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The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of May:

1. CBI Boss says No Plan to Revalue Iraqi Dinar
2. What a New Iraqi PM means for Your Dinars
3. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
4. Iraq Banking Sector Reform: Second Phase Under Way
5. "Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment
6. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
7. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
8. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
9. Central Bank Advances Iraqi Banking Reform, Eases Foreign Transactions
10. Iraq's "Swiss dinar" still lives on in Kurdistan Livestock Markets

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By John Lee.

Tom Barrack, the United States Ambassador to Türkiye, has been appointed Special Presidential Envoy to both Syria and Iraq, while retaining his ambassadorial post in Ankara.

The appointment was announced on Truth Social by President Donald Trump, who said Barrack would operate with the full backing of the US Department of State as Washington advances its strategic cooperation with the governments of Iraq and Syria.

(Source: Truth Social)

By John Lee.

The US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly, along with several other individuals and businesses, as part of a sanctions action targeting what it describes as the exploitation of Iraq's oil sector to benefit Iran and Iran-aligned militias.

The Treasury said Maarij had used his official positions, including as head of the Iraqi parliament's oil and gas committee and subsequently within the Ministry of Oil, to facilitate the diversion of Iraqi oil products for the benefit of oil smuggler Salim Ahmed Said and Iran-backed militia Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). OFAC alleged that Maarij authorised the trucking of several million dollars' worth of oil per day from the Qayara Oil Field to VS Oil Terminal FZE (VS Oil) in Khor al Zubair for export, where Iranian oil was allegedly mixed with Iraqi oil before being shipped to market.

Iraq's Ministry of Oil has denied the allegations against Al-Bahadly. In a statement, the Ministry said it rejects the accusations and affirms its full respect for legal procedures and the Iraqi judiciary. The Ministry said it is fully prepared to cooperate with any fair investigation, expressing confidence in the role of the Iraqi judiciary and the Integrity Commission.

Full statement from OFAC:

Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) increased economic pressure on Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq by designating individuals and businesses exploiting Iraq's oil sector and undermining the country's security.  This action includes Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly,Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, who abuses his position to facilitate the diversion of oil to be sold for the benefit of the Iranian regime and its proxy militias in Iraq.  OFAC is also designating three senior leaders of Iran-aligned terrorist militias Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada and Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq.  The United States will continue to hold these groups and other Iran-aligned terrorist militias in Iraq, such as Kata'ib Hizballah, accountable for their attacks against U.S. personnel and civilians, diplomatic facilities, and businesses across Iraq, which the groups conduct without regard for Iraq's sovereignty or democratic process.

"Like a rogue gang, the Iranian regime is pillaging resources that rightfully belong to the Iraqi people," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "Treasury will not stand idly by as Iran's military exploits Iraqi oil to fund terrorism against the United States and our partners."

OFAC is taking today's actions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets key sectors of Iran's economy, including Iran's petroleum sector, and E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups, their supporters, and those who aid acts of terrorism.  Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to

E.O. 13224, as amended, and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2020.  Kata'ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada was designated as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, in 2023 and as an FTO in 2025.

ECONOMIC FURY DELIVERS MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN

The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime's ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds.  Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted billions in projected oil revenue, taken actions that have led to the freezing of  nearly half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency, and cracked down on Tehran's shadow banking networks.

Treasury remains ready to take economic action against Iran's defense industrial base so that Iran cannot reconstitute its production capacity and project power outside its borders.  Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including airlines, and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate Iran's activities-including those connected to the People's Republic of China's independent "teapot" oil refineries.

Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions. Treasury will vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people.

Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime's primary revenue stream, and any person or vessel facilitating the illicit flow of oil or other products risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.

CORRUPTION IN IRAQ'S MINISTRY OF OIL

OFAC today designated Iraq's Deputy Minister of Oil, Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly (Maarij), who has been instrumental in facilitating the diversion of Iraqi oil products to benefit known Iran-affiliated oil smuggler Salim Ahmed Said (Said) as well as Iran-backed terrorist militia Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH).  For years, Maarij has used his official positions-first as the head of the Iraqi parliament's oil and gas committee, and then within the Iraq Ministry of Oil-to enrich Said, AAH, and by extension, Iran.

OFAC designated Said in June 2025 for running a network of companies selling Iranian oil falsely declared as Iraqi oil to avoid sanctions, including designated VS Oil Terminal FZE (VS Oil).  Integral to this operation was Said's ability to obtain favored access to Iraqi oil and procure forged documentation from Iraqi government officials, legitimizing illicit oil.  To that end, Said was responsible for bribing complicit officials in the Iraqi government, as well as reportedly installing Maarij in his official position.

Since 2018, Maarij has held multiple positions in Iraq's Ministry of Oil, including head of the licensing and contracts office, Deputy Minister, and acting Minister of Oil.  In his official capacities, Maarij enabled Said to illicitly procure oil products by granting exportation rights to Said's companies.  Maarij authorized trucking several million dollars' worth of oil per day from the Qayarah oil field to VS Oil in Khor Zubayr for export. VS Oil oversaw the mixing of Iranian oil with Iraqi oil before being shipped to market.  Maarij is also responsible for falsifying documentation on the provenance of oil for Said's network, enabling it to be smuggled to market disguised as purely Iraqi oil.

