with 29 out of the 51 incidents being of this nature. It was also reported that on 21 Aug the Director General of the Ministry of Interior was killed in Small Arms Fire attack in the Mansour area of the city.

Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices have also been used on a regular basis with 11 being reported resulting in a number of civilians being successfully targeted – a number of deaths have been reported in open sources, but it is unclear whether this is as a result of the Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device attacks.

With the U.S. drawing down its forces and the Iraqi government talks in limbo, Iran appears to be telegraphing to the U.S. that it has retained some critical levers over the years to turn the heat up in Iraq at a time when the U.S. lacks the force strength of the 2007 surge. By insisting on a strong Sunni presence in the Iraqi government and proceeding with its withdrawal plans, the U.S. is taking a gamble that Iran, whose primary interest is to consolidate Shiite influence in Iraq, will impose limits on itself to contain ethno-sectarian fissures and prevent an outbreak of violence so large that it would risk unraveling the political gains Iran has made thus far.

The timing for the return of the Shiite militant leader, Abu Deraa, to Iraq was likely carefully deliberated by Iran with the withdrawal of U.S. combatant forces from the country during the last week when the remnants of the 2nd Infantry Division left Iraq two weeks before their scheduled departure. However, the Iraqi government remains in complete flux, with Iranian-backed political forces blocking an attempt by the U.S. ensuring a prominent place for Iraq’s Sunnis in the ruling coalition and this issue is unlikely to be resolved in the near term. The U.S. will have 50,000 troops in country to maintain a blocking force against Iran through at least 2011 to influence its negotiations with Iran over Iraq.

Basra

In comparison to the other regions in Iraq, it has been a relatively quiet week this week in terms of the number of incidents in the south east region.

This could potentially reflect the start of the second week of Ramadan in this area. The reports of another Explosively Formed Projectile attack in the north of Basra city and a further Indirect Fire attack against the Basra Contingency Operating Base resulting in the death of a U.S. soldier, have been the main incidents this week.

The general atmospherics in Basra are most likely at the lowest for about 18 months. The lack of constant electricity (even regular electricity), the lack of clean water, inflation and the rise in food prices during Ramadan are causing substantial problems. The importance of the religious ceremonies of Ramadan may provoke a heightened level of attacks from insurgent groupings in Iraq who are keen to exploit the strict observance of rituals such as fasting, when Iraqis’ defenses are low. However, there is no substantial data to support or deny this; although ‘spectacular’ attacks such as large scale bombings targeting religious gatherings can be common during this time, particularly in religious cities such as Karbala. These points along with the latest attack carried out on 07 Aug 10 has affected the local populations belief about their security in the City and the role the Iraqi Security Forces are playing in this – especially in light of the U.S. draw down. Public anger is likely to be directed against provincial and national level politicians and their failure to form a government.

There have been further heightened threats issued during this reporting period including heightened threat on Main Supply Routes from Improvised Explosive Devices.

National Overview

This reporting period saw the levels of incidents rise by approximately 20% compared to the previous week. There was a significant rise in the number of recorded incidents in the North, North Central and Western Regions of Iraq, with the rest of the country experiencing no real change or slight reductions in the number of incidents. In the week that has seen Iraq’s top army officer criticising the planned US troop withdrawal by the end of next year as premature, and even more political wrangling with the suspension of talks to break the stalemate, Baghdad suffered from yet another ‘spectacular’ attack when 60 potential Iraqi Army recruits were killed in a suicide attack; again bringing the media spotlight firmly on Iraq security.

The holy month of Ramadan started on 11 Aug in Iraq, presenting an opportunity for insurgents, throughout the country, to exploit a time in the calendar where security may not be at it best. This period has been used in the past to attack security forces and may now also be used to take advantage of the political vacuum across the country to launch attacks. Military leaders, both U.S. and Iraqi, have made reference to this period as a chance for insurgents to attack across the country.

It is known that attacks have increased in the time preceding Ramadan and during the early parts of the month, but this year sees more problems for Iraq, most notably a lack of a robust Government and the thoughts of the local population that security may be an issue. Iraq is without a new government more than five months after voters handed the secular Iraqiya slate a narrow victory over the State of Law party of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; still none of the competing parties secured the clear majority needed to form a government alone.

There has been news to suggest that the Al-Dawa Party has unanimously decided to choose an alternative for Al-Maliki as a candidate to head the next government; and with the Iranian ambassador to Iraq expressing optimism that a new Iraqi government will be formed in the near future, it may be the the stalemate could be broken. Al-Hakim’s alliance stopped its negotiations with Al-Maliki’s coalition over a week ago and demanded changing Al-Maliki and submitting a candidate who is acceptable by the components of the National Alliance, particularly the Al-Sadr Trend and the other blocs as a condition for resuming the talks.

It has not been confirmed whether an alternative has been identified, but this may go someway to break the political deadlock that has been experienced since the elections in March 2010. The country is waiting for an official announcement on this subject before any official posture is taken by other political parties in Iraq. It comes, as already mentioned, at the beginning of Ramadan, so this may go some way to placate the Iraqi population, but it may also take some time to resolve this – longer than the period of Ramadan and potentially weeks if not months. As a result this may improve the security situation, but may also add fuel to the fire if the potential for momentum is not maintained.

However, the Iraqi Parliament will apparently not meet again unless there is a deal made between political blocs to distribute major state posts among them and U.S. and Iraqi officials have warned that insurgent groups may use the lack of a new government to step up their attacks.

Baghdad

Officially reported incidents in Baghdad increased for the second week in a row. This is now the highest level of incidents in the capital since the beginning of June. The International Zone has been targeted on five separate occasions with Indirect Fire this reporting period; however, none of the attacks were classed as successful. This reporting period has also seen Baghdad targeted five times with Explosively Formed Projectiles bringing the total this month to seven. It is evident that, along with Indirect Fire and Explosively Formed Projectile attacks, that Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices targeted at individuals are becoming more prevalent. The capital has been hit with many Improvised Explosive Devices this week with 16 official reports of this method of attack with an attack on 09 Aug killing two Iraqi policemen and wounding three others.

Of particular note this week was the attack on an Iraqi Army recruitment centre by a suicide bomber wearing an explosive-laden who blew himself up in the Baab al-Muatham neighborhood of central Baghdad, killing approximately 60 people and wounding 125. The attack, the deadliest this year, came a day after Iraq’s two main political parties suspended talks over the formation of a new government five months after elections took place in March.

As many as 1,000 army recruits were gathered at the army division headquarters due to 17 Aug being the last day for soldiers to sign up at the unit. Iraqi Security Forces were trying to bolster their ranks to prepare for the military withdrawal of the U.S. Major-General Qassim Al Moussawi, an Iraqi Army spokesman, blamed the deaths on a single suicide bomber, also citing Al Qaeda for enlisting the bomber.

The country’s security forces have been persistent targets at the hands of insurgent groups, especially in the capital, and it has sparked even more discussion as to the preparedness of the Iraqi Security Forces to handle the country’s security on their own in light of the U.S. planned withdrawal.

Lt Gen Babaker Zebari warned that the Iraqi military might not be ready to take control for another decade; he stated to a defence conference in Baghdad that the Iraqi Army would not be able to ensure the country’s security until 2020 and that the U.S. should keep its troops in Iraq until then. However, the U.S. says it is on target to end combat operations by the end of August and meet its deadline for removing all troops by the end of 2011.

Zebari’s warning echoes the remark by Saddam Hussein’s former foreign minister Tarik Aziz last week that the Americans were “leaving Iraq to the wolves”.

Basra

Incidents numbers in the Basra have reduced this week, however, of note are the two Indirect Fire attacks against the Basra Contingency Operating Base on the 15 and 16 August.

On 15 August one round of Indirect Fire landed to the south east of the Basra Contingency Operating Base, but no explosion was heard or seen. On 16 Aug the Basra Contingency Operating Base was targeted by seven rounds of Indirect Fire; in both instances both firing points were tracked from the north of Basra. There were no confirmed reports of casualties or damage in the Base.

A report was released in Basra by the Iraqi Security Forces suggesting that there was a heightened kidnap threat from an unidentified Shia group planning to kidnap U.S. Civilian personnel in the south east of Iraq. This is a threat that remains extant throughout the country even in times of heightened stability.

