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By John Lee.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi met US President Donald Trump at the White House on Tuesday to discuss bilateral economic cooperation, opportunities for American companies in Iraqi development projects, and the future of the Iraq-US relationship following the conclusion of the US military coalition presence in the country.

According to the Iraqi Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the talks covered oil sector cooperation, security and intelligence collaboration, and joint efforts to promote regional stability.

Speaking after the meeting in the Oval Office, Ali al-Zaidi said the visit aimed to build a strong economic partnership, noting that as the US military presence under the international coalition against ISIS draws to a close, the focus would shift to an economic presence through American companies. He said the relationship should be grounded in people-to-people ties supporting economic cooperation rather than military partnership.

Al-Zaidi described the partnership as a link between Iraq, one of the world's oldest civilisations, and the United States as the heart of the global economy, emphasising that it would serve the interests of both peoples. He said Iraq needed a strategic partner of the scale of the United States to navigate its economic and technological challenges, and that planned development and economic cooperation would extend to the Kurdistan Region, Basra, Anbar, and all Iraqi governorates.

Trump said the United States had supported Iraq in the fight against ISIS and was backing the al-Zaidi government in reinforcing stability and the economic steps that underpin the bilateral partnership, highlighting Iraq's significance in energy and the international economy.

(Source: Iraqi Prime Minister's Office)

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Ali al-Zaidi in Washington: What His Trip Actually Means for the Dinar

The forums have been buzzing. Iraq's prime minister is in Washington. He met Trump in the Oval Office. There were handshakes, warm words, and promises of deals. For the segment of dinar holders who treat every piece of Iraqi news as a potential trigger for the long-awaited revaluation, this week's visit looked like exactly the kind of high-level momentum they have been waiting for.

So let's look at what actually happened, what it means, and what it doesn't.

What al-Zaidi Was There to Discuss

Trump and al-Zaidi met at the White House on Tuesday, with both leaders pledging to deepen economic ties and boost Iraq's oil output. The visit was al-Zaidi's first international trip since taking office in May, and the agenda was clear well before the handshakes. Oil and gas agreements were expected to be signed, with US companies set to boost Iraq's production capacity and reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

Al-Zaidi was expected to sign several agreements, including a deal to establish a fund into which Iraq will deposit half a million barrels of oil per day in exchange for the US helping to boost the country's electricity supply. In a show of support for al-Zaidi's administration, the US also resumed cash shipments for Iraq's oil revenue, which have been handled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York since 2003.

Trump's framing was characteristically direct. He said "massive" new oil deals with Iraq would be announced soon, adding: "Iraq has tremendous potential because of their oil and because of other things. We're going to create a lot of jobs for both countries, and we're going to be taking out a lot of oil. A lot of oil is coming out, and the American companies are doing it."

Al-Zaidi, for his part, described a shift in the relationship's character. He said: "On the 30th of September, the US forces will be out of Iraq, while these companies will be inside Iraq. The social relations is about like economy, it's not about like military relations."

The Security Dimension

The visit was not only about oil. The disarming of pro-Iran Iraqi armed factions and restricting weapons under state authority, as well as Baghdad's relationship with Tehran, were expected to be among the issues the US side would raise. Al-Zaidi has set a September 30, 2026 deadline for all armed factions to disarm, which aligns with the withdrawal of the international coalition's military troops.

That deadline is significant, and not only for security reasons. Washington's willingness to resume dollar shipments to Iraq, and to deepen the oil investment relationship, is directly connected to Baghdad's progress on militia disarmament. The Trump administration has issued sanctions on Iran-backed militias, including Kata'ib Hizballah and Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haqq. The economic partnership being discussed this week is inseparable from the political conditions the US expects Baghdad to meet.

Shortly before al-Zaidi's departure, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of Iran-backed armed groups, rejected the prime minister's visit and its outcomes. That rejection is a reminder that the September disarmament deadline is an aspiration, not a settled outcome.

What the Dinar Forums Are Saying - and Why They're Wrong

Predictably, parts of the dinar speculation community have interpreted this week's visit as a bullish signal. A US-backed prime minister, Oval Office optics, Trump talking about "massive deals" - for those primed to read every development as a precursor to revaluation, the ingredients are all there.

They are not.

