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By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The Iraqi Dinar Caught in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Military Conflict Would Mean for Iraq's Currency

The Middle East is once again on the edge. The United States has assembled its largest concentration of naval and air power in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, two carrier strike groups, dozens of warships, and hundreds of warplanes now positioned within striking distance of Iran.

Negotiations between Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian officials in Geneva have reportedly yielded "significant progress", but the ultimate outcome may hinge on whether Iran is prepared to offer concessions significant enough for Trump to call a victory. With diplomacy fragile and military options on the table, one often-overlooked casualty of any escalation would be Iraq's currency, the dinar.

Iraq: The Battlefield Between Two Worlds

To understand what a US-Iran military conflict would do to the Iraqi dinar, you have to first understand Iraq's precarious geopolitical position. The country is simultaneously a close security partner of the United States and an economy deeply enmeshed with Iran. Iraq spends roughly $900 million monthly on Iranian goods, a major portion of this historically going to electricity and gas. Iranian-backed militias are embedded within Iraq's state institutions. US troops remain on Iraqi soil. Iraq's government walks a tightrope between US alliance and Iranian influence, and its currency walks the same tightrope with it.

The Iraqi dinar's journey has been one of the most dramatic in monetary history. The currency dropped substantially from 3 IQD per USD before 1991 to about 1,310 IQD per USD today. Decades of war, sanctions, and corruption have slowly eroded its value. In recent years, Iraq has made modest progress: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided structural guidance, oil revenues have been strong, and the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has maintained a managed peg to the dollar. Iraq's position as OPEC's second-largest oil producer and strong international support drive steady economic improvements. But all of that relative stability would face severe pressure the moment US bombs begin falling on Iranian soil.

Scenario One: A Limited Strike

The most likely immediate military scenario, and the one that has been most openly discussed in Washington, involves a targeted, time-limited campaign against Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure. Trump may order a targeted attack on select military sites inside Iran to pressure the country's leaders into agreeing to an acceptable deal, demonstrating US threats of action are real. The targets could include ballistic missile sites, facilities connected to Iran's nuclear program, or buildings used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In this scenario, the Iraqi dinar's fate would be shaped by several competing forces. On one hand, oil prices would almost certainly spike, and for Iraq, higher oil prices are a lifeline. Iraq's state budget is overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum revenues, and a sudden surge in global crude prices triggered by conflict fears would, in theory, fill state coffers. A better-funded government can defend its exchange rate more effectively.

On the other hand, a limited strike would almost certainly trigger Iranian retaliation, and Iraq would be squarely in the blast radius. Iran's kinetic retaliation plan relies on a reconstituted arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles capable of striking US bases and allied territory across the region, and many of those bases are in Iraq. US embassies in Iraq and other Arab states began to evacuate personnel in response to Iranian threats on American bases as far back as the lead-up to last year's Operation Midnight Hammer. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah have already issued explicit warnings: leader Ahmad al-Hamidawi warned that any strike on Iranian soil would trigger a "total war" involving militias across the Levant.

For the dinar, this translates to a severe confidence crisis. When violence erupts on Iraqi soil, even if Iraq is not the primary combatant, foreign capital flees, domestic savers rush to convert dinars to dollars, and the black market premium widens dramatically. The Central Bank of Iraq, which sells dollars at auction to defend its peg, would come under enormous pressure. Its foreign exchange reserves, while substantial, are not unlimited, and a sustained capital flight could force a de facto devaluation.

Scenario Two: Sustained Military Campaign or Regime Change

Current contingency planning in the Pentagon is configured for sustained, weeks-long operations against Iran if so ordered by Trump. A broader campaign aimed at degrading Iran's military capacity, or worse, one that tips into regime change, would represent a qualitatively different shock to the Iraqi economy.

Iraq's energy dependence on Iran is the most acute vulnerability. If war disrupts those supply lines, through Iranian cut-offs, infrastructure damage, or US sanctions enforcement, Iraqi power grids would come under renewed pressure. Blackouts would damage industry, commerce, and ordinary life. Economic output would contract sharply, and the government's ability to pay civil servant salaries and maintain social order would erode. In such conditions, the dinar would face significant downward pressure regardless of what the oil price is doing.

There is also the migration and refugee dimension. A major war with Iran, a country of over 90 million people, could produce refugee flows that would dwarf anything the region has seen since 2003. Iraq, which shares a long border with Iran and already hosts displaced populations from earlier conflicts, would be on the front lines of that humanitarian wave. The fiscal and social cost could be immense.

For currency markets, the historical parallel is instructive. During the 2003 US invasion of Iraq itself, Iraqi currency markets experienced extreme dislocations. Capital flight, hoarding of hard currency, and the collapse of normal economic activity all preceded any formal devaluation. A war next door, one that also engulfs Iraqi militias and potentially Iraqi territory, could produce similar dynamics even without Iraq being the primary target.

The Oil Price Paradox

One of the most important, and often misunderstood, dynamics in this scenario is the double-edged nature of oil prices. A major US-Iran conflict would almost certainly send crude prices sharply higher, at least initially. Iran is a significant oil producer, and any conflict that threatens the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply passes, would trigger immediate panic buying in global energy markets.

For Iraq, this creates a cruel paradox. Higher oil revenues would, in theory, improve the government's fiscal position and its ability to defend the dinar. But the same conflict that pushes oil prices up would simultaneously disrupt Iraq's own oil export infrastructure, close off Iranian energy imports that keep the lights on, trigger militia violence, scare away foreign investment, and force emergency spending on security. The net effect on the dinar would almost certainly be negative, as the costs outweigh the revenue windfall.

The Sanctions and Banking Dimension

Any escalation would also intensify the already complex sanctions environment that shapes how the Iraqi economy interfaces with the global financial system. The Trump administration focuses on selective sanctions against Iraqi banks while conditioning waivers for Iranian energy purchases. This policy could soon affect Iraq's economic partnerships and currency stability. Banks found to be facilitating Iranian transactions face being cut off from dollar-clearing networks, a potentially devastating punishment in an economy that relies so heavily on the greenback.