It is a distinct possibility that attacks seen on 07 August could now become more of the ‘norm’ in Basra, but on a more infrequent scale compared to the likes of Baghdad. This attack is most likely linked to Al Qaeda in Iraq or its Associated Movements. Iraqi Security Forces have suspected an Al Qaeda cell of operating in the Az Zubayr region since the 10 May Basra attacks, however, it is questionable whether a cell would be able to build and deploy devices of this size in a Shia dominated province under the scrutiny of Iraqi Security Forces. It is possible that the devices were constructed outside of Basra and then deployed by volunteers with good local knowledge. Public anger is likely to be directed against provincial and national level politicians.

Criminal activity will continue to take place in across the province. At present the number of high profile criminal incidents is relatively low, however, attacks on logistics convoys transiting through Basra is likely to increase as Basra province becomes busier with transiting convoys; criminality could also rise during time of increased unemployment and rises in inflation coupled with higher food prices – especially during the period of Ramadan.

National Overview

The reporting period saw a significant rise in the number of recorded incidents in Baghdad, as Al Qaeda in Iraq and Al Qaeda in Iraq Associated Movements seek to re-establish their grip on the City. An attack on an Iraqi Police check point that resulted in an Al Qaeda in Iraq flag being raised attracted headlines and raised questions about the ability of Iraqi Security Forces to cope come September this year.

The large number of arrests made in the north and north central areas last week appears to have had an affect, with the number of recorded hostile incidents dropping sharply. The Iraqi Security Forces continued to gain ground uncovering a number of arms caches around Ninevah and securing more arrests. However, these areas are renowned as insurgent strongholds and Al Qaeda in Iraq Associated Movements possess the capability to re-group relatively quickly.

Basra province was targeted by a simultaneous double Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices and an Improvised Explosive Device attack on 07 August that resulted in at least 46 dead and 180 wounded. This was the second such attack since May and demonstrates Al Qaeda in Iraq’s aim to stir up ethnic tensions in order to undermine the relatively secure southern areas of the country. A similar attack occurred in the usually quiet Al Kut in Wasit province on 03 August illustrating the widening of Al Qaeda’s scope of operations which is likely to continue during Ramadan.

The importance of the religious ceremonies of Ramadan tend to provoke a heightened level of attacks from insurgent groupings in Iraq who are keen to exploit the strict observance of rituals such as fasting, when Iraqis’ defenses are low. Spectacular attacks such as large scale bombings targeting religious gatherings can be common during this time, particularly in religious cities such as Karbala.

Iraq’s Security Forces continued to be subject to frequent attacks, at check points and during operations. Exemplifying this trend, on 11 August a bomb explosion in northern Diyala province killed eight Iraqi soldiers and wounded four others as they raided a house in Saadiya. Traffic police officers have experienced an unusually high level of targeting recently, prompting the Minister of Interior to request investigation into recent attacks, also recommending they use better protection equipment such as AK-47 assault rifles. The most recent attack occurred on 09 August when a bomb planted at the traffic police department in the Ghazaliya district of western Baghdad exploded, killing a traffic policeman and a bystander and wounding ten other people, including seven traffic police officers. This kind of targeting is expected to increase over the next few weeks as Al Qaeda in Iraq and Associated Movements seek to exacerbate instability as the United States Forces draw down and the government formation process remains in limbo.

Elections Overview

The political wrangling in Iraq has rumbled on to no avail, as each week sees a new suggestion of potential alliances. The Shiite alliance formed between the State of Law coalition and the Iraqi National Alliance is said to be on its last legs as the latter refuses to accept Maliki’s candidacy for the position of Prime Minister. As the Shiite agreement appears to disintegrate, other factions have been vying for supremacy by attempting to form new mergers. The Kurds seemingly have acquired the best negotiating position despite gaining the least votes; their measured allegiances are none too committal and they also benefit from the sectarian quota system that unofficially awards them the position of the presidency. Talks of awarding this position to Allawi as a sort of concession for losing out on the role of Prime Minister are provocative for this reason.

The delays to formal negotiations have been based on the battle for the top roles and Maliki’s refusal to back down. Many party loyalists continue to support him, while others push for the promotion of another from within their ranks, fearing that if they do not put forward a new candidate, the State of Law Coalition will lose its position of authority.

Iraqiyya continue to press on with their demands for proper representation in government as the party with the most votes. Senior officials have been quoted as saying that the State of Law Coalition is being obstructive and Maliki will need to back down for things to move forward. This explains the temporary freeze in progress that Iraq is experiencing as the key players await Maliki’s next move.

On 04 August Maliki announced, “I am ready to come down from the prime minister’s nominee for another potential candidate, if the new candidate will win 60 percent of votes by the members of State of Law in Iraq.” If another candidate is fielded then Maliki could potentially execute the “Putin option” of exerting influence from behind the scenes through a supportive ruler. This may yet be too late, as Sadrists recently suggested an Iraqqiya, Iraqi National Alliance and Kurdish formation for the new government. Whether the Sadrists with their staunch views and testy negotiation skills will be able to oversee this formation is questionable, but their case is afforded credence by the current status of the State of Law with the lack of a new candidate leaving Maliki in power.

A leader of the Sadrist Movement, Balqis Guli Muhammad remarked on the clarity that Maliki’s position was lending to negotiations saying, “What has become apparent now is that the Kurds, the National Alliance and the Iraqi List (Iraqiyya) may form a government… given that, the prime minister will be from Iraqiyya, the president will be a Kurd, and the parliament speaker will be a member of the Iraqi National Alliance.” This is of course very presumptuous and more an assertion of the Sadrist desire to gain power than of the strength of this potential alliance. What is clear is that it is all still to play for in the formation of government as none of the proposed combinations has a clear path to success. Consolidation of a new government remains elusive, though with Maliki’s recent concession we could begin to see progress in the recommendation of an alternative prime ministerial candidate.

Baghdad

Officially reported incidents in Baghdad increased from 27 to 37 last week. This is the highest level of violence witnessed in the capital since the beginning of June this year.

The most prevalent form of attack during the period was Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices targeting individuals, including an Iraqi Security Forces Colonel. The tempo of Indirect Fire attacks slowed from last week with only one reported attack against the International Zone on 03 August, an ineffective attack against Baghdad International Airport and an attack against United States Forces – Iraq in Taji. All of these attacks were assessed to be resultant from Shia’a insurgents. Shia’a insurgents were also believed to be responsible for two Explosively Formed Projectile attacks against United States Forces patrols in Sadiyah and New Baghdad.

The most symbolic incident in the city was an Al Qaeda in Iraq attack against an Iraqi Police check point in eastern Mansour. The attack killed five Iraqi Police Services members and injured several others. This was the second such attack since 29 July but was particularly noteworthy as an Al Qaeda in Iraq flag was raised at the check point. This attack is further evidence of Al Qaeda in Iraq’s attempts to re-establish themselves as open source reporting indicates that the group is looking to tempt disgruntled Sahwa (Awakening) Forces/Concerned Local Citizens members away from Iraqi Security Forces with cash payments. These offers may be tempting to some Sunni fighters who are dismayed by late payments and anticipate the sidelining of Sunni politicians in the formation of the new government.

Basra Province

On 07 August two Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices and an Improvised Explosive Device detonated in quick succession in the al Ashar district of Basra City, resulting in 43 dead and 180 injured according to an Iraqi Health Ministry source quoted by local media. A claim of responsibility has yet to be made but it is assessed that this was an Al Qaeda in Iraq or Associated Movements attack.

Iraqi Security Forces have suspected an Al Qaeda cell of operating in the Az Zubayr region since the 10 May Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive attacks, however it is questionable whether a cell would be able to build and deploy devices of this size in a Shia dominated province under the scrutiny of Iraqi Security Forces. It is possible that the devices were constructed outside the province and then deployed by volunteers with good local knowledge. A blame game between the Provincial Council and Iraqi Security Forces leadership has already begun and the Security Forces will be under pressure to achieve results. Public anger is likely to be directed against provincial and national level politicians whose failure to form a government that provides basic services and security threatens to radicalise ordinary citizens and spark civil unrest.

On 03 August, Shia insurgents attacked Basra Contingency Operating Base with 240mm rockets, the first time munitions of this kind have been used since 2008. The tempo of Indirect Fire attacks has slowed since last month, possibly as a result of a large weapons cache discovered on 01 August south of Az Zubayr. Amongst the cache were 76 rockets, which will have had an affect on at least one Shia insurgent cell operating in the province.