Nothing discussed in Washington this week has any bearing on the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar. The agenda was oil production, electricity infrastructure, militia disarmament, and the withdrawal of US troops. The Central Bank of Iraq sets exchange rate policy, not the prime minister, and not the White House. As noted in our November 2025 coverage, the CBI issued a formal statement confirming there is "no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar," explicitly calling revaluation rumours "speculation aimed at disrupting the market and undermining economic stability." That statement has not been withdrawn or updated. No CBI official was in Washington this week.

The resumption of dollar cash shipments to Iraq, which some forum commentators have flagged as significant, is also being misread. The US resumed those shipments as a signal of support for al-Zaidi's administration - a diplomatic tool, not a monetary one. The dollar pipeline from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York exists to allow Iraq to pay for imports and manage its oil revenues. It is not a mechanism for dinar revaluation, and its resumption says nothing about where the IQD/USD exchange rate is headed.

What the Visit Actually Represents

Taken on its own terms, the Washington trip was a genuine diplomatic achievement for al-Zaidi. His administration has prioritised anti-corruption investigations, including "Operation Dawn," which resulted in 67 arrests and the seizure of 375 kilograms of gold. That kind of concrete action gave him something real to show Washington, and the warmth of the reception reflected it.

Al-Zaidi has said he wants to move the relationship "beyond crisis management to opportunity creation, particularly opportunities that have a measurable economic impact." That framing is credible in the context of what was actually discussed: US companies entering Iraq's oil and gas sector, electricity infrastructure investment, and a structured path toward ending the US military presence.

These are meaningful developments for Iraq's long-term economic trajectory. A more stable fiscal position, deeper US investment, and a functioning relationship with Washington are all positive for the country. None of them, individually or together, creates a mechanism by which foreign holders of physical Iraqi banknotes profit.

The Bottom Line

Al-Zaidi's Washington visit was about oil, security, and the future shape of the US-Iraq relationship. It was a successful first international trip by a prime minister who needed to demonstrate credibility in Washington, and by most accounts he achieved that. The deals being discussed - energy agreements, electricity investment, alternative export routes - are the substance of a serious bilateral relationship.

For holders of physical Iraqi dinars waiting for a life-changing revaluation, however, the calculus is unchanged. The Central Bank has not altered its position. The exchange rate was not on the agenda at the White House. Trump's enthusiasm for Iraqi oil is enthusiasm for American companies extracting and profiting from that oil - not a signal that the dinar is about to multiply in value.

The forums will find reasons to be excited. They always do. But the question worth asking, before the next intel call tells you that the Oval Office handshake was a coded signal, is a simpler one: was the word "revaluation" spoken anywhere in Washington this week?

It wasn't.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor - not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page.

From The New York Times. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

U.S. Resumes Dollar Transfers to Iraq After Monthslong Suspension

The Trump administration had halted the shipments to Iraq as part of its efforts to pressure the Baghdad government to distance itself from Iran.

Click here to read the full article. (Subscription required.)

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of June:

1. Iraqi Central Bank Rejects Rumours of New Dinar Rate
2. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
3. "Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment
4. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
5. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
6. New Governor Takes Charge at Iraq's Central Bank
7. What a New Iraqi PM means for Your Dinars
8. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
9. Iraqi Dinar Prospects: Reality Check After Six Months of Trump
10. CBI Instructions for Exchanging Dinars

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

Iraq and US Reaffirm Strategic Partnership, Eye White House Meeting in July

Iraq-US Joint Statement Outlines Energy, Security and Investment Goals

Chevron, Starlink and Pipeline Rehabilitation Among Priorities in Iraq-US Joint Statement

By John Lee.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Tom Barrack, Special Presidential Envoy of President Trump, have reaffirmed the commitment of both governments to building a strong and mutually beneficial US-Iraq partnership. Barrack conveyed President Trump's wish to receive Prime Minister al-Zaidi at the White House in mid-July to discuss the future of the relationship.

According to the Iraqi Prime Minister's Office, the two sides discussed the Iraqi government's vision for a future free from terrorism and outlined plans for the complete disarmament and dissolution of all armed groups operating outside state authority, the consolidation of weapons under state control, and the imposition of full sovereignty - with the aim of ensuring Iraq is kept clear of regional conflicts and that its territory is not used by any party to threaten regional peace.