This creates a further squeeze on the dinar. If Iraqi banks are penalised for maintaining ties with Iran, ties that are partly economically necessary and partly politically unavoidable, the result is a fragmentation of Iraq's banking sector, reduced access to dollar liquidity, and a wider spread between the official and parallel exchange rates. Ordinary Iraqis, who already prefer to hold savings in US dollars rather than dinars, would accelerate that dollarisation, further undermining confidence in the local currency.

Historical Lessons: What 2003 Tells Us

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq offers a partial precedent, though the situations differ significantly. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the Iraqi currency market experienced extreme volatility. The old Saddam-era dinar was eventually replaced with a new currency, and a managed peg to the dollar was established. Over time, with massive oil revenues and international support, the new dinar stabilised.

But the early years of post-invasion Iraq were characterised by exactly the kind of dynamics a new conflict would recreate: capital flight, dollarisation, black market currency trading, and a gap between official and street exchange rates. The key difference now is that Iraq is not the direct target of military action, but it is the unavoidable collateral victim, geographically, economically, and politically sandwiched between the two combatants.

What Investors and Observers Should Watch

For those tracking the dinar, whether as currency speculators, businesses operating in Iraq, or observers of the wider regional economy, the key indicators to monitor are:

The Central Bank of Iraq's foreign exchange auction volumes and reserves. A sharp drop in reserves or a sudden suspension of dollar auctions would signal that the peg is under existential pressure. The spread between the official exchange rate and the parallel market rate. Historically, this spread widens during periods of political and security stress, and a significant widening would be an early warning of impending devaluation. The status of Iranian energy supplies to Iraq. If gas flows are disrupted and the lights go out, the economic fallout would be rapid and severe. And crucially, the behaviour of Iraq's Iranian-backed militias. If they activate in response to US strikes on Iran, Iraq would transition from bystander to active warzone, and the dinar would face its most serious crisis since 2003.

Conclusion: A Currency with No Good Options

The Iraqi dinar is, at its core, a hostage to forces far beyond Baghdad's control. Iraq's government has limited ability to insulate its currency from a major military confrontation between the United States and Iran, a conflict whose epicentre would be on its doorstep and whose shockwaves would run directly through its energy sector, banking system, and political fabric.

Administration officials have been unclear about what their objectives are as they confront Iran, and that uncertainty itself is a risk factor for the dinar. Markets hate ambiguity, and a conflict with no clear endgame is the worst of all possible scenarios for a currency already carrying the weight of decades of instability.

In the best case, a short, sharp military strike followed by a rapid return to negotiations, the dinar would likely suffer a temporary shock: a flight to dollars, a widening of the parallel market premium, and a drawdown of central bank reserves, but ultimately a manageable correction. In the worst case, a sustained campaign, militia activation across Iraq, energy supply disruption, and a regional war, the dinar would face its most severe test since the 2003 invasion. The outcome would depend not just on what the US military does to Iran, but on whether Iraq can remain a bystander in a war that, by its very geography, it cannot escape.

This article reflects the geopolitical and economic situation as of late February 2026. It does not constitute financial or investment advice.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

(Picture: The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently on route to the region).

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of January:

1. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
2. Iraqi Dinar "Plummets Against Dollar"
3. One Year of Trump: Iraqi Dinar Speculators Still Waiting
4. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
5. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
6. 10 Things the CBI Said About the Iraqi Dinar in 2025
7. Iraqi Dinar Prospects: Reality Check After Six Months of Trump
8. 8 Things the IMF Said About Iraq and the Dinar in 2025
9. Iraq Reviews Measures to Improve Sovereign Credit Rating
10. CBI Instructions for Exchanging Dinars

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

One Year of Trump: Iraqi Dinar Speculators Still Waiting for a Miracle That Will Never Come

As Donald Trump marks his first anniversary back in the White House on 20th January, one group of investors remains stubbornly committed to a fantasy: Iraqi dinar speculators still convinced that their fortunes will suddenly multiply a thousandfold. Many of these speculators think Trump's presence in the White House will be the catalyst for that revaluation (or 'RV', as they call it).

Twelve months of economic reality have done nothing to shake their faith, even as every metric confirms what experts have been saying all along -- there will be no massive revaluation.

The question is not whether the dinar will skyrocket in value. The question is: how much longer can speculators ignore the overwhelming evidence that their investment strategy is fundamentally flawed?

The Current Reality

As the anniversary of Trump's inauguration approaches, the official USD/IQD exchange rate remains unchanged from a year ago, while anecdotally the unofficial "street" value of the dinar has weakened a little.

While the weakening, if real, may be small, some would argue that any apparent softening of the currency indicates the general direction of travel, and that has been against the speculators.

Oil Prices Slump

Far from creating conditions for currency appreciation, Trump's first year has coincided with a marked deterioration in Iraq's fiscal position. With oil prices around $62 per barrel, Iraq's petroleum revenues, which account for more than 90 percent of total government income as of 2025, are no longer sufficient to cover planned public expenditures.

Despite a rise in recent days, Brent crude is down more than 20% since Trump regained power, and IMF estimates assume no major price increases this year.

Trump's Policies Have Made Things Worse

Rather than helping Iraq as some speculators imagined, Trump's policies have created additional headwinds. His aggressive stance towards Iran has disrupted Iraq's energy security, whilst his broader trade policies have contributed to oil price volatility.

For Iraq, caught between its dependence on Iranian energy imports and pressure from Washington, Trump's approach has created economic uncertainty rather than opportunity.

The Devaluation Risk

Perhaps most tellingly, experts are warning not of revaluation but of potential devaluation. A leading Iraqi economist has warned that Trump's pressure to reduce oil prices could harm the Iraqi economy and potentially lead to devaluation of the Iraqi dinar, according to reporting from earlier in 2025.