United States Forces – Iraq, Private Security Details and other foreign interests will continue to be targeted with Improvised Explosive Device attacks, in particular along the main and arterial supply routes. An Improvised Explosive Device attack against a civilian truck south of Nasiriyah on 01 August is likely to have been intended for a passing United States Forces patrol.

National Overview

On 2 August President Obama affirmed that the U.S. combat troops would leave Iraq at the end of the month, though he noted that a reduced U.S. presence of 50,000 troops will remain in Iraq under a less military guise.  These troops will make up a transitional force until the final U.S. withdrawal at the end of 2011.

In many parts of Iraq, the local security forces are already operating in a post-U.S. mode and some have done so for years already. In Basrah, the style of security is well-organized, visible and heavy-handed, reflecting the importance of the area to key federal decision-makers. In Baghdad, security forces are lowering their levels of activity, reflecting the fact that it is unrealistic to expect Surge-era levels of security operations to be maintained year after year, particularly in light of a reduced U.S. role.

The U.S. military and the Iraqi government have both stated that national levels of violence have not increased.  The Ministry of Health stated on 2 August that 335 Iraqis had been killed in violent attacks in July, a number that is consistent with figures from the beginning of the year.  Initially the Iraqi government released findings that saw a sharp increase in the number of deaths in July to 535.  The American forces disputed this figure, instead providing a modest figure of 216 Iraqi deaths, in addition to the death of one U.S. soldier.  The integrity of both sets of figures is questionable.  The U.S. rarely announces civilian casualty statistics and their findings are consistently lower than those of the Iraqi administration, it is possible that this reflects U.S. desire to project stability in order to ease their withdrawal.  On the other hand, the Iraqi government’s figures could be inaccurate due to administrative inefficiency.

Perhaps the main dark cloud on the horizon is the rising number of attacks against the Sunni Arab Sons of Iraq, who are facing pressure from both a government disarmament drive and a fierce insurgent campaign targeting the U.S. recruited police auxiliaries. The summer and autumn will probably see a slow-burning struggle between the Sons of Iraq and their adversaries, both Al-Qaeda in Iraq and aggrieved nationalist militants with scores to settle with their erstwhile allies. If the latter groups can defeat the Sons of Iraq in their own neighbourhoods, there will likely be a minor upswing in insurgent activity as such groups regain their safe havens inside Sunni areas and the Shia-led security forces are forced to enter such areas to heavy-handedly root out the militants.

Elections Overview

Iraq has now been five weeks without a government.  Last week’s announcement on the indefinite postponement of the next parliamentary session, which would designate the top roles of government, marks another deviation from the legal protocol.

Prime Minister Maliki’s bloc and the pan-Shiite Iraqi National Alliance continue to clash over the position of premier. Maliki is hanging on to power, hoping (with apparent growing desperation) to outlast opposition to his rule. Though the U.S. government has expressed its strong support of a nexus between Maliki and his arch-rival, Iyad Allawi of the Iraqiyyah movement, this pan-nationalist alliance remains a distant prospect. Allawi, the Iraqi National Alliance and the Kurds have each sent letters to Maliki asking him to step aside for the sake of the nation. President Talabani has begun to canvass the opinion of the federal Supreme Court on the constitutional crisis, probably as a means of increasing pressure on Maliki. With Maliki’s position looking increasingly untenable, there are three main options:

• Simple replacement. If Maliki can be convinced to “go quietly”, the main Shia coalition partners could agree on another Shiite politician to take the role. Adel Abd’al-Mahdi, current vice president and Iraqi National Alliance member, is the most commonly cited option. The Sadrist candidate, former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, is still considered an unlikely prospect.
• The “Putin” option. Maliki could agree to step aside on the condition that a fellow Da’awa Party politician becomes prime minister, effectively putting a Maliki supporter in the position. Options include Tariq al-Najem, Maliki’s chief-of-staff, or Jaafar Baqr al-Sadr, a rising Da’awah personality.
• Special arrangement. It is possible that one of the “strongmen” candidates – Maliki or Allawi – could lead the government again, but only at the head of a greatly weakened prime ministerial office. Mechanisms could include the splitting off of the prime ministerial office from a new position as the head of a national security committee. The aim would be to neuter the premier’s ability to control the security organs of the state. As Maliki caustically noted, this option would reduce the post of prime minister “to just a traffic cop” (reflecting the general disdain in Iraqi society for the ineffectual highway police).

Whichever option develops, it is clear that the first step – to elect a new president – will not occur until at least the last week of July, making government formation before Ramadan highly unlikely.

Baghdad

Baghdad’s security continues to be destabilised by regular violent attacks, though the overall incident levels remain relatively low, currently nearing the yearly low seen in late January 2010.

On 26 July Al Qaeda in Iraq Associated Movements generated headlines by detonating a Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device in the al Kindi area close to the al Arabiya TV station offices.  It has been assessed that the target of the attack was, in fact, nearby Government of Iraq offices. The bombing killed five and wounded twenty. Al Qaeda in Iraq Associated Movement elements were also believed to be responsible for a series of bombings in Shia dominated areas in Adhamiyah district that wounded sixteen people including nine Iraqi Security Force members. The bombings demonstrate Al Qaeda’s intent to provoke a reaction from the Shia community to reignite sectarian violence in Baghdad.

An inter-factional dispute amongst Shia insurgents loyal to Muqtada Al Sadr and a break away faction was believed to be the cause of several Improvised Explosive Device attacks in Sadr City on 28 July that killed fifteen people and wounded another 22.  Inter- factional clashes such as these could increase as the destabilising political vacuum is prolonged.

The number of Indirect Fire attacks on the International Zone has increased dramatically during July.  Six Indirect Fire attacks have been recorded targeting the Zone, for example, the attack aimed against the U.S. Embassy on 22 July that resulted in the deaths of three U.S. security personnel.  In comparison to the attacks in July, May and June 2010 saw no Indirect Fire attacks against the Green Zone.  There were three ineffective Indirect Fire attacks in this reporting period, all of which originated from Shia areas in the south and east of the city.  Indirect Fire attacks on the International Zone are expected to continue at their current elevated rate as insurgents seek to target U.S. forces as they drawdown.

Basra Province

On 30 July, Basra COB was attacked with nine rockets impacting outside the northern perimeter, with the closest Point of Impact situated three kilometers from the base.  This brings the total number of Indirect Fire attacks for the month of July to five, making it the busiest month on record (records begin post Operation Charge of the Knights, March 2008). This is also the highest number of rockets fired in one go, surpassing the 26 May 2009 attack where seven 107mm rockets were launched and three were found on the rails in the Qarmat Ali area. Iraqi Security Forces quickly arrested five men in connection with the attack. It is assessed that the number of rockets available to insurgents has increased to coincide with the withdrawal of U.S. Forces to give the appearance of U.S. troops retreating under fire.

This activity is not unique to Basra, U.S. bases in neighbouring provinces have also been targeted after periods of inactivity.  Forward Operating Base Gary Owen in al Amarah was targeted with Indirect Fire on 26 July, the first time since April that it has been targeted.

National Overview

The total number of hostile incidents reported nationally was 117, an increase of 9 from the previous reporting period. The number of incidents in the south central region increased again, the third consecutive rise. Elsewhere the number of incidents was within the normally expected levels; however the lethality of the attacks increased in some areas.

In Baghdad, Concerned Local Citizens and Iraqi Security Forces members were the victims of a mass casualty suicide attack. A further mass casualty attack was avoided when Iraqi Security Forces discovered a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device in the south of the city. The north central was not as fortunate as a series of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices resulted in dozens of casualties. Explosively Formed Projectiles were targeted at US Forces and Iraqi Army in Baghdad and Basra, resulting in the death of an Iraqi soldier.

The south central and south east regions saw a rise in hostile incidents for the third consecutive week. US Forces were the primary target and will probably remain so until the planned drawdown. The U.S. has approximately 70,000 troops in Iraq and plans to cut that number to 50,000 by the end of August 2010, ahead of a full withdrawal by 2012. In the west there was a continuation in attacks aimed at local nationals linked to the Government of Iraq. Infrastructure was also targeted again in an attempt by AQIZ to undermine the ability of the Government of Iraq to provide basic services.