Prime Minister al-Zaidi reaffirmed Iraq's commitment to deepening bilateral trade and investment relations. Both sides welcomed a series of specific commercial developments, including:

• Iraq's decision to complete the granting of an operating licence to Starlink to provide internet services to Iraqi consumers
• The launch of negotiations with Chevron for the development of the West Qurna 2 and Nasiriyah oil fields
• The resumption of operations by US companies HKN, Western Zagros and Hunt, with full security guarantees
• Progress on a memorandum of understanding with TI Capital for the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Banias pipeline as a vital oil export route
• Expansion of US-Iraq commercial cooperation to support Iraq's electricity needs, including US-based Excelerate Energy's project to develop a floating liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal at Khor al-Zubair

Both sides also affirmed their support for a strong, unified and sovereign federal Iraq grounded in constitutional institutions, with full equality for all citizens.

(Source: Prime Minister's Office)

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of May:

1. CBI Boss says No Plan to Revalue Iraqi Dinar
2. What a New Iraqi PM means for Your Dinars
3. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
4. Iraq Banking Sector Reform: Second Phase Under Way
5. "Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment
6. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
7. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
8. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
9. Central Bank Advances Iraqi Banking Reform, Eases Foreign Transactions
10. Iraq's "Swiss dinar" still lives on in Kurdistan Livestock Markets

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By John Lee.

Tom Barrack, the United States Ambassador to Türkiye, has been appointed Special Presidential Envoy to both Syria and Iraq, while retaining his ambassadorial post in Ankara.

The appointment was announced on Truth Social by President Donald Trump, who said Barrack would operate with the full backing of the US Department of State as Washington advances its strategic cooperation with the governments of Iraq and Syria.

(Source: Truth Social)

By John Lee.

The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly, along with several other individuals and businesses, as part of a sanctions action targeting what it describes as the exploitation of Iraq's oil sector to benefit Iran and Iran-aligned militias.

The Treasury said Maarij had used his official positions, including as head of the Iraqi parliament's oil and gas committee and subsequently within the Ministry of Oil, to facilitate the diversion of Iraqi oil products for the benefit of oil smuggler Salim Ahmed Said and Iran-backed militia Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). OFAC alleged that Maarij authorised the trucking of several million dollars' worth of oil per day from the Qayara Oil Field to VS Oil Terminal FZE (VS Oil) in Khor al Zubair for export, where Iranian oil was allegedly mixed with Iraqi oil before being shipped to market.

Iraq's Ministry of Oil has denied the allegations against Al-Bahadly. In a statement, the Ministry said it rejects the accusations and affirms its full respect for legal procedures and the Iraqi judiciary. The Ministry said it is fully prepared to cooperate with any fair investigation, expressing confidence in the role of the Iraqi judiciary and the Integrity Commission.

Full statement from OFAC:

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) increased economic pressure on Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq by designating individuals and businesses exploiting Iraq's oil sector and undermining the country's security.  This action includes Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly,Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, who abuses his position to facilitate the diversion of oil to be sold for the benefit of the Iranian regime and its proxy militias in Iraq.  OFAC is also designating three senior leaders of Iran-aligned terrorist militias Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada and Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq.  The United States will continue to hold these groups and other Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Iraq, such as Kata'ib Hizballah, accountable for their attacks against U.S. personnel and civilians, diplomatic facilities, and businesses across Iraq, which the groups conduct without regard for Iraq's sovereignty or democratic process.

"Like a rogue gang, the Iranian regime is pillaging resources that rightfully belong to the Iraqi people," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "Treasury will not stand idly by as Iran's military exploits Iraqi oil to fund terrorism against the United States and our partners."

OFAC is taking today's actions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets key sectors of Iran's economy, including Iran's petroleum sector, and E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups, their supporters, and those who aid acts of terrorism.  Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to

E.O. 13224, as amended, and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2020.  Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada was designated as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, in 2023 and as an FTO in 2025.

ECONOMIC FURY DELIVERS MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN

The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime's ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds.  Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted billions in projected oil revenue, taken actions that have led to the freezing of  nearly half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency, and cracked down on Tehran's shadow banking networks.

Treasury remains ready to take economic action against Iran's defense industrial base so that Iran cannot reconstitute its production capacity and project power outside its borders.  Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including airlines, and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate Iran's activities-including those connected to the People's Republic of China's independent "teapot" oil refineries.

Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions. Treasury will vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people.

Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime's primary revenue stream, and any person or vessel facilitating the illicit flow of oil or other products risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.

