Custom Search

By John Lee.

Seven OPEC+ countries, including Iraq, have agreed to a production adjustment of 188,000 barrels per day (bpd) from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023, to be implemented in August 2026.

The countries, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman, met virtually on 5 July 2026 to review global market conditions and outlook, according to OPEC.

The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full, subject to evolving market conditions, and in a gradual manner. The move also gives participating countries an opportunity to accelerate their compensation for previous overproduction.

The seven countries reaffirmed the importance of a cautious approach, and said they would retain full flexibility to increase, pause, or reverse the phase-out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing those announced in November 2023.

They reiterated their collective commitment to full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments, which will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). The countries confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024.

The seven OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation, with the next meeting scheduled for 2 August 2026.

Full statement from OPEC:

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman adjust production and reaffirm commitment to market stability

The seven OPEC+ countries, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023, namely Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman met virtually on 5 July 2026, to review global market conditions and outlook.

In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the seven participating countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 188 thousand barrels per day from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented in August 2026 as detailed in the table below. The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments announced in November 2023.

The seven OPEC+ countries also noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. The seven countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024.

The seven OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation. The seven countries will meet on 2 August 2026.

(Source: OPEC)

By John Lee.

Basra Oil Company (BOC) signed a confidentiality agreement with Chevron of the United States on Wednesday to regulate the exchange of information for the evaluation of the West Qurna 2 oil field, and to negotiate future agreements.

According to the Ministry of Oil, West Qurna 2 is one of Iraq's giant oil fields, from which Russia's Lukoil had withdrawn.

Minister of Oil Basim Mohammed Khudair al-Abadi said the ministry was in negotiations with Chevron over a number of other projects in addition to West Qurna 2, and that it offered opportunities for international companies to invest in Iraq.

He added that such investment projects create work for local companies and Iraqi labour, as well as developing infrastructure and services in areas near project sites.

(Source: Ministry of Oil)

By Dr Kamran Yeganegi, for Middle East Monitor, under a Creative Commons licence. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The Strategic Value of Kurdish Gas for Europe's Energy Security

Europe's Energy Challenge is Far From Over

Europe has made significant progress in reducing its dependence on Russian natural gas since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Through increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, expanded purchases from Norway, and greater reliance on the Southern Gas Corridor, European governments have managed to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities that once defined the continent's energy landscape.

Yet the notion that Europe's energy security challenge has been resolved is misleading. Diversification is not a one-time achievement but a continuous strategic process. As geopolitical tensions continue to reshape global energy markets, Europe must identify new sources of supply capable of strengthening resilience and reducing dependence on a limited number of producers and transit routes.

In this context, one potential contributor remains largely overlooked in European energy debates: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Located at the intersection of the Middle East, Turkiye, and European energy markets, the Kurdistan Region possesses substantial natural gas resources that could play an important role in Europe's long-term energy strategy.

Why Kurdish Gas Matters

The Kurdistan Region possesses some of the most promising undeveloped gas reserves in the Middle East. Fields such as Khor Mor and Chemchemal already contribute to regional energy production, while additional projects including Miran and Topkhana-Kurdamir have the potential to significantly increase output in the coming years.

Unlike many energy producers in the Gulf, whose exports depend heavily on maritime routes vulnerable to regional instability, the Kurdistan Region enjoys a unique geographic advantage. Its proximity to Turkiye creates the possibility of direct pipeline connections to existing energy infrastructure serving European markets.

For Europe, the importance of Kurdish gas extends beyond additional supply volumes. Every new source of energy reduces strategic dependence on existing suppliers and enhances the flexibility of the broader energy system. The lessons of the Ukraine crisis demonstrated that excessive reliance on a single supplier can quickly evolve from an economic issue into a geopolitical vulnerability.

Kurdish gas offers Europe an opportunity to strengthen diversification before another crisis emerges.

Turkiye's Ambition and the Emerging Energy Corridor

No discussion of Kurdish gas can be separated from Turkiye's growing role in regional energy geopolitics.

Existing infrastructure already connects Caspian resources to European consumers through Turkiye, while new initiatives continue to expand the country's importance within regional energy networks.

The Southern Gas Corridor has become one of the European Union's most significant non-Russian energy routes. Carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan through Turkiye into European markets, the corridor has demonstrated both technical feasibility and geopolitical relevance.

However, its future effectiveness depends on diversification within the corridor itself.

Adding Kurdish gas would strengthen the resilience of this network by increasing available supply and reducing dependence on a limited number of sources. Rather than competing with Azerbaijani exports, Kurdish production could complement them, creating a more robust energy architecture stretching from the Middle East to Europe.