Elections Overview

Another week has gone passed with no end to the political impasse. On 27 July Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamist-led coalition announced that a parliament session scheduled for Tuesday had been cancelled as discussions faltered over the formation of a new government. Haider al-Jorani, an MP from the State of Law coalition, said the session aimed at discussing the makeup of a new government had been postponed indefinitely. The session was due to elect a speaker of the house and a President. This delay does not come as a surprise as members of the State of Law coalition had been quoted in the media speaking negatively about the prospects for progress earlier in the week.

Ahead of the suspended session the Kurdistan Blocs’ Coalition had said that there was no way the Kurds would accept the post of the speaker of parliament as they are expecting the presidential post. The Kurds currently hold the role of President, however, they are probably punching above their weight and it would be unrealistic for them to expect a candidate from al Iraqiya or State of Law to take up what is seen as a lesser role in order to accommodate the Kurds who polled a much lower number of seats (57) in the national elections.
On 27 July the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen arrived in Baghdad to meet with Nuri al Maliki, Jalal Talibani and General Ray Odierno. In a press conference Mullen stated the progress made in securing Iraq since 2007 represented “a truly stunning achievement.” However, in private Mullen is likely be express concerns regarding the failure to form a Government and the affect this is having on the security situation.
Baghdad

Officially reported incidents in Baghdad increased slightly from 28 to 31 during the reporting period.

A mass casualty suicide bombing against an Iraqi Security Forces target was the first of two headline grabbing events during the reporting period. The number of Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Device attacks increased during this reporting period, indicating that insurgents have been re-supplied following large cache finds several weeks ago. Most of these attacks targeted off duty Iraqi Security Forces and Government of Iraq employees and were assessed to have been perpetrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq associated Movements. Iraqi Security Forces finds and Explosive Ordnance Disposal action successfully limited the number of effective hostile incidents during the reporting period, of note was the find of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device near an Iraqi Army check point in the south of the city.

The number of Indirect Fire attacks on the International Zone increased, with two attacks during the reporting period, making it the sixth such attack in July. The second headline incident was the successful Indirect Fire targeting of the US Embassy grounds, causing several injuries. Three foreign security contractors were killed in one of the blasts. Forward Operating Base Falcon in southern Baghdad was also targeted. It is assessed that these attacks are being launched by Shia’a insurgents, and are likely to continue against US personnel locations in the lead up to the September military draw down, as insurgents seek to paint a picture of US troops retreating under fire. The number of Explosively Formed Projectile incidents was notable, with two successful attacks and two finds in the north of the city. Explosively Formed Projectiles are traditionally Shia’a weapons and the increase in these attacks over the last two weeks fits the assessment that Shia’a insurgents will increase attacks against US Forces in the short term. Al Qaeda in Iraq Associated Movements targeting of Iraqi Security Forces and Government of Iraq related personnel will continue.

Basra Province

Incidents numbers in the south east region increased slightly from six to seven during this reporting period, with five of the incidents occurring in Basra.

A fourth Indirect Fire attack against Basra Contingency Operating Base in 20 days made July the busiest month of the year so far. Since mid May the longest period of time without an Indirect Fire attack has been 14 days. The previous Indirect Fire attack against the Contingency Operating Base was on 13 July, so an attack was expected sometime before 27 July. Another Explosively Formed Projectile attack targeted US Forces south west of Basra City on route Topeka. Attacks in this area are rare; the last attack close to this location was in March. It is assessed that the number of attacks on US Forces (in particular Indirect Fire) will increase as the US Forces draw down date comes closer. This assessment is in line with other areas where the Indirect Fire attacks on US locations have increased.

There may be an increase in the volume of traffic on the Main Supply Routes in the coming days as Shia’a pilgrims make their way to Karbala for the Shabaniyah festival. Local sources indicate that routes Hexagon and Tampa will be busy going west and may attract the potential for problems.

National Overview

Nationally recorded incident levels stayed at 108 this week, a level consistent with the most reporting periods throughout the year. There was little variation in week on week incident numbers for each of the regions.

The north central and Baghdad regions continued to account for the majority of hostile incidents. The north central area experienced 36 hostile incidents, consistent with previous reporting periods. The number of hostile incidents in Baghdad was similar to the previous reporting period at 28.

The highest impact attack occurred on 18 July when a suicide bomber detonated an explosive vest, killing at least 48 members of Concerned Local Citizens and Iraqi Security Forces personnel as they queued for their wages in a Sunni district of Baghdad. Despite improvements in security that has seen a reduction in ‘spectacular’ attacks, al Queada in Iraq and their associated movements continue to perpetrate such attacks from time to time, providing them with much needed publicity.

The north and north central areas were very active again with Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul being targeted with hand grenades and suicide vests amongst the methods of attack. A suicide car bomb was used to target a Private Security Company convoy on 19 July in Mosul. US bases in Balad and Kirkuk received a higher proportion of indirect fire attacks than usual and elsewhere in the region Concerned Local Citizen personnel and their families were targeted with assassination and intimidation attacks.

Al Qaeda in Iraq and their associated movements continued to attempt to regain influence in the western region by conducting attacks in the Fallujah, Ramadi and Hit areas with small arms fire and under vehicle improvised explosive devices.

Assassination attacks will continue to destabilise security, as politicians, security force officials and other pro-government forces and government associates are targeted.

Elections Overview

On 18 July the Head of al-Iraqiya list, Iyad Allawi, and the Head of Sadr Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, met in the Syrian capital Damascus to discuss ways of progressing the Government forming process. Sources in the Sadrist movement have spoken positively of the meeting and made it clear that Allawi is far more open to negotiations on key Government posts that Prime Minister Maliki. This meeting may have been designed by both the al Iraqiya list and Iraqi National Alliance as a way of provoking action from the State of Law Party. An alliance between the Iraqi National Alliance and al Iraqiya is certainly the most unlikely of the possible alliances.

Following on from the Damascus meetings it was reported that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki would hold a meeting on the afternoon of 20 July with Head of al-Iraqiya List Iyad Allawi to discuss ways of solving the current political crisis, “The meeting came in response to an invitation from al-Maliki in an attempt to solve the current crisis among political blocs,” a source told an Iraqi news agency. The meeting is probably an indication that al Maliki is worried about being sidelined and may force him to be more flexible in negotiations.

Meanwhile the spectre of an election re run has been raised again. The possibility of another election was raised by the Kurdish Alliance some weeks ago, and it has been brought up again by Iraqi Member of Parliament Jamal Al-Din.
“This long delay in forming a government will make the likelihood of United Nations intervention considerable, particularly that Iraq is still under its authority,” he said.

“A small number of representatives of the political blocs deputies have confiscated the right of the other MPs to participate in the political process, in order to overcome the difficulties and to demonstrate the flexibility in the negotiations,” Jamal Al-Din added.

A new election is deemed as unlikely as there is little appetite for it amongst ordinary Iraqi’s. Also, security around such an event would be tough given that US Forces are now drawing down. It seems that the political horse training is likely to enter yet another week with little immediate prospect of a solution.

Baghdad

Incident levels were relatively low a the start of the week with USF-I taking the brunt of attacks in the form of IEDs on route Tampa and IDF attacks against FOB Falcon. Hostile incidents soon returned to normal levels helped in part by a return to form from Shia’a insurgents who were subdued last week as the 7th Imam pilgrimage took place. There were three EFP strikes against USF-I patrols during the week, all attributed to Shia’a groupings.

Sunni insurgents continued harassment and intimidation attacks against off duty ISF and GoI targets, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries, most notably a SAF and IED attack that killed five members of an IPS officer’s family. A VBIED attack using a bicycle was effectively targeted in Mahmudiyah resulting in one fatality and several injuries.
On 18 July a suicide bomber detonated an explosive vest, killing at least 48 members of Concerned Local Citizens and Iraqi Security Forces personnel as they queued for their wages in a Sunni district of Baghdad.

The International Zone was ineffectively targeted with indirect fire on 17 July and was probably the work of Shia’a insurgents. Attacks of this nature rarely inflict significant damage or casualties and perpetrated for the symbolic value that the International Zone holds.

Basra Province

Incident numbers in the south east region increased slightly from five to six during this reporting period, with four of the incidents occurring in Basra, which is in line with expectations.