CORRUPTION IN IRAQ'S MINISTRY OF OIL

OFAC today designated Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly (Maarij), who has been instrumental in facilitating the diversion of Iraqi oil products to benefit known Iran-affiliated oil smuggler Salim Ahmed Said (Said) as well as Iran-backed terrorist militia Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH).  For years, Maarij has used his official positions-first as the head of the Iraqi parliament's oil and gas committee, and then within the Iraq Ministry of Oil-to enrich Said, AAH, and by extension, Iran.

OFAC designated Said in June 2025 for running a network of companies selling Iranian oil falsely declared as Iraqi oil to avoid sanctions, including designated VS Oil Terminal FZE (VS Oil).  Integral to this operation was Said's ability to obtain favored access to Iraqi oil and procure forged documentation from Iraqi government officials, legitimizing illicit oil.  To that end, Said was responsible for bribing complicit officials in the Iraqi government, as well as reportedly installing Maarij in his official position.

Since 2018, Maarij has held multiple positions in Iraq's Ministry of Oil, including head of the licensing and contracts office, Deputy Minister, and acting Minister of Oil.  In his official capacities, Maarij enabled Said to illicitly procure oil products by granting exportation rights to Said's companies.  Maarij authorized trucking several million dollars' worth of oil per day from the Qayarah oil field to VS Oil in Khor Zubayr for export. VS Oil oversaw the mixing of Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before being shipped to market.  Maarij is also responsible for falsifying documentation on the provenance of oil for Said's network, enabling it to be smuggled to market disguised as purely Iraqi oil.

Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Salim Ahmed Said.

IRAQI MILITIA EXPLOITING RESOURCES

Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili (Al-Behadili), also known as Sayyid Awn, is a leader and economic official for AAH.  Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Al-Behadili played an important role in developing an oil trucking and security unit, allowing AAH to become a dominant actor in the Iraqi metals industry, as well as enabling AAH's entrance into fuel oil theft, which focused on stolen or subsidized oil.

Working directly with U.S.-designated AAH senior leader Laith Al-Khazali, Al-Behadili controlled oil smuggling financing and oversaw mineral industry activities for AAH.  In southern Iraq, Al-Behadili managed oil smuggling operations and AAH projects, using businesses, projects, and government contracts as a front for AAH financial activity.  As part of his activities on behalf of AAH, Al-Behadili was also complicit in dealing directly with Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.  In his capacity as AAH Economic Committee member, Al-Behadili was involved in negotiating contracts to ship oil from Iran and coordinating with the IRGC-QF on shipping AAH's oil.

Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq.

Al-Behadili owns or controls four Iraqi companies that operate in the oil sector-Gulf Energy Oil Services Limited, Gulf General Contracting Limited, Iraq International Energy for the Import and Sale for Petroleum Products Limited, and Gulf Energy for General Transport and Marine Services and Real Estate Consultancy LLC-all of which are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili.

IRAN-BACKED TERRORIST MILITIA OFFICIALS

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) is an Iran-aligned terrorist militia that has planned and executed numerous attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria.  Ahmed Khudair Maksus Maksus is the former KSS Deputy Secretary General under U.S.-designated Secretary General Hashim Finyan Rahim al-Saraji.  Mohammed Issa Kadhim al-Shuwaili (Al-Shuwaili), operating under the alias Abu Maryam, is a senior KSS official.  Since at least 2025, Al-Shuwaili has collaborated directly with Hizballah illicit finance team members, including Ali Qasir, on the purchase and delivery of weapons into Iraq.  Al-Shuwaili also arranged the payment of millions of dollars to Hizballah to facilitate the purchase of weapons, and coordinated logistics related to the transfer and delivery of the weapons with Hizballah associates.

Ahmed Khudair Maksus Maksus is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.  Mohammed Issa Kadhim al-Shuwaili is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Ali Qasir, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.  Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.  FinCEN is currently accepting whistleblower tips.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions.  OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked today.

Full statement from the Ministry of Oil (Baghdad):

This unofficial translation is provided in good faith for general information only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, Iraq Business News accepts no responsibility for any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations.

Clarification

The Ministry of Oil denies the accusations directed at the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Oil for Distribution Affairs, Mr. Ali Maaraj Al-Bahadli. While the Ministry affirms its full respect for legal procedures and the Iraqi judiciary, it emphasizes the importance of adopting transparency and accountability in handling all cases and accusations based on evidence and facts, away from any other considerations or interpretations.