For Turkiye, the benefits are equally clear. Kurdish gas could contribute to domestic energy security, reinforce Ankara's role as a transit hub, and deepen economic interdependence with northern Iraq.

This convergence of interests creates a rare alignment between economic incentives and geopolitical objectives.

The Political Obstacle: Baghdad and Erbil

Despite its strategic potential, the future of Kurdish gas exports ultimately depends on politics.

The long-standing dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over hydrocarbon governance remains one of the most significant barriers to large-scale energy development. Successive Iraqi governments have maintained that energy contracts must be managed through federal institutions, while the Kurdistan Regional Government has consistently defended its authority to conclude agreements independently.

The result has been years of legal uncertainty.

For international investors, uncertainty is often more damaging than risk itself. Energy companies are prepared to operate in challenging environments, but they require predictable legal frameworks before committing billions of dollars to long-term projects.

Without a durable political settlement between Baghdad and Erbil, many of the region's most promising gas projects may struggle to attract the investment necessary for large-scale development and export infrastructure.

The challenge extends beyond domestic Iraqi politics. European policymakers seeking diversified energy supplies and Turkish officials pursuing regional energy connectivity cannot replace the need for an internal Iraqi consensus. Sustainable energy cooperation requires a governance framework accepted by both federal and regional authorities.

Security and Infrastructure Challenges

Political disagreements are not the only concern.

Recent attacks targeting energy facilities in northern Iraq have highlighted the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Incidents affecting gas production facilities have demonstrated how security disruptions can influence both energy supply and investor confidence.

Energy corridors require long-term stability. Pipelines are not short-term projects; they are strategic investments expected to operate for decades. As a result, international investors evaluate not only resource availability but also political stability, infrastructure security, and institutional reliability.

These concerns should not be underestimated. However, they should also be viewed in perspective.

Many of today's successful energy corridors emerged despite significant geopolitical challenges. The Southern Gas Corridor itself was once regarded as an ambitious project facing considerable political and technical obstacles. Yet sustained political commitment transformed that vision into reality.

The same could be true for Kurdish gas if regional stakeholders demonstrate sufficient strategic determination.

A Strategic Opportunity for Europe

European energy policy often focuses on immediate challenges. Yet strategic planning requires a longer horizon.

The Kurdistan Region is unlikely to become a major supplier to Europe overnight. Infrastructure development, political agreements, and investment decisions require time. However, the essential foundations already exist: substantial gas reserves, geographic proximity to Turkiye, established energy cooperation, and growing European interest in diversified supply chains.

The question facing European policymakers is not whether Kurdish gas can replace existing suppliers. It cannot.

The more relevant question is whether Europe can afford to ignore a resource capable of strengthening long-term energy resilience.

The post-Ukraine energy order remains under construction. While Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian gas, the search for secure and diversified supplies continues. Strategic foresight requires identifying tomorrow's opportunities before they become urgent necessities.

In that regard, the Kurdistan Region deserves far greater attention than it currently receives.

Conclusion

The future of European energy security will depend not only on reducing dependence but also on expanding strategic options.

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq offers one such option. Its considerable gas reserves, advantageous geography, and proximity to existing transit infrastructure provide a foundation for a potentially significant energy corridor connecting the Middle East with European markets.

The obstacles are undeniable. Political disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil, security concerns, infrastructure requirements, and investment challenges all remain substantial barriers.

Yet history demonstrates that major energy corridors are rarely created under ideal circumstances. They emerge when political leaders recognize long-term strategic interests and act before opportunities are lost.

For Europe, Kurdish gas should not be viewed merely as a regional resource. It should be understood as a potential strategic asset in an increasingly uncertain energy landscape. The real question is whether Europe, Turkiye, Baghdad, and Erbil possess the political vision necessary to transform that potential into reality.

By John Lee.

Seven OPEC+ member states have agreed to implement a combined production adjustment of 188,000 barrels per day (bpd) in July 2026, according to a statement from the group. The countries involved are Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman.

The group met virtually on Saturday to review global market conditions. The adjustment forms part of the additional voluntary production cuts first announced in April 2023, which the seven countries said may be returned in part or in full subject to market conditions.

The seven nations reaffirmed the importance of retaining flexibility to increase, pause, or reverse the phase-out of voluntary adjustments, including those announced in November 2023. They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduction since January 2024, with the compensation period extended to the end of December 2026.

Conformity and compensation will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). The group will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, with the next scheduled for 5 July 2026.

Full statement from OPEC:

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman adjust production and reaffirm commitment to market stability

The seven OPEC+ countries, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023, namely Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman met virtually on 7 June 2026, to review global market conditions and outlook.