On 15 July at approximately 0830hrs, a Private Security Company was effectively targeted with an explosively formed projectile on route Tampa, close to the junction with route Atlanta. The device damaged the vehicle but did not cause any serious injuries. There have been four roadside bomb attacks against Private Security Company convoys on a 4km stretch of Tampa going north from the Atlanta/Tampa checkpoint since May. There is no concrete evidence that insurgents are specifically targeting Private Security Companies, however, the statistics for this small stretch of highway give food for thought.

There was an improvised explosive device found on route Minden to the east of Basra City, on 17 July and followed an increased threat warning for the area. There have only been two attacks on route Minden this year, both against US Forces. It would seem that insurgents are looking to up the tempo of attacks against US Forces in this previously quiet area.

On 19 July at approximately 2100hrs, an improvised explosive device detonated in Basra City. The target of the attack is unknown; however, most night time attacks in the city target US Forces.

On 20 July a Private Security Company escorting a convoy from the Kuwaiti border reported being attacked with small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades in a desolate area 20km north of the border. This attack does not fit Shia’a insurgent modus operandi and is assessed to have been criminal activity, perhaps an attempted hi-jacking.

National Overview

Nationally recorded incident levels saw an increase from 85 to 108 in the reporting period. The main reason for the increase was Sunni insurgent targeting of Shia pilgrims en route to the Moussa Kadhim shrine in Baghdad.

The north central and Baghdad regions continued to account for the majority of hostile incidents.  Baghdad saw a minor rise in hostile incidents from 29 to 30, although the intent to inflict further damage was evidenced by a large number of Improvised Explosive Device finds in the city during the Shia pilgrimage. The north central region saw a return to its usual operational tempo with incidents rising from 26 to 36.

The highest impact attack occurred on 07 July when a suicide bomber detonated a belt of explosives, killing at least 30 Iraqi Shi’ite pilgrims en route to the Moussa Kadhim Shrine.  The attack was reminiscent of the 2005 bomb threat against a nearby bridge that resulted in a stampede that killed 1,000 pilgrims.  Intensified security measures to protect the pilgrimage, such as a city wide ban on bicycles and motorcycles, were reinforced by 200,000 police and soldiers in the city.

Targeting religious ceremonies is a popular method of insurgent attack as the large crowds provide a window of opportunity to inflict wide scale civilian casualties whilst diminishing the authority of the national security forces.  Sectarian motivated attacks such as these illustrate the goal of Al Qaeda and its affiliates to exacerbate divisions in Iraq to obstruct progress towards stability.  The current period of political uncertainty coupled with the fast approaching drawdown of the United States Forces could see insurgents launch similar large scale attacks against financial, political and infrastructure targets.  Assassination attacks will continue to destabilise security, as politicians, security force officials and other pro-government forces and government associates are targeted.

Elections Overview

The drawn out negotiations to fill the top posts of Iraq’s government are a sign of the resilience of the system of ‘muhasisa’ or quotas, as each sect seeks to assert its right to allocated positions of authority. Iraq’s politicians profess to want to escape the Lebanon style quota system but the precedent has been set for a Shiite Arab prime minister, a Kurd President and a Sunni Arab speaker of Parliament.  The Sunni population have perceived their allocation of the speaker of Parliament as a ‘raw deal’ as this position wields the least influence.  Many Sunnis pledged support to Iraqiya’s Iyad Allawi in the elections though his nomination, as a Shiite, to the position of prime minister would not see their sect represented.  In the event of an alliance between Allawi’s bloc and the Shiite State of Law two of the top positions could be occupied by Shiite leaders, though this outcome would receive widespread objection.  Politicians outside Iraqiya have conceded that allowing Allawi to take up the position of Prime Minister would be problematic as it would disrupt the sectarian balance laid out in the quota system.

United States Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Iraq last week prompted reports of a new alliance between the seemingly opposed Iraqiya and State of Law blocs.  The two leaders Maliki and Allawi had been seen to be objectionable to negotiations, with Allawi claiming that his foe was behind assassination attempts against him and his peers.  Meetings between the two blocs seem to have improved though key representatives of both blocs were keen to dismiss any suggestions of a new State of Law – Iraqiya government.  The official commentary has reported that daily meetings between the two leaders have focused on ameliorating relations to promote inclusion, rather than a formal agreement.  Allawi’s media advisor, Raheem al-Shammari confirmed the lack of progress by stating, “They have not yet made any breakthrough on the main controversial issue related to the Prime Minister’s position.  Iraqiya still insist that we have the right to form the new government.”

The State of Law have been cautious not to denounce their prior agreement with the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) though relations between them appear to have cooled since Biden’s unofficial visit to Iraq.  However elements of the Iraqi National Alliance, notably the Sadrist Bloc, make difficult allies for the State of Law due to their adamant rejection of both American influence on Iraq and Maliki’s claims to another term as Prime Minister and their strong ties to Iran.  Iran will seek to prolong the period of uncomfortable limbo in Iraq as this satisfies the aim of disrupting the American military withdrawal, whilst lending Iran a stronger bargaining card with which to defend its nuclear arsenal.

On Monday 12 July, the leaders of the main blocs postponed the second session of parliament as they were no closer to resolving the debate over the top roles in parliament.  Intense wrangling and backroom deals are likely to continue as each faction seeks to assert their candidates for the positions.  Analysts predict that the divvying up of positions of power in government will mean, as a former ambassador to Iraq said, “There will be a little something for everybody,” but a good deal for Iraqis will remain elusive as the arrangement will lack functionality.

Baghdad

Officially reported incidents in Baghdad increased by one incident during the reporting period, although the number of civilian casualties rose significantly largely due to the number of attacks on Shia pilgrims between 06 – 08 July. The intensified Iraqi Security Force presence in order to secure the routes led to many Improvised Explosive Device finds, which capped the number of casualties.

Over a three day period, 06, 07 and 08 July, Shia pilgrims made their way through Baghdad to the Moussa Kadhim shrine, for the annual commemoration of the Saint’s death.  A significant number of pilgrims were injured by Indirect Fire and Improvised Explosive Devices on 06 July, while four Improvised Explosive Devices, including a suicide vest attack, killed 35 on 07 July and on 08 July, the final day of the festival, 22 were killed in five Improvised Explosive Device and Small Arms Fire attacks.

The firing point for the Indirect Fire attack on the International Zone on 05 July that followed Sadrist demonstrations in Kufa has been located in Sadr City.  Sadrist militants are likely to continue their protests if they do not feel they are adequately represented in Iraq’s new government.

Open source reporting claims that a western Private Security Company opened fire on an Iraqi vehicle on Route Irish, close to Baghdad International Airport on 08 July. Regardless of the circumstances this incident will only serve to increase negative sentiment towards Private Security Companies in Baghdad.

It is assessed that the next reporting period will see similar levels of hostile activity though with fewer casualties, as insurgent groups return to attacking Iraqi Security Forces, United States Forces – Iraq and government associated targets.

Basra Province

There were only four officially recorded hostile incidents in Basra during the reporting period, none of which were directed at Private Security Companies.

U.S. Forces-Iraq patrols have been attacked twice during the period; the first attack was an Improvised Explosive Device attack in the west of the city on 09 July, which was followed on 12 July by another Improvised Explosive Device attack, this time on route Minden, to the east of the city – only the second attack on this route all year.

Insurgents have continued to attack the Basra Contingency Operating Base with Indirect Fire, launching an effective salvo on 09 July that destroyed a US accommodation block and injured 35.  This operation was unique as the rockets were fired from 17km west of the Contingency Operating Base, a much greater distance than other recent Indirect Fire attacks.  It remains to be seen whether the success of the attack is due to an enhanced capability or pure luck.

A further Indirect Fire attack was carried out against the Contingency Operating Base on 13 July during the early hours.  Two 122mm rockets were fired, the first landing outside of the Contingency Operating Base and the second close to Delta gate, one of the main entry/exit points to the Contingency Operating Base.  There was no significant damage or casualties.  There is no clear reason for the increase in tempo of these attacks as there has been no apparent provocation from the U.S. Forces-Iraq or Iraq Security Forces-I.  As the date for the withdrawal of U.S. troops moves closer it is possible that the number attacks against such targets will increase in order to create an illusion of US troops withdrawing under fire.

There are currently two extant threats, one a province wide Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device threat and another which suggests a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device will attempt an attack on Basra COB/airport sometime between 13 and 17 July.