Ali Maarij Al-Bahadly is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Salim Ahmed Said.

IRAQI MILITIA EXPLOITING RESOURCES

Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili (Al-Behadili), also known as Sayyid Awn, is a leader and economic official for AAH.  Following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Al-Behadili played an important role in developing an oil trucking and security unit, allowing AAH to become a dominant actor in the Iraqi metals industry, as well as enabling AAH's entrance into fuel oil theft, which focused on stolen or subsidized oil.

Working directly with U.S.-designated AAH senior leader Laith Al-Khazali, Al-Behadili controlled oil smuggling financing and oversaw mineral industry activities for AAH.  In southern Iraq, Al-Behadili managed oil smuggling operations and AAH projects, using businesses, projects, and government contracts as a front for AAH financial activity.  As part of his activities on behalf of AAH, Al-Behadili was also complicit in dealing directly with Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.  In his capacity as AAH Economic Committee member, Al-Behadili was involved in negotiating contracts to ship oil from Iran and coordinating with the IRGC-QF on shipping AAH's oil.

Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq.

Al-Behadili owns or controls four Iraqi companies that operate in the oil sector-Gulf Energy Oil Services Limited, Gulf General Contracting Limited, Iraq International Energy for the Import and Sale for Petroleum Products Limited, and Gulf Energy for General Transport and Marine Services and Real Estate Consultancy LLC-all of which are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mustafa Hashim Lazim Al-Behadili.

IRAN-BACKED TERRORIST MILITIA OFFICIALS

Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) is an Iran-aligned terrorist militia that has planned and executed numerous attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria.  Ahmed Khudair Maksus Maksus is the former KSS Deputy Secretary General under U.S.-designated Secretary General Hashim Finyan Rahim al-Saraji.  Mohammed Issa Kadhim al-Shuwaili (Al-Shuwaili), operating under the alias Abu Maryam, is a senior KSS official.  Since at least 2025, Al-Shuwaili has collaborated directly with Hizballah illicit finance team members, including Ali Qasir, on the purchase and delivery of weapons into Iraq.  Al-Shuwaili also arranged the payment of millions of dollars to Hizballah to facilitate the purchase of weapons, and coordinated logistics related to the transfer and delivery of the weapons with Hizballah associates.

Ahmed Khudair Maksus Maksus is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.  Mohammed Issa Kadhim al-Shuwaili is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Ali Qasir, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked.  Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions.  Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000.  FinCEN is currently accepting whistleblower tips.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions.  OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked today.

Full statement from the Ministry of Oil (Baghdad):

This unofficial translation is provided in good faith for general information only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, Iraq Business News accepts no responsibility for any errors, omissions, or misinterpretations.

Clarification

The Ministry of Oil denies the accusations directed at the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Oil for Distribution Affairs, Mr. Ali Maaraj Al-Bahadli. While the Ministry affirms its full respect for legal procedures and the Iraqi judiciary, it emphasizes the importance of adopting transparency and accountability in handling all cases and accusations based on evidence and facts, away from any other considerations or interpretations.

The Ministry announces its full readiness to cooperate and to conduct any fair investigation regarding what has been stated, stemming from its belief in the role of the Iraqi judiciary and the Integrity Commission, and its respect for the oversight and legal institutions of the state.

The Ministry also affirms that crude oil export operations, marketing, tanker loading, and related procedures do not fall within the duties of the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Oil for Distribution Affairs, as the relevant authorities and companies handle this file in accordance with established contexts and mechanisms.

The Ministry notes that the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) had previously issued a statement clarifying export and marketing mechanisms, and denied what was raised regarding the aforementioned matter.

(Sources: US Department of the Treasury; Iraq Ministry of Oil)

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of April:

1. "Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment
2. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
3. What a New Iraqi PM means for Your Dinars
4. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
5. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
6. Digital IQD Proposal targets $7-12bn Economic Gains
7. CBI lists Authorised Exchange Firms for Dollar Sales
8. IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar
9. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
10. Dinar-Dollar Demand Shifts as Import Dynamics Adjust

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq Has a New Prime Minister. Here's What It Means for Your Dinars (Spoiler: Not What the Forums Are Saying)

After five months of political deadlock, Iraq finally has a prime minister-designate. Ali al-Zaidi, a successful 40-year-old businessman with no prior political experience, was nominated by the Coordination Framework, Iraq's largest Shiite parliamentary bloc, on April 27, 2026, breaking an impasse that had pushed the country past its constitutional deadline.

So what does this nomination actually mean for Iraq, and for those holding physical Iraqi dinars in hope of a dramatic revaluation?

Who Is Ali al-Zaidi?

According to media accounts, Al-Zaidi was born in Baghdad in 1986 into a family from the southern Dhi Qar province. He holds a master's degree in banking and finance and is a member of the Iraqi Bar Association. He has extensive business experience, owning the Taawon Hypermarket shopping centres in Baghdad, the Al Awees holding company, and the local news outlet Dijlah TV.