Iraq has precedent for currency devaluation when faced with fiscal pressure. In December 2020, amidst a collapse in oil prices, the Central Bank of Iraq devalued the dinar by 22.7 percent, changing the official rate from 1,190 to 1,460 dinars to the U.S. dollar. The current economic pressures are severe enough that another devaluation cannot be ruled out -- the exact opposite of what speculators expect.

The Psychology of Denial

What's remarkable about dinar speculation is not just the gap between expectation and reality, but the psychological mechanisms that keep believers invested despite overwhelming contrary evidence.

The psychology of dinar speculation shares characteristics with other speculative bubbles and get-rich-quick schemes, with confirmation bias leading believers to interpret any news as supporting their thesis whilst dismissing contrary evidence.

This pattern has been evident throughout Trump's first year. When the president makes any comment about the Middle East, speculators interpret it as a sign that revaluation is imminent. When oil prices rise temporarily, it's seen as vindication. When predictions fail to materialise, the goalposts simply move to the next date.

There's no economic mechanism by which a sudden, massive revaluation could occur without devastating consequences, as such a move would instantly make Iraqi goods and services prohibitively expensive, destroy the country's export competitiveness, and potentially trigger economic chaos.

The Human Cost

Beyond the economic analysis lies a more troubling reality. Some individuals have diverted substantial portions of their savings into dinars, sometimes purchasing at markups far above the official exchange rate from dinar dealers. Others have held onto their investments for years, forgoing more conventional investment strategies that might have actually generated returns.

After one year of Trump's presidency -- a period some speculators insisted would bring the long-awaited revaluation -- these investors are no closer to their dreams. The dinar has not appreciated; the promised miracle has not materialised.

What the Next Year Holds

Looking ahead, the outlook for Iraq, and therefore for the dinar, remains challenging. The World Bank projects that the current account is forecast to remain in deficit in 2025-27 and lead to a decline in the reserve to import ratio to 6.6 months in 2027.

The IMF emphasises the need for urgent measures, noting that Iraq's vulnerabilities have increased in recent years due to a large fiscal expansion, with the oil price remaining well below what is needed to balance the budget.

These projections suggest continued fiscal strain, potential further reserve depletion, and mounting pressure on the dinar to weaken, not strengthen.

The Verdict After One Year

One year into Trump's presidency, the verdict is clear: Iraqi dinar speculation remains what it has always been: a fundamentally flawed investment strategy based on economic misunderstanding and wishful thinking.

The dinar has not revalued by 1,000x. It has not revalued by 100x. It has not revalued by 10x. It has, in fact, slightly depreciated on the street. Iraq's economy faces mounting fiscal pressures, declining reserves, and an uncertain future tied to volatile oil markets.

Trump has shown no interest in Iraqi currency policy, nor would he have the power to simply decree a revaluation even if he wanted to. The mechanisms of currency valuation respond to economic fundamentals, not presidential wishes.

For speculators still holding dinars and waiting for their fortunes to change, the question must be asked: what evidence would it take to change your mind? If twelve months of deteriorating fundamentals, weakening reserves, mounting fiscal deficits, and continued absence of any revaluation haven't shaken your faith, what will?

The Iraqi dinar speculation phenomenon remains a cautionary tale about the intersection of hope, economic illiteracy, and the human tendency to cling to beliefs even when confronted with overwhelming contrary evidence. As Trump begins his second year in office, the speculators continue to wait for a miracle that economics tells us will never come.

The true revaluation needed is not of the dinar, but of the investment strategy itself. Until speculators recognise that currencies reflect economic realities rather than political fantasies, they will continue their futile wait for riches that exist only in their imaginations.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

8 Things the IMF Said About Iraq and the Dinar in 2025

10 Things the CBI Said About the Iraqi Dinar in 2025

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of December:

1. CBI on Banking Reform, "Digital Dinar", Dollar Transactions
2. Iraqi Central Bank Reduces Supply of Dinars
3. 10 Things the CBI Said About the Iraqi Dinar in 2025
4. CBI Training on Detection of Counterfeit Dinars
5. CBI Chief on the Future of Financial Markets in Iraq
6. 8 Things the IMF Said About Iraq and the Dinar in 2025
7. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
8. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
9. CBI Instructions for Exchanging Dinars
10. CBI Denies Dinar Revaluation Rumours as Inflation Falls

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Will 2026 Be the Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

For nearly two decades, a peculiar investment subculture has persisted in the shadows of global finance: Iraqi Dinar speculation. Thousands of hopeful investors have purchased millions of dinars, convinced that Iraq's currency will soon "revalue" and transform their modest investments into life-changing fortunes. With 2026 on the horizon, the perennial question resurfaces: Is this finally the year?

The Impossible Dream That Won't Die

The Iraqi Dinar investment pitch is seductive in its simplicity. Iraq possesses some of the world's largest proven oil reserves. Surely, speculators reason, once the country stabilizes politically and economically, its currency must appreciate dramatically, perhaps returning to its pre-1991 Gulf War exchange rate when one dinar traded near par with the US dollar. Today's exchange rate hovers around 1,300 dinars per dollar, suggesting astronomical potential gains.

Online forums buzz with excitement over every piece of Iraqi economic news: A new oil contract signed; a political reform announced; a statement from Iraq's Central Bank. Each development is analyzed for signs of the imminent "revaluation" or "RV" that will supposedly occur overnight, catapulting dinar holders into wealth.

The Reality Check

Mainstream economists and currency experts have consistently dismissed dinar speculation as unrealistic at best, and a scam at worst. The fundamental problem lies in basic monetary economics. Iraq has roughly 100 trillion dinars in circulation. A revaluation to anything approaching dollar parity would require Iraq's economy to support a money supply equivalent to $100 trillion -- roughly five times the entire US money supply and far exceeding Iraq's GDP by orders of magnitude.

