100 Days: Maliki’s Frustrations and Unrealistic Dreams

More importantly, though, Maliki’s talk of alternatives to his own cabinet seems rather unrealistic in the current situation. Significantly, when it came to getting Khuzaie approved, Maliki had to rely on the votes of Iraqiyya and Hashemi, making it painfully clear that his so-called “political majority” had no existence as an alternative to Iraqiyya in parliament. If an alternative majority had existed, of course, Maliki would have found loyal security ministries and rushed them through parliament long time ago.

Indeed, Maliki’s recents hints about a government resignation comes across as something of a bluff. Dissolving parliament and having new elections seems too risky, and is mostly something that Ayad Allawi of Iraqiyya keeps focusing on. But the other alternative is risky, too. For the government to resign the prime minister – Maliki himself – would have to step down, and once more the president would have the task of appointing a new PM designate in accordance with article 76 of the constitution. Would Maliki feel sufficiently secure that the Kurds would not turn elsewhere or use the opportunity to extract another 10 conditions or so for supporting his next government? Perhaps his reported appointment today of Falih al-Fayyad of the Ibrahim al-Jaafari branch of the Daawa movement as deputy minister for national security tells the true story. It seemed more like a turn inwards than a sign of newfound confidence towards bold and new solutions.