In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the seven participating countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 188 thousand barrels per day from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented in July 2026 as detailed in the table below. The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments announced in November 2023.

The seven OPEC+ countries also noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. The seven countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024. The compensation period will be extended until the end of December 2026.

The seven OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation. The seven countries will meet on 5 July 2026.

(Source: OPEC)

By John Lee.

Seven OPEC+ member countries have agreed to implement a production adjustment of 188,000 barrels per day (bpd) in June 2026, following a virtual meeting held on 3 May 2026.

The seven countries involved are Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman, all of which had previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023. [United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced that it will exit the OPEC and OPEC+ from 1st May.]

The group stated that the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full, subject to market conditions, on a gradual basis. Key points from the meeting include:

• A production adjustment of 188,000 bpd to be implemented in June 2026
• Full flexibility retained to increase, pause, or reverse the phase-out of voluntary adjustments, including those announced in November 2023
• Commitment to full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including monitoring by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC)
• Intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024
• Monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation

The seven countries will hold their next meeting on 7 June 2026.

Full statement from OPEC:

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman adjust production and reaffirm commitment to market stability

The seven OPEC+ countries, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023, namely Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman met virtually on 3 May 2026, to review global market conditions and outlook.

In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the seven participating countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 188 thousand barrels per day from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented in June 2026 as detailed in the table below. The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments announced in November 2023.

The seven OPEC+ countries also noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. The seven countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024.

The seven OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation. The seven countries will meet on 7 June 2026.

(Source: OPEC)

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The American - Israeli War Against Iran, the Unprecedented Severe International Energy Crisis and Detrimental Impacts on Iraq

On Friday evening, April 10th, the esteemed "Al-Mushtarak" platform graciously organized a debating event in which I discussed the implications, complexities, and consequences of the above topic. Here is a brief report on the event.

I began the PowerPoint presentation by asserting my conviction that the US-Israeli aggression against Iran has created and continues to create an unprecedented severe international energy crisis. The longer the aggression persists, the deeper the "energy crisis" becomes, and its cumulative consequences could potentially lead to an "energy catastrophe" on a global scale. I argued further that the world may witness and suffer from a form of "Imperialism of capture and control over resources through military means" in tenuous international law and relations.

The first part of my presentation analyses the components, indicators, and developments of the energy crisis. It begins by presenting the reasons that lead to the belief that what we are witnessing is an unprecedented, severe, and impactful international energy crisis. This is followed by identifying key terms for understanding the sequence, hierarchy, and cumulative nature of an international energy crisis: Availability, Reliability, Durability, Accessibility, Deliverability, Affordability, Ramifications, and Actions. Through the dynamics of the energy multiplier, accelerator, and deepener, the energy crisis of today could be worsened into an energy catastrophe on the global level.

Because oil price exhibits the most significant direct consequences of the war, the mechanisms impacting oil price movements -- market fundamentals, market sentiments, and the new America-specific TACO (Trump Always Chicken Out) Trading -- were analysed, along with their potential to cause stagflation in economic activity. This constitutes the heavy "political cost" of launching and continuing the aggression, especially for Trump.

While the focus, in the prevailing narratives, is on West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent crude prices, I observe that the price levels of other crudes -- Dubai, Oman, and Urals/Russian -- have been and remain significantly higher than those of WTI and Brent. Since the prices of Dubai and Oman crudes are the benchmarks for pricing, with premium, the Arabian Gulf crude oil destined for East Asian markets, and because East Asian refineries are important sources of exported petroleum products to Europe and America, the impact of increased prices of petroleum and petrochemical products on the final consumer reflects the prices of crude oil imported from the Arabian Gulf countries and Russia more, and far greater, than the increase in WTI and Brent crude prices. Hence, there is a need for a mindset shift when considering oil price consequences. This section was premised on information, data, and statistics compiled from reliable international sources.

The second part addressed the repercussions on Iraq's oil sector and the measures taken by the authorities to mitigate them.

It began by discussing the importance and necessity of activating the contractual clauses related to force majeure by all Iraqi companies affiliated with the Ministry of Oil. This is vital to avoid potentially very high costs Iraq could incur if force majeure were not invoked, particularly in the upstream petroleum projects under the concluded bid rounds and other modalities. The Ministry's companies have not yet invoked the article in a contractual, standardized, and comprehensive manner.

This part presented and discussed possible and available alternatives proposed by the authorities for exporting crude oil and fuel oil via pipelines and trucks, highlighting the non-availability, limitations, and lack of economic viability of such alternatives.