Currency values aren't arbitrarily set by government decree in modern economies. They reflect underlying economic fundamentals: productivity, trade balances, foreign reserves, inflation rates, and institutional stability. Iraq's economy, while showing some improvement, faces persistent challenges including corruption, political instability, dependence on oil revenues, and inadequate infrastructure.

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has repeatedly stated it has no plans for a major revaluation. Such statements are routinely dismissed by true believers as disinformation designed to keep the secret until the big announcement.

Why 2026 Might Be Different (Or Not)

Dinar enthusiasts point to several factors that could make 2026 a pivotal year. Iraq has made strides in economic development and is working toward greater integration with global financial systems. The country continues to increase oil production capacity and has attracted considerable foreign investment. Banking reforms are gradually modernizing Iraq's financial infrastructure.

Additionally, some speculators note that every year brings predictions of imminent revaluation, and eventually one of those years might prove correct -- the broken clock theory of currency speculation.

However, the counterarguments remain powerful. Iraq's political system remains fractured, with ongoing tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Corruption remains endemic. The economy's overwhelming dependence on oil makes it vulnerable to global price fluctuations. Infrastructure needs are enormous. Regional instability continues to pose security challenges.

Most tellingly, there's no economic mechanism by which a sudden, massive revaluation could occur without devastating consequences. Such a move would instantly make Iraqi goods and services prohibitively expensive, destroy the country's export competitiveness, and potentially trigger economic chaos.

The Human Cost of False Hope

Beyond the economic analysis lies a more troubling dimension: the personal toll on those who've invested heavily in dinar speculation. Some individuals have diverted substantial portions of their savings into dinars, sometimes at markups far above the official exchange rate when purchased through dinar dealers. Others have held onto their investments for years, forgoing more conventional investment strategies.

The psychology of dinar speculation shares characteristics with other speculative bubbles and get-rich-quick schemes. Confirmation bias leads believers to interpret any news as supporting their thesis while dismissing contrary evidence. Sunk cost fallacy makes it psychologically difficult to admit error after years of waiting. Online communities reinforce beliefs through groupthink.

Financial advisors and regulatory agencies have issued repeated warnings about dinar speculation. The Better Business Bureau has cautioned consumers, and some dinar dealers have faced legal action. Yet the dream persists, fueled by testimonials, YouTube videos, and chat rooms where the faithful gather to share their conviction that vindication is just around the corner.

The Verdict on 2026

Will 2026 be different from 2025, 2024, 2023, or any other year in the past two decades? The honest answer, based on conventional economic analysis, is almost certainly not. The structural barriers to a massive dinar revaluation haven't changed. Iraq's economy, while developing, isn't positioned for the kind of currency appreciation that would justify current speculation.

That said, predicting currency movements with absolute certainty is impossible. Unexpected political transformations, major oil discoveries, or unprecedented economic reforms could theoretically alter the trajectory, though not to the extent dinar speculators envision.

For those holding dinars, 2026 will likely unfold like previous years: a mixture of hope, disappointment, and moving goalposts as predicted revaluation dates come and go. The true believers will continue to believe, finding new reasons why next year will finally be the year.

The Iraqi Dinar speculation phenomenon serves as a cautionary tale about the intersection of hope, economic misunderstanding, and the human tendency to believe in shortcuts to wealth. For most investors, the more prudent course remains diversified portfolios, legitimate investments, and healthy skepticism toward promises of overnight riches.

As 2026 approaches, the Iraqi Dinar dream continues, not because the economics have changed, but because hope, once invested, is the hardest thing to relinquish.

See also:

10 Things the CBI Said About the Iraqi Dinar in 2025

8 Things the IMF Said About Iraq and the Dinar in 2025

Top 10 Dinar Articles from January

Iraqi Dinar Falls Against Dollar

10 Things the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) Said About the Iraqi Dinar (IQD) in 2025

1. February 19: CBI's Dollar Distribution System Among World's Most Monitored

Following meetings with the US Treasury and Federal Reserve in Dubai, the CBI reported recognition of Iraq's US dollar distribution system as one of the most monitored and controlled globally, effectively limiting manipulation and illicit dollar outflows. The bank emphasized significant transformation in international transfers aligning with global banking standards.

The CBI urged reliance on official channels for updates and warned against misinformation.

2.  February 27: Cash Transactions will Gradually Decline

Ali Mohsen Al-Allaq, Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), highlighted significant progress in digital payments, citing an increase in ATMs and e-wallets, which helped boost financial inclusion to 40% from 20% in just two years, supported by CBI initiatives.

He noted that Iraqi banks are undergoing major transformations, adopting internationally accredited financial systems to enhance cross-currency transactions and banking operations. Looking ahead, he envisioned banks shifting from traditional entities to smart digital platforms, issuing digital financial identities to facilitate seamless transactions.

3. May 8: Dinars to Dollars -- Official List of Approved Banks

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has announced that pilgrims can purchase dollars through designated banks and companies in Baghdad and other provinces.

4. September 4: CBI Launches Inter-Wallet Money Transfers

The Central Bank announced the launch of inter-wallet money transfer services, enabling individuals and businesses to conduct financial transactions with greater speed and flexibility. The CBI said this development marks a qualitative step in enhancing financial inclusion, supporting digital transformation, facilitating the movement of funds, and strengthening the business sector.

5. November 19: CBI Clarifies Role of Investment Department

The Central Bank issued a statement outlining the role of its Investment Department in supporting exchange rate stability. The department's objectives focus on maintaining confidence in the dinar.

6. November 21: CBI Issues Detailed Instructions for Exchanging Dinars

The Central Bank issued comprehensive instructions setting out criteria for trading and replacing banknotes, including standards for fit and unfit currency, procedures for damaged notes, and mechanisms for counting and sorting.

7. November 24: CBI Firmly Denies Any Plans to Change Exchange Rate

The Central Bank rejected rumours of a possible exchange rate modification, calling such speculation aimed at disrupting markets and undermining economic stability. The bank confirmed there is no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar.