This is the first time in Iraq's modern history that a businessman with no previous political experience has been named prime minister, according to Nabil Al-Marsoomi, an economics professor at Basra University. That is a genuinely notable development. Iraq's post-2003 prime ministers have all been career politicians shaped, and constrained, by the country's entrenched sectarian power-sharing system. Al-Zaidi arrives without that baggage, and without those alliances.

Al-Zaidi has friendly relations with much of Iraq's political elite, including figures aligned with both Iran and the United States, and would bring a strong business background to the office. A number of Kurdish and Sunni politicians have expressed openness to supporting his bid to form a government.

His political anonymity was the asset that got him here. He arrived at the nomination without enemies, and without allies of his own. In Iraq's fractured system, that made him the path of least resistance.

See also: 4 Top Profiles of the New Iraqi PM Designate

The Banking Question That Won't Go Away

The most significant complication in al-Zaidi's background, and the one most relevant to dinar holders, involves his former role in Iraq's banking sector.

He was chairman of Al-Janoob Islamic Bank for Investment and Finance, one of eight Iraqi commercial banks banned from engaging in US dollar transactions since early 2024. The ban was imposed by the Central Bank of Iraq, reportedly at the direction of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which cited concerns over fraud, money laundering and other illegal use of US currency.

This matters because Iraq's currency stability, oil revenues, and access to dollar reserves are all ultimately dependent on its relationship with US financial institutions. A prime minister whose previous banking role was linked to an institution sanctioned for dollar smuggling, in a country where dollar smuggling to Iran has been a persistent flashpoint with Washington, faces a obvious credibility test.

That said, some important nuance is worth noting. Legal sources familiar with the issue told Al-Monitor that there are no US sanctions on either Al-Janoob Islamic Bank or Zaidi personally. The sources said that the block was "due to the risks associated with the bank's ownership," adding that an independent review found no evidence of any direct outflow of funds from the bank to malign actors. And al-Zaidi is reported to have stepped down as chairman of Al-Janoob Islamic Bank in 2019, five years before the dollar transaction ban was imposed.

The distinction matters, but it does not make the association disappear. Washington will not judge the new prime minister by his CV. It will judge him by his cabinet appointments, his relationship with Iran-backed militias, and whether Iraq's banking system is used as a conduit for sanctions evasion.

The Geopolitical Tightrope

Al-Zaidi's nomination cannot be separated from the wider regional picture, which is as difficult as it has been in years.

The Coordination Framework's decision came after a weeks-long deadlock in which former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had been the initial candidate. His candidacy was withdrawn after US President Donald Trump threatened to withhold Iraq's access to dollars over al-Maliki's pro-Iranian stance. Al-Zaidi is, in this sense, a compromise forced partly by Washington's veto power over Iraq's financial lifelines.

The Trump administration has made clear its opposition to Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq, and the US embassy in Baghdad offered only cautious "best wishes" to al-Zaidi -- signalling engagement without explicit endorsement. Washington emphasised benchmarks of counter-terrorism, prosperity and sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the economic context remains challenging. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has forced Iraq to slash crude production to around one third of its pre-conflict export level of nearly 4.3 million barrels per day, depriving OPEC's second-largest oil producer of most of its hard-currency resources. The Wall Street Journal reported that the Trump administration suspended nearly $500 million in US dollar shipments to Iraq in a bid to push Baghdad to dismantle Iran-backed armed groups.

Al-Zaidi walks into office inheriting a fiscal crisis not of his making, a regional war on his doorstep, and an impatient Washington holding significant leverage over his country's finances.

What the Dinar Forums Are Getting Wrong

Predictably, some corners of the dinar speculation community have greeted al-Zaidi's nomination as a bullish signal, a business-minded technocrat who will "finally" push through the economic reforms that lead to revaluation. Some have gone further, interpreting the end of the political deadlock as itself a precursor to the long-promised "RV."

This reading misunderstands how currency policy works at almost every level.

The Central Bank of Iraq, not the prime minister, sets exchange rate policy, and the CBI issued a formal statement as recently as November 2025 confirming there is "no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar," explicitly calling revaluation rumours "speculation aimed at disrupting the market and undermining economic stability." A new prime minister, however business-friendly, does not override that institutional position. Nor would any serious economist advise him to.

The conditions that would theoretically support a significant dinar appreciation -- diversified revenue streams, a stable and transparent banking sector, full dollar access, low inflation, strong foreign reserves, and a resolution of the militia problem -- are not things any prime minister can deliver in a 30-day cabinet formation window, or indeed within a single term. They are generational projects.

Al-Zaidi now has 30 days to construct a cabinet that satisfies Iraq's entrenched sectarian power-sharing system and secure an absolute parliamentary majority, minister by minister, without the political base that has anchored every prime minister before him. That is the reality of his immediate situation. Currency reform does not feature in it.

Is There Any Genuinely Good News Here?