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices are not the weapon of choice for militant Shia’a groups, so any such attack would likely be the work of AQIZ/Sunni insurgents. The last Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device attack in Basra was on 10 May 10 and was assessed as an AQIZ/Sunni insurgent attack aimed at stirring up ethnic tensions.  Due to the strict security measures implemented at the Contingency Operating Base it would be unwise to risk compromise of a ‘spectacular’ weapon like a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device.  An attack against a lesser defended target in the city would be an easier option; however, this threat has to be taken seriously.

National Overview

It is estimated that 150 key figures including politicians, civil servants, tribal chiefs, police officers, Sunni clerics and members of the Sahwa militia (Awakening Council) have been assassinated throughout Iraq since the election on 07 March. This is a notably high incidence of targeted killings and highlights the current period of political instability. Uncertainty in the political arena has reflected in the security of the country, as assassination attacks are carried out on a basis of political point scoring and score settling. The 05 July suicide bomb attack on the provincial government building in Ramadi that is estimated to have killed four civilians and wounded 23 is indicative of this trend. Analysts and politicians have alluded to a tendency amongst political factions to use security as a political bargaining tool as, for instance, Maliki utilises a rhetoric of past security gains to cement his position.

Several members of Iraqiya have been killed by assassination attacks since the election, using silenced weapons and ‘sticky bombs’ (Under Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices). Only on 02 July Abdulkarim Hattab, an Iraqiya member, was targeted with an explosive charge against his vehicle in western Baghdad but was unharmed. Iraqiya have listed a number of potential suspects for these attacks, but the current political climate of uncertainty has increased the number of possible enemies, making it harder to discern who is responsible. Allawi’s bloc suspect Iran of meddling in the political affairs of Iraq and believe this could have extended to organising targeted attacks through their Shiite militia allies, due to their desire to limit the political strength of Iraqiya in order to promote Shiite interests.

Sunni extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQIM) are likely to be carrying out assassination attacks to destablise Iraq whilst punishing compliant Sunnis for supporting Iraqiya. External pressure from influential countries such as America to resolve the political impasse is mounting and as such Al Qaeda and its affiliates will attempt to block any progress towards stability by launching intimidation attacks and large scale attacks, like those seen at the Central Bank and the Investment Bank in Baghdad. Institutions that represent foreign investment and economic hubs could witness more targeted attacks as will Iraq’s infrastructure as insurgents persist in their goal of weakening Iraq to prevent any positive development. The attack on a mobile phone tower in Jalawlaa, Diyala on 02 July by gunmen, causing it to blow up thus disrupting the network, is a good example of this.

In June, the number of civilian casualties fell for the first time since the election in March. In total 204 civilians were killed last month, dropping from 275 civilian killed in May; a figure that is significantly lower than that of June 2009 when 373 civilians were killed. This yearly comparison is in line with an observed decline in the levels of violence since the height of the sectarian war in 2006/2007 though it does not detract from the daily occurrence of bomb and assassination attacks. Analysts fear that the consolidation of political rule, predicted to begin after Ramadan in September, will not bring with it the security and provision of services that Iraqis desperately need. The remaining “hardcore” of the insurgency will be tough to wipe out, especially as United States Forces begin to drawdown and re-focus their energies in the theatre of Afghanistan.

Elections Overview

Iraqiya’s Allawi has used the threat of assassination attacks against his list to argue that they are the virtuous option for the electorate amidst corrupt parties, who they publicly hold responsible for the attacks. Maliki’s supporters have countered Allawi’s claims of their involvement in assassination attacks by suggesting that he is using the rash of attacks to alleviate his bloc’s position in the struggle to form a government, whilst seeking to diminish the Shiite coalition’s viability. It is difficult to decipher the truth as the political bargaining intensifies and politicians utilise ‘dirty tricks’ to secure their role in the future government.

The power struggle for the top roles in government has persisted as the different factions within the new Shiite “Unity” Coalition, notably the Sadrist bloc and Maliki’s State of Law, stake their claims. The Sadrist bloc is insisting that Ibrahim Al-Jaafari take up the role of Prime Minister as Maliki refuses to give up his post. An increase in meetings between Allawi and Maliki has been seen as an attempt by Maliki to pressure the Sadrist Bloc into conceding to his rule, as his list achieved nearly as many votes as Iraqiya, lending it leverage with which to negotiate.

United States Vice President Joe Biden visited Iraq last week to encourage the different blocs to ease negotiations, reminding them of the importance of promoting inclusion of all factions and of seating the new government swiftly. Following meetings with Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, Prime Minister Maliki and Iraqiya leader Allawi, Biden announced, “Iraqiya, State of Law, Iraq National Alliance, the Kurdistan Alliance all are going to have to play a meaningful role in this new government for it to work.” This statement has prompted analysts to note a potential shift in focus from facilitating an alliance between the two largest Shiite blocs to enabling a Maliki – Allawi government, the latter of which would be favourable to the United States interests.

The Sadrist bloc rejects any involvement of foreign forces in national affairs and urged Iraqi politicians not to cooperate with Biden and other United States officials. This isolationist stance will not help the Sadrists bid for government as America is wary of Iran’s influence in Iraq and thus will be keen to see a new government that excludes Tehran sympathisers. Moqtadr al-Sadr displayed his awareness of the risk of losing out to secular Iraqiya as he warned, “I advise Allawi and Maliki not to allow the occupier to intervene.” The United States administration has insisted that it is not forcing its preferred outcome of the negotiations upon the leaders, rather it is pressing for the suppression of individual agendas in order to achieve a viable solution for Iraqis. Whether the United States’ influence will encourage the formation of a coalition between the State of Law Alliance and Iraqiya or not remains to be seen, as any fixed outcome remains elusive.

Baghdad

Baghdad’s security was blighted by a spate of assassination attacks, mainly concentrated in the south of the City, in keeping with the national trend of targeting Sahwa members, military and police officials, civil servants and politicians. On 02 July an Improvised Explosive Device struck a Sahwa headquarters in the southern area of al-Be’ietha, Doura. One Sahwa member was killed and nine others were wounded, among whom was the Sahwa forces commander in Doura, Sheikh Mustaf al-Juburi. Police were also targeted in Doura at a checkpoint on 01 July when unknown gunmen fired silenced pistols, killing two federal officers instantly.

At 10:00 on 05 July the United States Embassy was targeted with two mortar shells, it is thought this incident could be in reaction to Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Iraq. The Green Zone also witnessed an Indirect Fire attack using two kaytusha rockets; one caused heavy damage whilst the other failed to detonate.

The closure of Joint Services Station War Eagle this month could see a further increase in insurgent Indirect Fire attacks on Camp Taji as it would become the most accessible target in terms of proximity. Indirect Fire attacks are expected to take place during the next full moon phase and for the next 30 days, most likely between the hours of 18:00 and 06:00. The threat levels for kidnapping and Indirect Fire (IDF) against the Taji base remain high in accordance with reports of insurgent movements nearby.

Three Improvised Explosive Devices were reported near Taji in this reporting period. One suspected Al-Qaeda attack to the north of Taji targeted the Iraqi Army, another found and cleared device in the south was reported to be a ‘sticky bomb’ and a further third device attached to a bicycle was found and cleared in south east Taji.

Basra Province

Incident levels remained low in Basra province though foreign forces continued to be subject to attacks. On 02 July a United States Forces patrol was targeted with an Improvised Explosive Device on the east of cloverleaf intersection in the north of the city. On 03 July Basra Contingency Operating Base was ineffectively targeted with Indirect Fire.

A Private Security Company reported an explosively formed projectile detonation on route Sioux Falls to the north west of Um Qasr and another explosively formed projectile detonated on a section of route Tampa south. It remains unclear as to whether Private Security Companies are being specifically targeted by insurgents, or if they are suffering collateral damage from Improvised Explosive Device / Explosively Formed Projectile incidents more often due to the increase in Private Security Company traffic on the Main Supply Routes. Further attacks can be expected along the Main Supply Routes to the west and south of the City.

There were no further civil disturbances due to electricity shortages in Basra City during the review period and reports suggest that power capacity in the City has improved recently due to the removal of illegal power lines.

US Forces and Iraq Security Forces and their associates will continue to be targeted by insurgent elements with Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Projectile attacks on Main Supply Routes and Indirect Fire attacks against the Basra Contingency Operating Base.

National Overview

There were 105 incidents reported nationally between 20 – 26 June showing a small decrease in the level of incidents from the previous week when 123 were officially reported. The number of Explosively Formed Projectiles used in that period dropped from eight to two, both of which occurred in Basra, targeting a Private Security Company and a United States Forces – Iraq patrol. In the review period, the north central region saw the most reported incidents, increasing slightly from 37 to 40.