8. December 2: Digital Dinar Under Development; Exchange Rate Not a Fiscal Tool

Governor Ali Mohsen Al-Alaq stated that the digital dinar project is under implementation, but requires time and robust infrastructure before launch. He stressed that the exchange rate should not be used as a tool to address structural fiscal gaps, warning that a devaluation of the dinar would harm low-income groups and erode confidence in the currency.

9. December 17: Currency Supply Reduced by 5.5%

The CBI reported a 5.5 percent decline in currency issued during the third quarter of 2025, falling to 99,681 billion Iraqi dinars from 104,127 billion Iraqi dinars in the same period of 2024.

10. December 18: Inflation Drops to Historic Lows

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) reported that Iraq's inflation rate fell to -0.8 percent in the third quarter of 2025, down from 3.5 percent in the same period of 2024.

See also:

8 Things the IMF Said About Iraq and the Dinar in 2025

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

By John Lee.

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has presented detailed updates on its banking-sector reform programme, with Governor Ali Mohsen Al-Alaq outlining structural plans aimed at rebuilding a compliant and modern financial system.

Al-Alaq said the engagement of Oliver Wyman followed restrictions on dollar transactions imposed on a number of Iraqi banks, noting that the consultancy is supporting deep reforms to ensure full adherence to international standards. He added that there are reassurances regarding the gradual return of affected banks to normal operations once required reforms are completed.

All Iraqi banks have signed the reform document, the Governor confirmed. Compliant institutions will be allowed to conduct transactions in other foreign currencies through a phased approach, under close monitoring by international counterparts.

On digital transformation, Al-Alaq stated that the digital dinar project is under implementation, but requires time and robust infrastructure before launch.

He reaffirmed the Bank's commitment to price stability by maintaining low inflation through a stable official exchange rate, warning that a devaluation of the dinar would harm low-income groups and erode confidence in the currency. He stressed that the exchange rate should not be used as a tool to address structural fiscal gaps, which instead require reforms to strengthen domestic revenues, control spending, diversify the economy, and support the government's direction.

See also:

Top 10 Dinar Articles from November

IMF Explains Iraq's Exchange Rate Arrangement

CBI Denies Dinar Revaluation Rumours as Inflation Falls

(Source: CBI)

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of November:

1. CBI Instructions for Exchanging Dinars
2. CBI to Support Dinar Stability
3. CBI Denies Dinar Revaluation Rumours as Inflation Falls
4. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
5. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
6. Dinar RV: What does Sudani's Victory mean for Speculators?
7. Dinar RV: Will Iraqi Election Speed the Process?
8. Iraqi Dinar: Govt Attempts to Preserve Value
9. Stability of the Iraqi Dinar Exchange Rate: CBI Paper
10. Iraqi Dinar Prospects: Reality Check After Six Months of Trump

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By John Lee.

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has said that its monetary policies have pushed inflation to historically low levels, adding that there is no intention to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar (IQD).

In a statement issued on Monday (24th November), the bank rejected rumours of a possible exchange rate change, describing it as speculation aimed at disrupting the market and undermining economic stability.

Statement from the Central Bank of Iraq:

This unofficial translation is provided in good faith for general information only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, Iraq Business News accepts no responsibility for any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations.

Central Bank of Iraq Confirms Exchange Rate Stability and Achieves Lowest Inflation Levels in the Region

As the end of 2025 approaches, the Central Bank of Iraq has announced the achievement of tangible progress in its strategic objectives relating to maintaining stability in the general price level, as the inflation rate recorded a decline to historic levels considered the lowest in the region, supported by its monetary policies and considered measures despite current economic challenges.

The Central Bank clarified in an official statement that the Bank's Law No. (56) of 2004, particularly Article 1/4/a, clearly defines its core functions in formulating and implementing monetary policy, including exchange rate policy. In this context, the Bank confirmed that there is no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar, in line with its central objective of ensuring price stability, an objective that has been successfully achieved during the past period.

The statement emphasised that the Central Bank continues to support exchange rate stability, reinforced by optimal levels of foreign reserves of currencies and gold.

The Central Bank also confirmed its continuation in meeting all banks' requests for external enhancement in US dollars and other foreign currencies such as the Chinese yuan, Turkish lira, Indian rupee and UAE dirham, in addition to the continuation of bank card settlements and personal transfers through MoneyGram and Western Union, as well as cash currency sales for travel purposes, noting that there is no pressure whatsoever on current foreign reserves.

The statement noted that any external statements or opinions relating to changing the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar do not express the Central Bank's position, and represent interpretations aimed at disrupting the market and inciting speculation and affecting the stability of the national economy.

(Source: CBI)

See also:

CBI to Support Dinar Stability

CBI Instructions for Exchanging Dinars

By John Lee.

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has issued a statement setting out its criteria for trading and replacing banknotes.

This unofficial translation is provided in good faith for general information only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, Iraq Business News accepts no responsibility for any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations.

Instructions and Standards for Trading and Exchanging Banknotes and Counting and Sorting Mechanisms

The Central Bank of Iraq, pursuant to its Law No. 56 of 2004 as amended, is responsible for determining the denominations of Iraqi currency (paper and metallic), their specifications and designs, printing paper banknotes and minting metallic coins. It is also responsible for their destruction and replacement, determining defective notes, and has the authority to refuse to exchange such currency (paper and metallic) or to confiscate it if the circumstances set forth in these instructions are met. Iraqi banknotes are homogeneous in all their denominations, have absolute legal tender status, and are accepted by the Central Bank of Iraq and its branches, banks, institutions and the public. Discrimination between denominations by imposing a specific denomination on the public or refusing to accept a specific denomination is unacceptable and is considered contrary to law. We request all banks to comply with the instructions and standards for trading and exchanging banknotes and the counting and sorting mechanisms as set out below:

1. Standards for Trading Banknotes:

A- Banknotes Fit for Circulation

A banknote issued by the Central Bank of Iraq remains fit for circulation if it has been subject to any of the following:

Firstly: If it has sustained one or more tears not exceeding 3 cm that have been repaired with transparent adhesive tape on one or both sides and this has not affected its features.

