Parliament Approves the Second Maliki Government

That said, from the perspective of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki of the all-Shiite National Alliance, the process has been handled quite masterfully. From a situation where both the Kurds and the secular Iraqiyya entered the negotiations with ambitious agendas, he has managed to create an end game where many from the other parties were forced to abandon their principles (or at least saw them consigned to an uncertain future), with only the thirst for power in the shape of high government office remaining. The “robust power-sharing arrangements” and checks and balances that the United States has been calling for are nowhere to be seen; instead there are simply ministers – and a whole lot of them. Signifying the extent to which Maliki has managed to turn the tables, after months of talk about the need to check his tendency of centralising his own power in the security forces, the parliament today voted by a big majority to let him personally take care of the three most important security ministries for the time being.

As for how the individual players fared in today’s appointment, the outcome is a mixed one. It is logical to start with Iraqiyya, which was the big winner in the now distant 7 March elections. On the one hand, Iraqiyya has travelled quite far from its original negotiating position: They lost the premiership, and the future (and indeed the coming into existence) of the projected “national council for strategic policies” seems uncertain at this point since it is predicated on consensus on that thorny issue in the Iraqi parliament. Additionally, they have signed up to participate in a government which is based on agreements with the Kurds that contradict everything Iraqiyya stands for in terms of Iraqi nationalist policies. On the other hand, though, Iraqiyya has also scored some significant victories. First it secured the important speakership for Usama al-Nujayfi last November. Today, it was given what is by far the greatest slice of influence in the next government alongside that of Maliki’s own State of Law faction within the National Alliance. Rafi al-Eisawi has been given the all-important ministry of finance, and there are other high-level appointments for Salih al-Mutlak (deputy premier), Izz al-Din al-Dawla (agriculture), Muhammad Tamim (education), Abd al-Karim al-Samarraie (science and technology), Muhammad Allawi (communications), Ahmad al-Karbuli (industry) and Salah al-Jibburi (minister of state). Not all of these portfolios are equally important, but as a group these ministers will be the only point of gravity that could potentially form a challenge to Maliki’s own main backers (which include Jasim Muhammad Jaafar, a Turkmen, as sports minister, Muhammad Shiya al-Sudani of Maysan as minister for human rights, Ali al-Adib as minister for higher education, Husayn al-Shahristani as deputy premier, Ali al-Dabbagh and Safa al-Din al-Safi as ministers of state , plus a more technocratic but probably still reasonably Maliki-friendly new oil minister, Abd al-Karim Luaybi).

On the other hand, the Kurds have achieved relatively poor representation, with only one “hard” ministry (foreign) given to Hosyar Zibari. The other ministries given to them include health, commerce, women’s affairs, and, according to some accounts, civil society! Some reports said the Kurds wanted to press Maliki to sign an approval of their famous 19 demands, and some reports said they got the coveted signature. Signature or not, the problem for the Kurds are likely to be their comparatively minor role in the next government and the fact that most of their demands, such as the passage of an oil law, is predicated on both consensus within the unwieldy government and action by the Iraqi parliament.

The other assumed kingmaker in this process, the Sadrists, also have seen relatively modest results, with just two ministers proper (Nassar al-Rubayie for works and planning and Muhammad al-Darraji for housing and development), plus one minister of state (Abd al-Mahdi al-Mutayri). They are however expected to be remunerated for their backing of Maliki through high offices in some of the southern governorates, from where some leading Daawa people (such as Muhammad al-Sudani) now join the central government in Baghdad instead. Fadila received even less (Hasan al-Shammari at justice and a female minister of state), but the truly remarkable development in the Shiite camp must be the relative marginality of ISCI and Badr. Hadi al-Amiri was reasonably loyal to Maliki during the internal rivalry in the National Alliance and he has been awarded the transport ministry. Other than that, there is Hasan al-Sari who continues as minister of state for the southern marshlands (he is “Hizbollah in Iraq” rather than ISCI though), but not much else except possibly one of the less known new ministers of state.