Yes, and it is worth acknowledging. A business-oriented prime minister with cross-sectarian acceptability and no obvious factional debts is, on paper, a better starting point for economic governance than a return to Maliki-era political entrenchment. Al-Zaidi promised to focus on making Iraq "a balanced country, regionally and internationally," and multiple senior political figures across sectarian lines have expressed support for his nomination.

His CV touts a "comprehensive national vision, focused on strong institutions, productive economy, modern education and international partnerships." These are the right words. Whether he can act on them within a system specifically designed to resist economic reform by distributing spoils among political factions is an entirely different question, and one that Iraq-watchers have been asking about every new government since 2003.

Iraq is a country with huge potential. It has real oil wealth, a young population, and a private sector that has demonstrated resilience through extraordinary adversity. None of that is in dispute. But a country with a promising new prime minister is not the same thing as a country on the verge of a currency revaluation, and the dinar promotion industry's habit of treating every political development as a stepping stone to the "RV" does its followers no favours.

The Bottom Line

Ali al-Zaidi's nomination is genuinely interesting news for Iraq. It ends a damaging five-month paralysis, introduces a leader with real economic credentials, and crucially, was not blocked by Washington, which matters enormously for Iraq's dollar access and financial stability. These are not trivial positives.

But for holders of physical Iraqi dinars waiting for a life-changing revaluation, the calculus has not changed. The Central Bank has not changed its position. The structural barriers to a dramatic exchange rate shift remain intact. And a new prime minister, however capable, faces a 30-day deadline to form a cabinet in a system designed to reward political loyalty over economic rationality, all while managing a fiscal crisis caused by a war he had no part in starting.

The forums will find reasons to be excited. They always do. The more useful question, the one worth asking before the next "intel call", is not whether this prime minister is good for Iraq. He might well be. The question is whether anything he could plausibly do in office would turn a shoebox full of banknotes into a retirement fund.

The answer to that question has not changed.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor -- not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

"Deleting the Zeros": What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment

Top 10 Dinar Articles from March

Dinar-Dollar Demand Shifts as Import Dynamics Adjust

You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?

Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The American - Israeli War Against Iran, the Unprecedented Severe International Energy Crisis and Detrimental Impacts on Iraq

On Friday evening, April 10th, the esteemed "Al-Mushtarak" platform graciously organized a debating event in which I discussed the implications, complexities, and consequences of the above topic. Here is a brief report on the event.

I began the PowerPoint presentation by asserting my conviction that the US-Israeli aggression against Iran has created and continues to create an unprecedented severe international energy crisis. The longer the aggression persists, the deeper the "energy crisis" becomes, and its cumulative consequences could potentially lead to an "energy catastrophe" on a global scale. I argued further that the world may witness and suffer from a form of "Imperialism of capture and control over resources through military means" in tenuous international law and relations.

The first part of my presentation analyses the components, indicators, and developments of the energy crisis. It begins by presenting the reasons that lead to the belief that what we are witnessing is an unprecedented, severe, and impactful international energy crisis. This is followed by identifying key terms for understanding the sequence, hierarchy, and cumulative nature of an international energy crisis: Availability, Reliability, Durability, Accessibility, Deliverability, Affordability, Ramifications, and Actions. Through the dynamics of the energy multiplier, accelerator, and deepener, the energy crisis of today could be worsened into an energy catastrophe on the global level.

Because oil price exhibits the most significant direct consequences of the war, the mechanisms impacting oil price movements -- market fundamentals, market sentiments, and the new America-specific TACO (Trump Always Chicken Out) Trading -- were analysed, along with their potential to cause stagflation in economic activity. This constitutes the heavy "political cost" of launching and continuing the aggression, especially for Trump.

While the focus, in the prevailing narratives, is on West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent crude prices, I observe that the price levels of other crudes -- Dubai, Oman, and Urals/Russian -- have been and remain significantly higher than those of WTI and Brent. Since the prices of Dubai and Oman crudes are the benchmarks for pricing, with premium, the Arabian Gulf crude oil destined for East Asian markets, and because East Asian refineries are important sources of exported petroleum products to Europe and America, the impact of increased prices of petroleum and petrochemical products on the final consumer reflects the prices of crude oil imported from the Arabian Gulf countries and Russia more, and far greater, than the increase in WTI and Brent crude prices. Hence, there is a need for a mindset shift when considering oil price consequences. This section was premised on information, data, and statistics compiled from reliable international sources.

The second part addressed the repercussions on Iraq's oil sector and the measures taken by the authorities to mitigate them.

It began by discussing the importance and necessity of activating the contractual clauses related to force majeure by all Iraqi companies affiliated with the Ministry of Oil. This is vital to avoid potentially very high costs Iraq could incur if force majeure were not invoked, particularly in the upstream petroleum projects under the concluded bid rounds and other modalities. The Ministry's companies have not yet invoked the article in a contractual, standardized, and comprehensive manner.

This part presented and discussed possible and available alternatives proposed by the authorities for exporting crude oil and fuel oil via pipelines and trucks, highlighting the non-availability, limitations, and lack of economic viability of such alternatives.

