A constitutional revision committee was eventually formed in October 2006, months past the deadline for the completion of its work. It did produce some draft changes in 2007 and wrote everything up in 2009. However, this was never considered a final package of revisions and was never voted on.
Inevitably, the question today is whether the new Iraqi parliament can legally form a new constitutional revision committee, and, if so, whether its revisions can be approved under the special rules specified under article 142 of the constitution. (“Ordinary” constitutional revision under article 126 requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority and a popular-referendum majority.) The constitution clearly mentions one committee only, but many of the original committee members lost their seats in the March 2010 elections, making it quite unrealistic to revive the old committee. Also, if a new committee is indeed formed, should it start afresh or continue on the basis of the rather toothless draft of revisions prepared by the previous committee?
The likely political dynamics of any such new committee is also an open question. Normally, constitutional issues should bring together the Shiite Islamist State of Law alliance of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the secular Iraqiyya alliance of Ayad Allawi against the Kurds and the Shiite Islamist Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). In theory, both State of Law and Iraqiyya are sceptical to the extension of the federal principle to the rest of Iraq beyond Kurdistan in the way it was enabled in the 2005 constitution (when ISCI and the Kurds dominated). Lately, however, personal rivalries between Allawi and Maliki have prompted Iraqiyya to take surprising positions on several constitutional questions, including supporting the Kurdish stance on the oil and gas law. If recent trends are anything to go by, this could easily turn into a renewed debate about such inventions as the national council for high policies instead of clearing up the existing framework. Indeed, in announcing their desire to reform the constitution, politicians of Iraqiyya seemed to focus mostly on anti-authoritarianism and the dispersal of power, which might well pull them closer to the Kurds than to Maliki on many questions.
The constitutional mandate for a new committee seems unclear in the extreme. Whether it could actually arrive at a package of revisions seems doubtful. Still, there are no signs that parliament is able to move forward on other critical issues at this time. Maybe another revision committee could at least create a new forum with the potential to avoid a mere replication of the frontlines that are having such a destructive impact on most other spheres of Iraqi politics at the moment?