The Ministry announces its full readiness to cooperate and to conduct any fair investigation regarding what has been stated, stemming from its belief in the role of the Iraqi judiciary and the Integrity Commission, and its respect for the oversight and legal institutions of the state.

The Ministry also affirms that crude oil export operations, marketing, tanker loading, and related procedures do not fall within the duties of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Oil for Distribution Affairs, as the relevant authorities and companies handle this file in accordance with established contexts and mechanisms.

The Ministry notes that the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) had previously issued a statement clarifying export and marketing mechanisms, and denied what was raised regarding the aforementioned matter.

(Sources: US Department of the Treasury; Iraq Ministry of Oil)

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of April:

1. "Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment
2. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
3. What a New Iraqi PM means for Your Dinars
4. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
5. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
6. Digital IQD Proposal targets $7-12bn Economic Gains
7. CBI lists Authorised Exchange Firms for Dollar Sales
8. IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar
9. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
10. Dinar-Dollar Demand Shifts as Import Dynamics Adjust

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq Has a New Prime Minister. Here's What It Means for Your Dinars (Spoiler: Not What the Forums Are Saying)

After five months of political deadlock, Iraq finally has a prime minister-designate. Ali al-Zaidi, a successful 40-year-old businessman with no prior political experience, was nominated by the Coordination Framework, Iraq's largest Shiite parliamentary bloc, on April 27, 2026, breaking an impasse that had pushed the country past its constitutional deadline.

So what does this nomination actually mean for Iraq, and for those holding physical Iraqi dinars in hope of a dramatic revaluation?

Who Is Ali al-Zaidi?

According to media accounts, Al-Zaidi was born in Baghdad in 1986 into a family from the southern Dhi Qar province. He holds a master's degree in banking and finance and is a member of the Iraqi Bar Association. He has extensive business experience, owning the Taawon Hypermarket shopping centres in Baghdad, the Al Awees holding company, and the local news outlet Dijlah TV.

This is the first time in Iraq's modern history that a businessman with no previous political experience has been named prime minister, according to Nabil Al-Marsoomi, an economics professor at Basra University. That is a genuinely notable development. Iraq's post-2003 prime ministers have all been career politicians shaped, and constrained, by the country's entrenched sectarian power-sharing system. Al-Zaidi arrives without that baggage, and without those alliances.

Al-Zaidi has friendly relations with much of Iraq's political elite, including figures aligned with both Iran and the United States, and would bring a strong business background to the office. A number of Kurdish and Sunni politicians have expressed openness to supporting his bid to form a government.

His political anonymity was the asset that got him here. He arrived at the nomination without enemies, and without allies of his own. In Iraq's fractured system, that made him the path of least resistance.

See also: 4 Top Profiles of the New Iraqi PM Designate

The Banking Question That Won't Go Away

The most significant complication in al-Zaidi's background, and the one most relevant to dinar holders, involves his former role in Iraq's banking sector.

He was chairman of Al-Janoob Islamic Bank for Investment and Finance, one of eight Iraqi commercial banks banned from engaging in US dollar transactions since early 2024. The ban was imposed by the Central Bank of Iraq, reportedly at the direction of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which cited concerns over fraud, money laundering and other illegal use of US currency.

This matters because Iraq's currency stability, oil revenues, and access to dollar reserves are all ultimately dependent on its relationship with US financial institutions. A prime minister whose previous banking role was linked to an institution sanctioned for dollar smuggling, in a country where dollar smuggling to Iran has been a persistent flashpoint with Washington, faces a obvious credibility test.

That said, some important nuance is worth noting. Legal sources familiar with the issue told Al-Monitor that there are no US sanctions on either Al-Janoob Islamic Bank or Zaidi personally. The sources said that the block was "due to the risks associated with the bank's ownership," adding that an independent review found no evidence of any direct outflow of funds from the bank to malign actors. And al-Zaidi is reported to have stepped down as chairman of Al-Janoob Islamic Bank in 2019, five years before the dollar transaction ban was imposed.

The distinction matters, but it does not make the association disappear. Washington will not judge the new prime minister by his CV. It will judge him by his cabinet appointments, his relationship with Iran-backed militias, and whether Iraq's banking system is used as a conduit for sanctions evasion.

The Geopolitical Tightrope

Al-Zaidi's nomination cannot be separated from the wider regional picture, which is as difficult as it has been in years.