Data on Iraqi oil exports indicates very low generated revenues during March due to a thin export volume through the southern outlets. The price levels of Basra Medium and Basra Heavy crude oil in the US markets were higher than those of WTI and Brent crude, since SOMO uses another benchmark -- ASCI -- for pricing its exports to the American market.

The section also discussed the chronic problem of Iraqi refineries, which is characterised by high fuel oil production and limited production of gasoline and diesel/gas oil. The extent to which official directives disregard this chronic reality by calling for increasing refinery production at maximum capacity, without considering the lack of sufficient storage capacity for the fuel oil surplus production, was also discussed.

The problem of associated gas shortages due to halting oil production was also addressed, along with its repercussions on cooking/heating gas -- LPG production -- and electricity generation activities. This is a chronic dilemma that Iraq has suffered from for decades, and it will only worsen further with the approaching summer, characterised by soaring temperatures.

The Ministry has taken a number of belated and limited measures that cannot compensate for its failure in previous years to take sufficient precautionary measures to confront the consequences of a well-known and highly probable crisis.

The third part includes a number of other important and relevant considerations of geopolitical, geomilitary, geostrategic, and international relations dimensions, as well as concluding remarks.

The event included discussion, comments, and questions after my presentation. The full recording of the event, in Arabic, can be viewed and downloaded through the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dBrKmWxiFQ [Arabic]

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

"Deleting the Zeros" -- What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment

Few phrases in the Iraqi dinar speculation world generate more excitement than "deleting the zeros." It surfaces in forums, YouTube videos, and "guru" intel calls as a signal that something transformative is imminent -- that the Iraqi government is quietly preparing a currency reboot that will reward patient holders of physical dinars.

The problem is that this excitement rests on a fundamental misreading of what the phrase actually means, a misreading that is, in some cases, deliberately encouraged by the people selling the currency.

Here is what the record actually shows.

Two Different Things, One Deliberate Confusion

The confusion starts with terminology. "Revaluation" and "redenomination" are not interchangeable, despite being routinely treated as such in dinar promotion circles.

Revaluation, as defined by standard monetary economics, is a calculated upward adjustment to a country's official exchange rate -- the currency actually becomes worth more relative to other currencies. This is what dinar holders are hoping for: a decision by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) to declare that the dinar is suddenly worth, say, one US dollar instead of 0.076 cents. That would, in theory, multiply the dollar value of a dinar holding by over a thousand times.

Redenomination, by contrast, is a purely administrative process. It changes the face value printed on banknotes without changing what those notes can actually buy. As Wikipedia's entry on the subject states plainly, redenomination "is considered symbolic as it does not have any impact on a country's exchange rate in relation to other currencies." If Iraq removes three zeros, your 1,000,000 dinar note becomes a 1,000 dinar note -- but a loaf of bread that previously cost 1,000 dinars now costs 1 dinar. Nothing has changed in real terms. You have not made a penny.

What Iraq Has Actually Said

Iraq's "delete the zeros" plan has been discussed, announced, postponed, and re-discussed for well over a decade. As far back as June 2011, the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq was explicit: "Deleting zeros from the currency of Iraq had nothing to do with the price and exchange rate." He went further: "Some imagine that the state wants to influence the price or exchange rate by deleting the zeros -- this is invalid."

That was 2011. By 2012, the project had already been pushed back to 2014, with a parliamentary committee member noting the Iraqi environment was "currently unprepared for this operation." 2014 came and went. So did every year since.

Governor Ali Al-Alaq has described it as an ongoing internal technical project. No new banknotes have been printed. No public education campaign has launched. No timeline has been announced. The Central Bank has explicitly linked any future redenomination to achieving economic stability first -- not the other way around.

Then, in November 2025, the CBI went further still. It issued a formal public statement rejecting rumours of any exchange rate change, stating there is "no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar," and explicitly calling such rumours "speculation aimed at disrupting the market and undermining economic stability." The statement added that any external claims about changing the exchange rate "do not express the Central Bank's position."

It is difficult to imagine a clearer official denial. And yet the forums continue.

What Redenomination Actually Does -- And Doesn't Do

To understand why "deleting the zeros" is not good news for foreign speculators, it helps to look at how it has worked elsewhere.

Turkey's redenomination in 2005 is the example most often cited as a success story. Turkey removed six zeros from the lira -- one million old lira became one new lira. Before the reform, a cinema ticket cost 7,500,000 lira. After, it cost 7.50. Inflation fell, the banking system modernised, and the economy strengthened. But someone holding old Turkish lira notes outside Turkey did not become wealthy. Their purchasing power was preserved, not multiplied.

Brazil's 1994 currency reform is another frequently cited case. With inflation running at over 2,000 percent, the government introduced a new currency, the Real, alongside significant fiscal tightening. The reform worked because it addressed root causes -- not because holding old notes suddenly became lucrative.

Zimbabwe, by contrast, redenominated twice in 2008, with inflation ultimately reaching 231 million percent, and eventually abandoned its currency entirely. The lesson: redenomination is a tool for accounting tidiness and psychological reset. It is not, by itself, a source of value. As a standard accounting and monetary analysis confirms: "In all cases, no legitimate income effect was recorded from the act of redenomination itself."