Iraqi Security Forces continue to develop despite the partial funding freeze imposed on security spending by the Ministry of Finance. Key challenges include the constrained Iraqi government budget; poor planning and procurement capacity and limited ministerial transparency and capability. Iraqi Security Forces do not show any signs of fracturing along ethnic or sectarian lines and continue to make progress in diversifying the composition of units.

An ongoing concern is the attempted disarmament of the Sons of Iraq militias (the Concerned Local Citizens). This issue is thought to be a serious risk to local security conditions in some parts of Baghdad, eastern Anbar, Babil, plus the provinces immediately north of Baghdad (Diyala and Salah al-Din). Though not a widespread phenomenon yet, there is potential for anti-government resistance to disarmament and a resultant shift of sympathies by Sunni militiamen back to anti-government forces.

Elections Overview

When the new Iraqi parliament convened for the first time on 14 June, the session was left open in an attempt to procedurally stall the process of government formation. The move was choreographed by the core of the emergent “unity government” – Prime Minister Maliki’s bloc, the pan-Shiite Iraqi National Alliance and the Kurds.

The delay will provide these factions with more time to complete their negotiations regarding the prime ministerial position and the dispensation of ministerial portfolios. This gambit worked in 2006, when the opening session of parliament lasted for 60 days. When the session finally closed in May 2006, most of the issues had been agreed and the other milestones on the government formation track were met in quick succession. This is probably how the process will unfold this year as well. It may be difficult to complete all negotiations before the start of Ramadan around 11 August, making it possible that there will be no government before the time Ramadan ends in mid-September.

Prime Minister Maliki continues to seek re-nomination for the premiership through his Shia allies and the Kurds. His ostensible allies, the Iraqi National Alliance, continue to seek to unseat him and replace him with Iraqi National Alliance politician Adel Abd’al-Mahdi. Maliki’s strategy is to point to his cohesive bloc of 89 State of Law list members and his very high personal voting tally to highlight his credentials, whilst using his remaining time in government to offer inducements to potential allies and to string out the government formation process to outlast his adversaries.

Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiyya movement appears to be fragmenting and weakening, with elements entering into dialogue with Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance over ministerial positions. Iraqiyya negotiators have agreed to participate in a “national partnership government.” Allawi’s group are unlikely to be an “insider” partner in the government, and will instead be splintered, with some elements falling outside the government and others given ministerial positions to buy them off.

On 29 June, Prime Minister Maliki and former Prime Minister Allawi met for a second time, though no further information was forthcoming as to the progress on the formation of the next government. It is in both parties interest to seek cooperation; for Maliki it could win back the confidence of the Sunni electorate thus giving his unity government more credence and for Allawi it could offer him proper inclusion in the government through the designation of key roles for him and other key Iraqiya members. However, the testing relationship between the two leaders could jeopardise any future deals.

Baghdad

The Islamic State of Iraq, an Iraqi offshoot of Al Qaeda, has claimed responsibility for the simultaneous double Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device outside the Trade Bank of Iraq in the Mansur district. Open sources quoted a spokesman for the group mocking the weak security surrounding the area, suggesting that the bank was targeted in order to de-legitimise the government by demonstrating its inability to protect or maintain core services. A similar motive can be observed in recent attacks on electricity infrastructure across Iraq. The bank’s association with efforts to attract foreign investment are also thought made it an appealing target for insurgents who are vehemently opposed to such endeavours.

At Camp Taji the threat levels for kidnapping and Indirect Fire remained high in accordance with reports of insurgent movements near Taji. On 26 June an Indirect Fire Attack using 107mm rockets impacted four times on the base though no casualties were reported. The Iraqi Army Quick Response Force recovered four 107mm rockets and nine Improvised Rocket Launchers at the launching site south east from Taji.

No attacks were reported against Private Security Details and Route Irish and the International Zone and Baghdad airport did not witness any incidents. There were no officially recorded EFP attacks in the capital (although there was an ineffective Explosively Formed Projectile attack against USFI in the Abu Ghraib area).

Basra Province

There were two attacks against United States Forces Iraq patrols, the first took place on 24 June on Route Topeka, the second on 25 June when an Explosively Formed Projectile was used in the north of the city; this is only the second Explosively Formed Projectile attack in the city this year.

Local nationals continued to demonstrate against the government following on from last week’s protest about the dire lack of electricity. Security operations in the City were stepped up and the demonstrations passed without incident. These rallies could continue into next week, though they are likely to die down now that the resignation of the Electricity Minister, Karim Wahid, has been accepted.

Local reporting has stated that the Sadrist militia, the Mahdi Army, have been attempting to bring people onto the streets in protest against the government, although their efforts are proving unsuccessful at present. This move by the Sadrist militia is likely to be part of the wider political strategy to undermine Prime Minister Maliki and force him to stand aside.

US Forces and Iraq Security Forces and their associates will continue to be targeted by insurgent elements with Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Projectile attacks on Main Supply Routes and Indirect Fire attacks against the Basra Contingency Operating Base.

National Overview

The number of incidents reported nationally showed a slight decrease from 145 last week to 123 incidents this week.  Marked fluctuations in incident levels have become characteristic of the security picture in 2010 as security force initiatives reach the more difficult stage of trying to uproot the foundation of insurgent groups in Iraq.

A slight rise in the use of Explosively Formed Projectiles (EFP’s) was recorded this week, up to eight from five last week. Out of the eight detonations country wide, seven occurred in the Baghdad area and one in the South Central region.  There were no officially reported Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) in Baghdad during the review period, with the majority of VBIED attacks taking place in the north, which saw the biggest increase in overall activity, with 16 reported incidents compared to six for the previous week. These levels are still comparatively low when compared to the north central region, though it is assessed that there is an enduring residual threat in the province of Ninevah which encompasses Al-Qaeda strongholds such as the village of Amil in Mosul.  Security gains in hotspots like this will be harder to attain as local communities remain fearful of insurgent threats and wary of the combined security forces operational efficacy.

The north central region saw a big decrease in officially reported incidents, going from 62 last week to 37 this week, dropping by almost half.  Baghdad saw a drop in officially reported incidents from 54 to 42.  Both the north central region and the capital city are likely to remain the focus of insurgent efforts, though recent incidents do not suggest an increase in the level of sophistication of attacks.

The spate of assassination attacks indicate that Iraq is witnessing a period of score settling among different factions, particularly between the anti-Al Qaeda Sahwa militia and Al-Qaeda insurgents.  The ready availability of weaponry and the weakness of the federal administration will likely see this period of unsettling incidents extended over the next few months.  It is worth noting that these incidents are not explicitly linked to the current political situation and therefore will not necessarily decline following the conclusion of the current parliamentary negotiations.  The increase in criminal activity, witnessed again this week with a second attack on a bank in Baghdad on 20 June is likely to continue as insurgents seek to acquire alternative funding whilst destabilising Iraq’s fragile security.

Elections Overview

Political negotiations have been lacking in progress during the review period as parliamentary wrangling over the key posts, notably that of Prime Minister, remains fraught as the main factions struggle to reach a compromise.  The effect of this extended period of political limbo has been felt throughout the country as the electorate suffer sweltering heat and a lack of basic services.

The south and south central regions have witnessed popular protests against the lack of electricity in particular in Basra where residents are forced to endure up to twenty hours without electricity.  At least one protestor was reportedly shot dead by police forces responding to the unrest in Basra on 19 June.  Heavy handed police treatment of protestors coupled with neglect at the hands of parliamentary representatives has angered Iraqi civilians who have begun to single out ministers for accountability.  The electricity minister Karim Waheed has handed in his resignation though Al-Maliki has yet to accept it, stating frankly that Iraq could be in for another two years of limited electricity supply and Waheed has the level of experience required to tackle the problem.

Iraq’s Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari summarised the public mood towards the political difficulties by saying, “People are tired of the lack of services, lack of action, and all this debate on television about government formation and positions.  The public sense is one of anger and tiredness.”  Many Iraqis view the new “Super Shiite coalition” with suspicion as they cite Iranian influence as well as an abandonment of the secular vision epitomised by Iraqiya for a religious alliance urged on by the Shiite cleric Ayatollah Al Sistani.  Iraqiya leader Allawi has not alleviated these concerns, as he has publicly spoken about the threat of assassination attempts against him, supposedly verified by American sources, which he claimed could be sponsored by Al-Maliki’s allies.  These political disputes are exacerbating public discontent whilst providing insurgents with a window of opportunity to reassert their strength by carrying out headline grabbing attacks.