Secondly: If it has sustained a cut in one of its corners within 2 cm and this has not affected its features.

Thirdly: If it shows signs of circulation and use, and has not sustained damage or harm affecting its appearance, colour or size.

B- Banknotes Not Fit for Circulation

Firstly: Banknotes are deemed not fit for circulation if one of the descriptions listed below applies to them, and their holders shall be compensated for their full value [with the exception of damaged notes specified in paragraph (1/b/Secondly/3)] immediately upon presentation to government and private banks and their branches. Banks shall subsequently deposit them with this Bank or one of its branches, and the equivalent amount shall be credited to their accounts without imposing any penalty.

1. If the banknote is worn or damaged despite not being torn and not having lost parts.
2. If the banknote consists of two parts (with different numbers) and its area approximates the area of the original banknote and is secured with adhesive tape.
3. If the banknote is secured with one or more transparent adhesive tapes along its length or width.
4. If the banknote has cuts in more than one corner.
5. If the banknote is defectively printed (in terms of design, size, colour, or other security features that the genuine banknote bears).
6. If it contains stamps or writing that do not affect its external appearance.
7. If the banknote has lost less than 50% of its area.

Secondly - Banknotes Damaged Due to Burning, Burial or Any Other Cause:

Banknotes damaged due to burning, burial or any other cause not mentioned in paragraph (1/b/Firstly) shall be received by this Bank and its branches exclusively according to the following mechanism:

1. Required Documents:

a) Civil status identification or unified card or departmental identification and residence card with the citizen's telephone number.

b) Confirmation from a police station or judicial authority in the case of banknotes damaged as a result of gunfire or contaminated with blood due to accidents.

c) Provision of proof of the source of funds as follows:

• For amounts exceeding 10,000,000 dinars (ten million dinars) up to 25,000,000 dinars (twenty-five million dinars), presentation of departmental identification if an employee is required, or a salary slip showing the amount of income and length of service, or proof of a source of income commensurate with the amount to be exchanged. A tradesman must provide proof of practising his profession through a professional practice licence from the relevant sectoral authorities, or a shop lease contract, or production vehicle registration, and other proof of a source of income commensurate with the amount.
• For amounts exceeding 25,000,000 dinars (twenty-five million dinars) up to 100,000,000 dinars (one hundred million dinars), presentation of property ownership documents, shares, sales contracts or any official documents proving the legitimacy of the source of such funds (company ownership deed, partnership or contracting or supply contract) commensurate with the submitted amount is required.

2. In the event of dissatisfaction with the required documents submitted due to their lack of authenticity or their disproportionality to the submitted amount, the applicant shall be referred to the Legal Department for the purpose of providing a written undertaking whereby he assumes legal and criminal responsibility for the accuracy of the information provided and that such funds came from legitimate sources and are not connected with any illegal work or suspicious operations.

3. A penalty of 10% of the value of the damaged banknotes shall be levied in favour of this Bank due to their damage resulting from misuse, burial, burning, or any other cause, with the exception of banknotes damaged due to circulation as detailed in paragraph (1/b/Firstly), which shall be exchanged without imposing a penalty.

4. In the event that it is not possible to count the damaged banknotes, they shall be estimated by a committee formed for this purpose, and the committee shall issue its decision within fifteen working days.

2- Confiscation of Damaged Banknotes:

Damaged banknotes not fit for circulation as described below shall be confiscated, and their holder or the party that submitted them shall be notified of the confiscation decision. Anyone whose banknotes have been refused and confiscated has the right to submit a request to the Governor or his delegate through the Director General of Issue and Treasury or the Director General of the Bank Branch to reconsider the decision, and the decision of the Governor or his delegate shall be final:

1. If changes have been made to the external appearance of the banknote as a result of writing, drawing, printing, stamps or containing adhesive material.
2. If the banknote has lost 50% or more of its area or consists of two parts with one side, and in the event that there is evidence convincing the Central Bank that the missing parts of the notes have been completely destroyed, partial or full compensation shall be provided for them.

3- Confiscation of Counterfeit and Perforated Notes:

a) Counterfeit notes shall be confiscated and whoever possessed them shall be provided with a receipt confirming receipt of such notes by the cashier or a designated employee at the Central Bank of Iraq and its branches and all banks and their branches, and the details (number of counterfeit notes, their denominations, the name of the depositing customer in whose deposits they appeared and his account number) shall be recorded in a register by the cashier.

b) Confiscated counterfeit notes shall be stamped with the counterfeit stamp bearing the name of the bank and branch and sent to the Central Bank by official letter containing the information in paragraph (a) above.

c) Banks must act in accordance with our letter numbered (9/4/551) dated 1/12/2024 in the event of discovering counterfeit notes.

d) A banknote if changes have been made to it to make its appearance similar to a genuine note by placing or joining different parts of counterfeit or non-conforming currency.

e) Banknotes perforated with four holes in a single banknote that leaked from cancelled banknotes prepared for destruction in our (Mosul) branch after its occupation by terrorist gangs in 2014, where the holes were sealed for the purpose of circulating them as shown in Annex No. (1), shall be confiscated. The banking system must confiscate them and deliver them to the Central Bank of Iraq.