The "Guru" Interpretation

This is where the deliberate exploitation of the confusion becomes visible. A common claim in dinar speculation communities is that redenomination will actually benefit foreign holders of old-format notes -- that Iraq will somehow offer above-market exchange rates, or that the transition period creates a window for profit.

One forum post from as recently as April 2026 makes the argument that during redenomination, Iraqis will be forced to bring their dinars to banks to exchange for new notes, and that this somehow benefits external holders. It doesn't. A redenomination exchange is exactly that -- an exchange at the redenomination ratio, not a windfall. And as multiple official sources have confirmed, any redenomination would apply within Iraq, for Iraqis, using domestic banking infrastructure. Foreign holders of physical banknotes are not part of the plan, and there is no mechanism by which they would benefit.

Why Iraq Is Actually Discussing It

The legitimate reason Iraq keeps revisiting redenomination is straightforward and has nothing to do with enriching foreign speculators. As a senior CBI advisory panel member explained as far back as 2011, there are currently trillions of dinars in circulation represented by enormous volumes of physical banknotes of varying small denominations. This creates genuine practical problems: Iraqis making large purchases -- a car, for example -- resort to using US dollars rather than carrying bags of cash. The Central Bank wants to reduce that dollar dependency, streamline accounting across government and commerce, and modernise the payments infrastructure. Redenomination, when Iraq is ready for it, is a housekeeping measure.

The CBI's current position is that it is building the preconditions -- expanding digital payments, strengthening the legal framework, improving banking sector oversight -- before any redenomination could realistically proceed. This is sensible central banking. It has no bearing on the investment thesis being sold to dinar holders outside Iraq.

The Bottom Line

Iraq has been discussing removing zeros from its currency for at least fifteen years. Every time it has come up, the Central Bank has said the same thing: this is an administrative reform, not a revaluation, and it will not change the exchange rate. The most recent official CBI statement, issued in November 2025, went out of its way to reject even the rumour of an exchange rate change and to condemn speculation as harmful to Iraq's economic stability.

If and when Iraq eventually redenominates its currency, it will be good news for Iraqi businesses, Iraqi accounting departments, and the Iraqi banking sector. It will not be good news for people holding physical banknote bundles in other countries, waiting for a life-changing windfall.

The confusion between these two things is not accidental. It is the engine that keeps the dinar speculation industry running.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor -- not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

Top 10 Dinar Articles from March

Dinar-Dollar Demand Shifts as Import Dynamics Adjust

You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?

Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of March:

1. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
2. Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?
3. Dinar-Dollar Exchange Rate: Iran War has Little Impact
4. IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar
5. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
6. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
7. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
8. One Year of Trump: Iraqi Dinar Speculators Still Waiting
9. Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]
10. Iraqi Dinar Prospects: Reality Check After Six Months of Trump

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?

You made the purchase some time ago -- maybe a few years back, maybe longer. You heard the pitch: Iraq sits on some of the world's largest proven oil reserves, the dinar is trading at a fraction of what it once was, and when the country finally gets its act together, holders of today's cheap banknotes will be rewarded handsomely. So you bought. And now, with a regional war disrupting Iraqi oil exports and Baghdad struggling to pay its own civil servants, you are wondering what to do next.

This article is not going to tell you that Iraq is a basket case. It isn't. But it is going to be honest with you about what the numbers say -- and what your actual options are.

What You're Really Holding

Let's start with a basic fact that dinar dealers tend to gloss over. The Iraqi dinar is not a traded currency in any conventional sense. Major banks do not offer exchange in Iraqi dinars. The currency is only available for purchase or sale by selected brokers or money exchangers, and since no formal exchange exists for the Iraqi dinar, dealers can charge whatever they want to buy and sell it.

This matters enormously when you think about getting out, because dealers who sell IQD will only buy it back at drastically lower rates. As a concrete example, buying one million Iraqi dinars from one online platform costs $1,220 -- but selling one million dinars back to the same platform returns only $625. That means the dinar's value against the US dollar would need to increase by approximately 95% just for a buyer to break even.

Read that again. You need a near-doubling of the dinar's value just to recover your original outlay. The "investment" was compromised the moment you handed over your money.

Brokers typically charge a fee of 30% or more over and above the authorized exchange rate when selling dinars, and bid 30% under the formal exchange rate when buying them back. Purchasing and selling IQD could therefore lead to a loss of 50% or more without any movement in the exchange rate whatsoever.

The "RV" That Isn't Coming

The pitch for the dinar has always rested on the idea of an imminent "revaluation" -- a sudden, dramatic official increase in the dinar's exchange rate. Online forums buzz with excitement over every piece of Iraqi economic news, with each development analyzed for signs of the imminent RV that will supposedly occur overnight, catapulting dinar holders into wealth.

A survey conducted in early 2025 revealed that more than half of respondents expected the dinar to revalue by at least 1,000 times within the first 100 days of the new US presidential term. Such expectations are not grounded in reality.