Data on Iraqi oil exports indicates very low generated revenues during March due to a thin export volume through the southern outlets. The price levels of Basra Medium and Basra Heavy crude oil in the US markets were higher than those of WTI and Brent crude, since SOMO uses another benchmark -- ASCI -- for pricing its exports to the American market.

The section also discussed the chronic problem of Iraqi refineries, which is characterised by high fuel oil production and limited production of gasoline and diesel/gas oil. The extent to which official directives disregard this chronic reality by calling for increasing refinery production at maximum capacity, without considering the lack of sufficient storage capacity for the fuel oil surplus production, was also discussed.

The problem of associated gas shortages due to halting oil production was also addressed, along with its repercussions on cooking/heating gas -- LPG production -- and electricity generation activities. This is a chronic dilemma that Iraq has suffered from for decades, and it will only worsen further with the approaching summer, characterised by soaring temperatures.

The Ministry has taken a number of belated and limited measures that cannot compensate for its failure in previous years to take sufficient precautionary measures to confront the consequences of a well-known and highly probable crisis.

The third part includes a number of other important and relevant considerations of geopolitical, geomilitary, geostrategic, and international relations dimensions, as well as concluding remarks.

The event included discussion, comments, and questions after my presentation. The full recording of the event, in Arabic, can be viewed and downloaded through the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dBrKmWxiFQ [Arabic]

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.

By John Lee.

The Iraqi government has confirmed tax settlement arrangements related to operations at the West Qurna 2 oil field, as part of broader contractual and financial adjustments.

Under the decision, North Oil Company (NOC), as the government partner in the contract, will settle the tax obligations in accordance with Decision No. 41 of 2026.

The Council of Ministers also confirmed that outstanding liabilities attributed to Russia's Lukoil have been incorporated into the total value of the final settlement approved under Decision No. 129 of 2026.

The settlement framework includes tax dues for the years 2025 and 2026.

(Source: PMO)

By John Lee.

OPEC has announced that eight OPEC+ countries will implement a production adjustment of 206,000 barrels per day in May 2026, as part of ongoing efforts to stabilise global oil markets.

The decision was taken during a virtual meeting on 5 April involving Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman.

The eight countries will continue to meet monthly to review market conditions, compliance, and compensation, with the next meeting scheduled for 3 May 2026.

Full statement from OPEC:

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman adjust production and reaffirm commitment to market stability

The eight OPEC+ countries, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023, namely Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman met virtually on 5 April 2026, to review global market conditions and outlook.

In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the eight participating countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 206 thousand barrels per day from the 1.65 million barrels per day additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented in May 2026 as detailed in the table below. The 1.65 million barrels per day may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments of the 2.2 million barrels per day announced in November 2023.

The eight OPEC+ countries also noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. The eight countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024.

In addition, the eight OPEC+ countries reiterated the JMMC's statement for its 65th meeting, highlighting the critical importance of safeguarding international maritime routes to ensure the uninterrupted flow of energy.

The eight countries also expressed concern regarding attacks on energy infrastructure, noting that restoring damaged energy assets to full capacity is both costly and takes a long time, thereby affecting overall supply availability. Accordingly, they stressed that any actions undermining energy supply security, whether through attacks on infrastructure or disruption of international maritime routes, increase market volatility and weaken the collective efforts under the DoC to support market stability for the benefit of producers, consumers, and the global economy. In this regard, the eight countries commended the DoC countries that took the initiative to ensure the continued availability of supplies, particularly through the use of alternative export routes, which have contributed to reducing market volatility.

The eight OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation. The eight countries will meet on 3 May 2026.

(Source: OPEC)

By John Lee.

The Iraqi government has reviewed a proposed settlement with Lukoil following its withdrawal from the West Qurna 2 field.

The discussions took place during a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, with the participation of Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs and Minister of Oil Hayan Abdul Ghani Al-Sawad, Finance Minister Taif Sami, and senior oil ministry officials.

The meeting addressed the legal framework for a final settlement with Lukoil, examining the causes of delays and agreeing on key points to establish a legal basis for the agreement. A final recommendation has been submitted to the Council of Ministers for decision.

In February, the Prime Minister's Office reported that the cabinet had approved a settlement with Lukoil to transfer operations to Basra Oil Company (BOC).

(Source: Ministry of Oil)

By Simon Watkins for OilPrice.com. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

How Chevron's New Deals Could Transform Iraq's Production Outlook

The very recent signing of two sets of major oil deals by U.S. oil giant Chevron following the forced withdrawal of Russian firms from key energy projects in Iraq is a key turning point in the West's resurgence in the Middle East, a senior U.S. Treasury source told OilPrice.com last week.

Click here to read the full report.

See also:

Jiyad: Preliminary Assessment of Chevron Agreements