The Coordination Framework's decision came after a weeks-long deadlock in which former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had been the initial candidate. His candidacy was withdrawn after US President Donald Trump threatened to withhold Iraq's access to dollars over al-Maliki's pro-Iranian stance. Al-Zaidi is, in this sense, a compromise forced partly by Washington's veto power over Iraq's financial lifelines.

The Trump administration has made clear its opposition to Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq, and the US embassy in Baghdad offered only cautious "best wishes" to al-Zaidi -- signalling engagement without explicit endorsement. Washington emphasised benchmarks of counter-terrorism, prosperity and sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the economic context remains challenging. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has forced Iraq to slash crude production to around one third of its pre-conflict export level of nearly 4.3 million barrels per day, depriving OPEC's second-largest oil producer of most of its hard-currency resources. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration suspended nearly $500 million in US dollar shipments to Iraq in a bid to push Baghdad to dismantle Iran-backed armed groups.

Al-Zaidi walks into office inheriting a fiscal crisis not of his making, a regional war on his doorstep, and an impatient Washington holding significant leverage over his country's finances.

What the Dinar Forums Are Getting Wrong

Predictably, some corners of the dinar speculation community have greeted al-Zaidi's nomination as a bullish signal, a business-minded technocrat who will "finally" push through the economic reforms that lead to revaluation. Some have gone further, interpreting the end of the political deadlock as itself a precursor to the long-promised "RV."

This reading misunderstands how currency policy works at almost every level.

The Central Bank of Iraq, not the prime minister, sets exchange rate policy, and the CBI issued a formal statement as recently as November 2025 confirming there is "no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar," explicitly calling revaluation rumours "speculation aimed at disrupting the market and undermining economic stability." A new prime minister, however business-friendly, does not override that institutional position. Nor would any serious economist advise him to.

The conditions that would theoretically support a significant dinar appreciation -- diversified revenue streams, a stable and transparent banking sector, full dollar access, low inflation, strong foreign reserves, and a resolution of the militia problem -- are not things any prime minister can deliver in a 30-day cabinet formation window, or indeed within a single term. They are generational projects.

Al-Zaidi now has 30 days to construct a cabinet that satisfies Iraq's entrenched sectarian power-sharing system and secure an absolute parliamentary majority, minister by minister, without the political base that has anchored every prime minister before him. That is the reality of his immediate situation. Currency reform does not feature in it.

Is There Any Genuinely Good News Here?

Yes, and it is worth acknowledging. A business-oriented prime minister with cross-sectarian acceptability and no obvious factional debts is, on paper, a better starting point for economic governance than a return to Maliki-era political entrenchment. Al-Zaidi promised to focus on making Iraq "a balanced country, regionally and internationally," and multiple senior political figures across sectarian lines have expressed support for his nomination.

His CV touts a "comprehensive national vision, focused on strong institutions, productive economy, modern education and international partnerships." These are the right words. Whether he can act on them within a system specifically designed to resist economic reform by distributing spoils among political factions is an entirely different question, and one that Iraq-watchers have been asking about every new government since 2003.

Iraq is a country with huge potential. It has real oil wealth, a young population, and a private sector that has demonstrated resilience through extraordinary adversity. None of that is in dispute. But a country with a promising new prime minister is not the same thing as a country on the verge of a currency revaluation, and the dinar promotion industry's habit of treating every political development as a stepping stone to the "RV" does its followers no favours.

The Bottom Line

Ali al-Zaidi's nomination is genuinely interesting news for Iraq. It ends a damaging five-month paralysis, introduces a leader with real economic credentials, and crucially, was not blocked by Washington, which matters enormously for Iraq's dollar access and financial stability. These are not trivial positives.

But for holders of physical Iraqi dinars waiting for a life-changing revaluation, the calculus has not changed. The Central Bank has not changed its position. The structural barriers to a dramatic exchange rate shift remain intact. And a new prime minister, however capable, faces a 30-day deadline to form a cabinet in a system designed to reward political loyalty over economic rationality, all while managing a fiscal crisis caused by a war he had no part in starting.

The forums will find reasons to be excited. They always do. The more useful question, the one worth asking before the next "intel call", is not whether this prime minister is good for Iraq. He might well be. The question is whether anything he could plausibly do in office would turn a shoebox full of banknotes into a retirement fund.

The answer to that question has not changed.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor -- not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

"Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment

Top 10 Dinar Articles from March

Dinar-Dollar Demand Shifts as Import Dynamics Adjust

You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?

Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"