4- Counting and Sorting Mechanisms:

a) Banks must prepare counting and sorting centres with an area commensurate with the volume of their deposits, and must seek to acquire modern machinery and update it continuously to ensure the counting and sorting of banknotes received from their customers, whilst employing qualified workers to do so, provided that we are supplied with the numbers and types of machines used at the head office and its branches.

b) Banks shall send their cash deposits to the vaults of this Bank and its branches after counting and sorting them and separating the damaged ones in bags bundled of good quality and sealed using sewing machines designated for sewing bags, and an additional strip shall be placed during sewing to increase the strength of the bag, with adhesive tape of a colour matching the colour of the denomination bundled inside the bag, and an identification card placed on the bag describing its contents of banknotes, the name of the bank, the type of denomination, and the name of the person who bundled the bag, with the deposit date included either on (the bag or the identification card). It is preferable to fill each bag with the name of one cashier containing (40) bundles, each bundle (1,000 notes) securely tied on both sides by machines designated for this purpose, each bundle containing (10 packets), each packet containing (100 notes) with two identification cards in the first (100) notes and the last (100) notes stamped with a stamp bearing the name of the bank, the three-part name of one cashier, the type of denomination and the date. In the event that there is more than one cashier's name in one bag or identification papers not belonging to the depositing bank, discrepancies shall be recorded against the bank.

c) The name of a cashier cannot be determined for discrepancies discovered in the bank's deposits if the counting and sorting operations in this Bank were carried out through comprehensive machines, and the discrepancies shall be recorded against the bank.

d) One bag (40 bundles) shall be filled in two patterns as follows:

Firstly: Denominations (250, 500, 1,000, 50,000) dinars shall be vertically (7) bundles for five rows, making their number (35) bundles. As for the remaining five bundles, two of them shall be horizontally from the sides and the remaining three in the middle vertically, making the number (40) bundles.

Secondly: Denominations (5,000, 10,000, 25,000) dinars shall have a base of (4) bundles horizontally in two rows and a height of (10) bundles to make the total bundles in the bag (40) bundles.

e) For organisational purposes, banks must commit to notifying the Central Bank of the date and amount of deposits in both currencies (local and foreign).

f) Banks must open windows for exchanging damaged and defective banknotes for the public, and announce this through identification boards and advertisements, organise a special register for damaged currency, and deliver it to this Bank and its branches, promote circulation with banknotes of small denominations, and supply all bank branches with them.

g) Banks shall deposit damaged banknotes received from their customers or from the general public for any quantity, even if it is a single banknote, provided they are well sorted and actually damaged, and sent with letters explaining their condition and amounts according to a delivery timetable to be determined by the Issue and Treasury Department. In the event that there are banknotes fit for circulation in your damaged deposits and in large quantities, this is considered a banking violation for which the bank shall be held accountable.

h) Authorised persons to review this Bank/Issue and Treasury Department shall be nominated through the electronic platform designated for this purpose, as well as the names of workers used by the bank to transport cash deposits into this Bank, their addresses and identity documents, provided they carry identification badges specific to the bank. Otherwise, the bank shall bear legal responsibility.

i) Correspondence with this Bank shall be signed by the Director General for government banks and the authorised director for private banks and the regional director for foreign branches or their deputies in their absence.

5- Mechanism for Counting and Sorting Banknotes at the Central Bank of Iraq:

a) Penalties imposed on discrepancies discovered in your deposits of Iraqi banknotes shall be calculated as follows:

Firstly: Any surplus discovered in the bank's deposits shall be credited to its current account.

Secondly: Any shortage discovered in the bank's deposits shall be debited to its current account and a penalty shall be imposed in the manner determined by the Bank on the value of the banknotes (shortage), and the penalty rate has currently been set at (100%) of the value of the banknotes with compensation for the shortage from its account.

b) In the event of discovering counterfeit notes within the bank's deposits (whether conforming to or different from the declared denomination), they shall be confiscated and recorded as a shortage in both cases (surplus or shortage of 100 notes), and the penalty rate shall be recorded in the manner determined by the Bank. The penalty rate has currently been set at (500%) of the value of the discovered counterfeit notes with compensation for the shortage from the bank's account.

c) When Iraqi banknotes appear that differ from the declared banknotes, their number shall be recorded as a shortage in both cases (surplus or shortage of 100 notes) with imposition of a shortage penalty of (100%), and the (different denomination) notes discovered in the bank's deposits shall be credited to its current account.

Fifthly: When non-Iraqi currency denominations appear, they shall be delivered to the bank's authorised representative and recorded as a shortage in both cases (surplus or shortage of 100 notes) with imposition of a shortage penalty of (100%) of the declared denomination.

Sixthly: Banknotes perforated with four holes referred to in paragraph (3/e) discovered within the bank's deposits shall be confiscated and recorded as a shortage in both cases (surplus or shortage of 100 notes), with imposition of a shortage penalty as in paragraph (5/a-Secondly).

b) The bank has the right to object to the counting and sorting results within one week from the date of being notified of the results, and the bank's authorised representative is permitted to view the video recording taken by surveillance cameras of the process of opening the bank's bags.

c) Official correspondence and communication shall be with the Banks Follow-up and Reconciliation Section, and results of counting and sorting operations and copies of cashiers' identification papers shall be sent via email ([email protected]). Identification papers shall be destroyed after seven days from notifying the bank of discrepancies, and the bank shall not have the right to claim them.

d) Receipt and delivery of deposits or withdrawals of banknotes in both currencies (local and foreign) shall be during official working hours, currently set from (8:30 - 2:00), and no vehicles or persons affiliated with banks shall be permitted to enter outside these times. These deposits and withdrawals must be transported by armoured vehicles from or to this Bank. In the event that your deposits are delayed beyond the times mentioned above for reasons convincing to the management of this Bank and its branches, such deposits may be received as a trust for a period not exceeding one working day by means of a trust deposit form, provided that the received amounts are bundled and sealed with the bank's seal in a manner ensuring they cannot be opened except in the presence of its authorised representative on the morning of the following working day for the purpose of withdrawing the trust and conducting the initial examination.

e) The responsibility of the Central Bank of Iraq and any bank or cashier or any person is at the point at which the banknotes leave their possession, and it is assumed that the person receiving the banknotes should not leave the receipt point before confirming the amount. The recipient of banknotes from this Bank may request to carry out counting operations himself and with whomever he wishes from the personnel of his department, under the supervision of Central Bank staff, including the provision and preparation of all counting requirements including counting and bundling machines. After completing the counting process, the bank becomes responsible for the banknotes it pays even if they bear identification cards of the parties from which they were received.

f) In the event that the bank discovers an error in its deposits (surplus or shortage) before conducting the counting and sorting operation for those deposits, it must notify the Issue and Treasury Department at the end of the deposit day or at the beginning of the following day by sending an official letter specifying the error amount and type of denomination precisely. After the counting and sorting operations for those deposits, confirmation shall be made of the conformity of the difference amount with what is mentioned in the bank's letter in the presence of the authorised representative, and compensation for the shortage from the bank without imposing a penalty or delivery of the surplus, if any, by official report.

g) In the event that a bank retains identification cards belonging to the Central Bank or another bank and includes them in its deposits and releases them for circulation in that manner, this is considered a violation for which the bank shall be held accountable.

