These are certainly not justifications condoning that Maliki built a monopoly of power. Rather they can be a helpful standpoint from which to interpret the shortcomings of the Iraqi political reality, and to answer questions surrounding the role of Maliki in creating these flaws.
While Maliki succeeded in subjecting Iraq to the powers of the state by striking at al-Qaeda and the disparate militias between 2007 and 2009 in an operation dubbed Charge of the Knights, the parliament of Iraq was hapless in confronting the task of building the state, which required resolving more than 100 essential pieces of pending legislation.
At that time, the political center was preoccupied with disagreements that distracted it from the dangers of leaving the country without a legal framework to regulate the functions of its institutions.
Thus the Iraqi parliament neglected to pass laws governing the security forces and the army, failing to even heed the importance and gravity of these laws. This legal void led to accusations of Maliki monopolizing power with military resolutions, which have escalated more recently to accusations of a more serious nature. Maliki’s political associates have pleaded their non-involvement regarding Maliki’s expansion of power, despite the fact that they represent the majority in both parliament and government.
This reality expands beyond military regulations to many other functions of the state, which Maliki has also in turn been accused of monopolizing. Regardless of the credibility of these charges, the pivotal question is: Why were those functions of the state left undefined in the first place?