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has stated repeatedly that no such revaluation is planned, and anyone with a basic understanding of economics would know that it would be impossible, yet speculative revaluation claims continue to circulate.

There is also a persistent and deliberate confusion being exploited by promoters between two very different things. Many promoters confuse a revaluation -- a rare, dramatic jump in a currency's value -- with a redenomination, which adjusts the currency by removing zeroes without increasing purchasing power. Iraq has publicly discussed redenomination, not revaluation, multiple times. If Iraq removes three zeroes from its currency, your one million dinars becomes one thousand new dinars -- worth exactly the same amount. You have not made a penny.

The Kuwait Comparison Doesn't Hold Up

The origin story of dinar speculation is worth understanding, because it explains the persistence of the myth. The speculation originated from a misunderstanding of why the value of the Kuwaiti dinar recovered after the First Gulf War, leading to an assumption that the Iraqi dinar would follow suit. However, there are substantial differences in economic and political conditions between Iraq now and Kuwait then.

The main reason the Kuwaiti currency recovered was that its money supply had not been compromised, and it had a clear path back to normal. Iraq, on the other hand, had printed vast quantities of dinars; the comparison was always flawed, and two decades of non-revaluation have confirmed it.

So What Are Your Options?

If you are holding dinars right now, there are three realistic paths forward. None of them involves getting rich.

Option 1: Sell now and cut your losses.

This is the option most financial advisors would recommend, and the math supports it. You will take a significant loss on the spread, but you will recover something -- and you can redeploy that capital into an investment that has a realistic thesis behind it. The dinar's buy and sell rates differ widely depending on where and how you sell, and transaction fees can be substantial, so it pays to shop around before committing to a sale. Look for a licensed, regulated dealer and compare multiple buyback rates before you transact.

Option 2: Hold, but set a hard exit date.

If you cannot bring yourself to sell at a loss, at least impose discipline on yourself. Pick a date -- say, twelve months from now -- and commit to selling regardless of what the forums are saying. The psychology of dinar speculation shares characteristics with other speculative bubbles: confirmation bias leads believers to interpret any news as supporting their thesis while dismissing contrary evidence, and the sunk cost fallacy makes it psychologically difficult to admit error after years of waiting. A hard deadline is the only reliable defence against both.

Option 3: Treat it as a collectible and write it off mentally.

Some people buy dinars in quantities small enough that the loss, while real, is not life-altering. If that describes you, you can simply regard the notes as a curiosity -- they are, after all, legal tender in a real country with a real history -- and stop thinking of them as an investment. This is not a financially productive approach, but it is an honest one.

What Iraq Actually Looks Like Right Now

To be fair to Iraq: the country has real economic assets and genuine momentum in some areas. Iraq's foreign exchange reserves stood at approximately $94-97 billion in mid-2025, and the economy is forecast to grow by 4.4% in 2026. Iraq issued 1,867 licences for new industrial projects during 2025 alone, spanning the whole range of industry sectors. These are not the indicators of a collapsed state.

But a growing economy and a revalued currency are two entirely different things. The Iraqi dinar is expected to remain range-bound and largely flat, with no credible indicators of a sharp revaluation. The currency's fixed exchange rate, limited accessibility, and dependence on oil exports constrain its potential for significant appreciation. Iraq's economic recovery will benefit Iraqis, but it will not deliver a windfall to foreign holders of physical banknotes.

A Word About the People Selling You the Dream

Multiple US state agencies have issued formal warnings to investors that there is no place outside Iraq to exchange the dinar, that it is typically sold by dealers at inflated prices, and that there is little evidence to substantiate the claims of significant appreciation due to revaluation.

The forums, the "gurus," the YouTube channels, the "intel calls" -- these are not news services. They are, at best, communities of wishful thinkers reinforcing each other's hopes. At worst, some of them are actively profiting from keeping you in the trade: every month you hold is another month a dealer is not asked to buy back your dinars at the price they sold them to you.

The Bottom Line

Iraq is a country worth watching, and its long-term economic trajectory could be very exciting. But the specific proposition that holders of physical Iraqi dinars outside Iraq will one day see a dramatic, overnight increase in their currency's value has no credible economic foundation, has been explicitly denied by the Central Bank of Iraq, and has been waiting to come true for over twenty years.

The question is not whether the RV is coming. The question is what you are going to do while you wait for something that is not going to happen.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor -- not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq's Payroll Cliff: Why the Dinar Can't Be Your Retirement Plan

For two decades, promoters of the Iraqi dinar as an investment have pointed to the country's oil wealth and whispered of an imminent revaluation -- an "RV" -- that would transform modest stacks of Iraqi banknotes into life-changing fortunes. The pitch has always depended on a single assumption: that Iraq's oil revenues would eventually give Baghdad the financial muscle to dramatically revalue its currency upward.

Today, that assumption is under more stress than ever, and the cracks are showing in the most concrete way possible: the Iraqi government may soon be unable to meet its own payroll.