6- Foreign Currency Banknotes

a) Cash Deposits: This Bank receives deposits of foreign currency banknotes subject to counting and sorting fees for all denominations and all issues according to the mechanism set out below:

Firstly: Compliance with the official deposit times mentioned in paragraph (5/d).

Secondly: Sending an official letter to this Bank authorising the bank's employees to deposit foreign currency banknotes by means of a deposit slip showing the details of the amount and stamped with the bank's seal, the name of the authorised representative and his signature.

Thirdly: Sending an electronic memory device containing the numbers of the deposited banknotes with a paper list of numbers for each (100) notes, and in the event of non-conformity of numbers, the numbers recorded by the Bank shall be adopted.

Fourthly: Banks shall send their foreign cash deposits (dollars and euros) after counting and sorting them and packing them according to currency denominations to the vaults of the Central Bank of Iraq and packing them in good quality bags (thick nylon). One bag shall contain (10) bundles (ten bundles) as a maximum, each bundle containing (1,000) notes (one thousand notes) tied securely, distributed into (10) batches (ten batches), each batch containing (100) notes (one hundred notes) bundled in nylon bags and sealed by heat sealing or sewing them with the designated machine after adding a strip to increase the strength of the bag, and placing an identification card on the bag describing its contents of banknotes, the name of the bank, the type of denomination and the deposit date, with inclusion of the name of the person who bundled the bag.

Fifthly: Foreign currency banknotes deposited shall be counted and sorted on the same day, and in the event of discrepancies, the bank's authorised representative shall compensate directly. In the event that counting and sorting them on the same day is not possible, they shall be deposited in the foreign currency vault pending counting and sorting, and the work date shall be determined later.

Sixthly: Counterfeit foreign notes (dollars and euros) shall be confiscated with compensation for the shortage by the bank's authorised representative.

Seventhly: In the event of a shortage within deposits of foreign currency banknotes (dollars and euros), it shall be compensated by the bank's authorised representative.

Eighthly: When a surplus appears in foreign currency banknotes, it shall be delivered to the bank's authorised representative by means of a receipt of receipt.

Ninthly: When foreign currency banknotes appear that differ from the declared banknotes, they shall be replaced with the same denomination and any shortage compensated through the authorised representative.

Tenthly: One bag shall be filled by placing two bundles horizontally in two rows, making the number of bundles (8) bundles. As for the last two bundles, they shall be vertically for the third row, making the number (10) bundles.

Eleventhly: When damaged foreign cash deposits appear within the bank's deposits and are rejected by the counting and sorting machines, the bank shall have the option of compensating for the number of notes or this Bank exchanging them through the Federal Bank, provided the bank bears the exchange cost.

Twelfthly: The bank shall be provided with a confirmation receipt in the event that the accounting entry cannot be made, and they may be received as a trust as in paragraph (5/d).

b) Cash Payments:

Firstly: Cash payments through the foreign currency sale and purchase window:

1. Providing the bank with a written undertaking upon receipt of the participation amount in the foreign currency sale and purchase window obliging it to distribute the share of the companies participating with it according to the electronic distribution of this Bank and sending the undertaking within (48) hours.

Secondly - Cash Payments from the Bank's Balance with this Bank:

1. The bank shall commit to submitting tables in Excel format with the numbers of foreign currency banknotes received distributed to the final beneficiary in instalments or a single instalment, and in the event that it does not distribute all or part of the amount, we shall be informed by official letter showing the amount remaining within its vaults.
2. The bank may not submit more than one request to withdraw the amount in one day.

c) Criteria relied upon in rejecting foreign currency banknotes (dollars and euros) during counting and sorting operations if one of the descriptions listed in detail below applies to them:

Firstly: If it has sustained a cut in one of its corners or was torn or has lost any part of the note area.

Secondly: If it has sustained a tear and has been repaired with transparent adhesive tape from any side.

Thirdly: If it contains a large stamp or several small stamps that affect its features.

Fourthly: If it shows signs of circulation and use (worn) that affect its appearance or features.

Fifthly: If foreign materials have adhered to it and affected its features such as inks, dyes, glues, ground, cooked or paste materials, fats or oils.

Sixthly: If it has been stored in incorrect storage conditions leading to it yellowing or emitting a musty smell.

7- Mechanism for Transporting Cash Deposits

All banks must use armoured vehicles belonging to them or to entities specialised in transporting funds for the purpose of transporting cash deposits from and to this Bank and between banks, and provide us with the types and numbers of armoured vehicles or the entity responsible for transport.

8- Compliance with the Instructions Set Out Above

1. In the event that banks do not comply with the applicable instructions and banking violations are repeated and there is no response to our letters when requested, the Issue and Treasury Department shall recommend referring the violating bank to the Committee for Determining Penalties Imposed on Banks and Non-Banking Financial Institutions in accordance with the Central Bank of Iraq Law.

9 - The aforementioned instructions shall come into force from the date of issuing the letter and shall replace all our previous letters and circulars in this regard.

 

See also:

CBI to Support Dinar Stability

CBI Denies Dinar Revaluation Rumours as Inflation Falls

The Dinar Page

(Source: Central Bank of Iraq)