Baghdad

The capital city witnessed another attack on a bank during the review period as twin car bombs exploded in a car park of a private bank in central Baghdad on 20 June killing at least six people and wounding 42.  The building housing the bank was heavily damaged in the blasts and two of the dead were police officers guarding a nearby Interior Ministry office that issues Iraqi ID cards.   Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have reinforced security measures around potential targets of robberies such as goldsmiths and jewellers in anticipation of further criminal activity.  This perceived crime wave could be indicative of a change in insurgent tactics, techniques and procedures towards organised crime.

At Camp Taji the threat levels for kidnapping and Indirect Fire (IDF) remained high in accordance with reports of insurgent movements near Taji and the area witnessed two Small Arms Fire (SAF) attacks.

No attacks were reported against Private Security Details and Route Irish and the International Zone and Baghdad airport did not witness any incidents.  There were no officially recorded EFP attacks in the capital (although there was an ineffective EFP attack against USFI in the Abu Ghraib area).

Basra Province

The level of security remained stable in Basra province with only a few incidents reported this week.  There was however a significant increase in civil unrest as Basrawis expressed their dissatisfaction with the provision of basic services, in particular at the dire level of electricity supply as temperatures rose to around 130 degrees Fahrenheit.  The death of two protestors further antagonized local communities who are likely to persist in their demonstrations, despite the recent resignation of the Minister of Electricity.

The head of Basrah’s provincial council, Jabber Amin, announced on 21 June that he would be pushing for greater autonomy from Iraq’s central government for Basra in an attempt to allay concerns over the neglect of local issues.  Previous efforts to achieve more independence for Basra have failed to secure enough support and Basrawis fear that the provincial council will struggle to maintain security and services without American assistance.

US Forces and Iraq Security Forces and their associates will continue to be targeted by insurgent elements with Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Projectile attacks on Main Supply Routes and Indirect Fire attacks against the Basra Contingency Operating Base.

National Overview

145 incidents were reported nationally during this reporting period showing a marked increase in the level of incidents from last week when only 92 were officially reported. A slight rise in the use of Explosively Formed Projectiles was also seen this week with four detonations country wide compared to only two last week; three out of the four Explosively Formed Projectiles targeted United States Forces Iraq’s call signs in Baghdad. The fourth incident involving an Explosively Formed Projectile was in the south central region to the north east of Diwaniyah. During the last 30 days there have been seven attacks involving Explosively Formed Projectiles and five finds of these devices.

The north central region saw a rise in incidents from 35 last week to 62 this week, almost a doubling in the number of incidents. Similarly Baghdad saw a substantial rise in the number of incidents from 36 to 54.

On 13 June roughly eight attackers raided Baghdad’s Central Bank of Iraq, after an initial bomb blast caused by five suicide bombers, a three hour gun battle ensued as the  Iraqi Security Forces tried to gain control of the situation.  Open source reporting has set the casualties from this incident at a figure between 21 and 26 with around 72, mostly civilian, injuries.  On 25 May there was a similar raid carried out on a Baghdad goldsmith, seeing fourteen civilian deaths; three civilians were killed in an attack on a gold market in southern Basra on 9 June.

This series of robberies alludes to an emerging national trend for criminal activity which analysts have suggested is a sign that insurgent groupings are seeking alternative funding, in the event of a lack of external funding.  The perceived lack of financial support could be the result of effective Iraqi Security Forces reinforcement of the borders with Syria and Iran, both previously porous to smuggling.  The gains made by the joint operations of the Iraqi Security Forces and United States Forces Iraq’s against Al-Qaeda and other armed opposition groups through the capture or killing of key leaders are thought to have presented an additional strain on resources.  Iraqi Security Forces security operations have been increasingly successful in recovering weapons caches across Iraq, reducing insurgent reserves.

Iraq’s military and police have rushed to secure banks and goldsmiths across the country fearing further attacks of this kind as their efficacy is called into question.  At the same time Iraqis are questioning the ability of their parliamentarians, as grassroots issues such as electricity supply are persistently neglected.

Elections Overview

Iraq’s new parliament convened on 14 June though the meeting was largely a matter of protocol with no significant progress made towards forming the next government.  On 10 June the two Shiite blocs announced their official alliance under the title of “the National Alliance.”  This move has marginalised the Sunni backed Iraqiya and Allawi has sought to counter this by reiteratin

g their right to form the next government, as top Sunni leaders within the movement urge him to concentrate on scoring key posts alongside the Shiite alliance.

Negotiations have been hampered by inter-alliance wrangling as Maliki and Allawi stake their claim for the premiership, with Maliki emphasising the country’s dependence on a strong experienced ruler.  The Sadr Movement have also put forward their candidate the vice president Adel Abdul-Mahdi as they have made it clear that they will not support a continuation of Maliki’s reign as he has been, “ungrateful towards the Sadrist blocs”.  The struggle to find a suitable leader that satisfies the extensive criteria of all participants is likely to be protracted, extending the difficult period of political uncertainty.  Abdul Mahdi deplored the situation, stating, “There is no real progress up to now, nothing real… we are still at a standstill.”

Allawi and Maliki finally met for a 90 minute discussion in what was described as an “ice breaker” meeting on 12 June.  The two leaders have agreed on the importance of a unity government, but Allawi’s commentary has become increasingly critical of Maliki, describing his post-electoral strategy as power seeking and elitist.  As the battle of wills rages on, Iraq’s citizens have expressed resentment that their elected officials are not meeting the country’s needs.  Insurgent groups will continue to exploit this lack of faith and gap in authority by launching attacks on civilians and officials.  For neighbouring Iran Iraq’s current status offers an opportunity to strengthen their negotiating position with the U.S. as it seek to withdraw its troops this summer.

Baghdad

The audacious attack on Iraq’s central bank signalled a decline in security in Baghdad this week and challenged the authority of Iraq’s Security Forces.  This incident also served as a reminder of the potential for large scale attacks in the city.

There were five Improvised Explosive Device attacks on Route Tampa; these attacks were to the south and north of Camp Taji.  Three of these attacks targeted Iraqi Army patrols and two targeted United States Forces Iraq’s patrols. One US soldier was seriously wounded in one of the Improvised Explosive Device attacks – there is no information at this time on the Iraqi Army patrols targeted. It is strongly believed that these Improvised Explosive Device attacks are a continuation of attacks in retaliation to the arrest of a senior Al-Qaeda-Iraq leader near Taji in April this year.

Walid Mahdi, an Al-Qaeda-Iraq cell leader infamous for planning Indirect Fire attacks against United States Forces Iraq’s installations is believed to have relocated near Camp Taji.  Walid’s historic, and well known, tactics is to fire two mortars in succession and then egress again with the pick up truck that he fired it from. Historically these attacks were on Tuesdays and Thursdays between the hours of 04h00 and 05h00, as well as 20h00 to 21h00. Recent cache discoveries and arrests made by United States Forces Iraq’s forces and Iraqi Army suggest that he intends to carry out these activities in the vicinity of Camp Taji. The threat level on the Forward Operating Base has been raised to Very High for Indirect Fire at this time.

There were no attacks reported against Private Security Details and Route Irish, the International Zone and Baghdad airport did not witness any incidents.

Basra Province

Incident levels remained low in Basra as Iraqi Security Forces continued to seize quantities of arms and ammunition.

Criminal activity was evident in Basra City as on 9 June six gunmen stormed into three gold jewellery shops shortly before 8pm killing the owners and fleeing with a large amount of jewellery.  This kind of incident could become more commonplace as insurgents seek to acquire funds and to intimidate the local population.

On 8 Jun at approximately 1640hrs Basra Contingency Operating Base was attacked with two – three rounds of Indirect Fire.  It has been confirmed that three rounds were fired at the Contingency Operating Base though the Point Of Origin for this attack is still unknown.

US Forces and Iraq Security Forces and their associates will continue to be targeted by insurgent elements with

Improvised Explosive Devices and Explosively Formed Projectile attacks on Main Supply Routes and Indirect Fire attacks against the Basra Contingency Operating Base.