A Quarter of the Country on the State's Books

Understanding the scale of the problem requires stepping back from currency speculation for a moment and looking at Iraq's fiscal architecture. More than 10.5 million Iraqi citizens, roughly a quarter of the nation's total population, receive a monthly salary from the state, according to a report from Iraq's Parliamentary Finance Committee. The Ministry of Finance must secure 8 trillion Iraqi dinars every single month to cover the salaries of government employees, retirees, and social protection beneficiaries.

This is not a new problem, but it is an accelerating one. More than 40 percent of Iraq's workforce is employed in the public sector or state-owned enterprises, which consumed 59 percent of all federal government expenditures in the first half of 2025. In 2023 alone, the federal government added more than 800,000 people to the public payroll, either hiring them into an already swollen public sector or enrolling them in social benefits programs.

The political logic behind this expansion is not hard to follow. Iraq's power-sharing arrangement divides key governmental positions among political parties representing Arab Shia, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds, and partitions rents from public funds and contracts among those same parties. Ministries are often treated as party fiefdoms, primarily serving the interests of their respective parties rather than the public good. Hiring is patronage. Payroll is political glue. And cutting it, as one prime minister discovered, triggers mass protests.

When Oil Money Runs Short

All of this might be sustainable if oil revenues stayed high. They haven't. The oil price required to balance Iraq's budget has risen to $84 per barrel, according to an IMF estimate, while oil prices had been hovering around $67. Iraq's petroleum revenues, which account for more than 93 percent of total government income, are no longer sufficient to cover planned expenditures.

Now add a war Iraq didn't start. The US and Israeli strikes on Iran have effectively halted Gulf oil shipping, including Iraqi exports, and the immediate fiscal consequences for Baghdad are severe. Informed sources have told local outlets that Iraq's financial resources are no longer sufficient to secure public sector salaries and pensions, that state-owned banks have significantly depleted their liquidity, and that payment delays are increasingly likely unless urgent solutions are found. Iraqi Kurdish officials have warned that Baghdad could fail to meet its public-sector payroll within weeks.

The real-world consequences of payroll failures are already visible: teachers and school administrators have gone on strike in protest of non-payment, leaving students out of class. Health workers have walked out, limiting services to emergency care. Doctors, facing financial pressure, have turned to private practice, hollowing out the public hospital system for patients who can't afford private care.

What This Means for the Dinar, and for "RV" Believers

This is where the currency speculation community deserves a direct and honest word.

The fundamental argument for a massive dinar revaluation has always been that Iraq's oil wealth would eventually force the Central Bank to jack up the dinar's value, rewarding patient holders with stratospheric returns. The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has repeatedly stated it has no plans for a major revaluation. Such statements are routinely dismissed by true believers as disinformation designed to conceal the secret until the big announcement. This is faith-based investing, not analysis.

The economics work against it at every level. For the dinar to experience a dramatic increase in value, Iraq would need to undergo an extraordinary economic transformation. The large money supply means that any attempt to revalue the currency would require a substantial reduction in the number of dinars in circulation, a move that is logistically and economically unfeasible.

Promoters frequently argue that Iraq's oil reserves guarantee dramatic revaluation. The reality is that while Iraq has significant oil reserves, they rank fifth globally, not first, and oil reserves alone don't determine currency strength. Kuwait has oil. Venezuela has oil. Currency strength is built on institutions, diversification, rule of law, and fiscal discipline, none of which Iraq has yet consolidated.

Meanwhile, the practical obstacles for investors are punishing even before geopolitics enter the picture. The Iraqi dinar has extremely poor liquidity. Dealers who sell IQD will only buy it back at drastically lower rates, meaning the dinar's value would need to increase dramatically just for investors to break even, let alone profit. Since no formal exchange exists for the Iraqi dinar, dealers can charge whatever they want to buy and sell it. The spread alone will eat your returns.

Confused about the difference between "revaluation" and "redenomination"? You're in good company, and that confusion is deliberate. Scammers regularly misinterpret Iraq's discussions about removing zeros from the currency as evidence of impending revaluation. Removing zeros is an administrative process that changes the face value of currency without changing its actual worth; if Iraq removed three zeros, 1,000 old dinars would become 1 new dinar, but purchasing power remains identical. You'd still be holding the same value. The casino didn't change the denomination on your chips.

Iraq Isn't Going Away, But Your Investment Logic Might Be

None of this is to say Iraq is a failed state. It is a resilient country that has survived invasion, occupation, civil war, the rise and fall of ISIS, and grinding political dysfunction while still producing oil, holding elections, and maintaining a functioning, if strained, central bank. Iraq's economy is projected to return to positive growth in 2026, and the government holds significant foreign reserves. These are real assets.

But a country managing a payroll crisis, dependent on oil revenues for over 90 percent of government income, caught in a regional war it didn't choose, and carrying a public-sector workforce that consumes the majority of its budget is not a country primed for a currency moonshot. It is a country focused on keeping the lights on and the salaries flowing,  month by month, increasingly on a knife's edge.

For those holding dinars, 2026 will likely unfold like previous years: a mixture of hope, disappointment, and moving goalposts as predicted revaluation dates come and go. The promoters will find new reasons why next year is the year. The forums will buzz. The "gurus" will post. And somewhere, a retiree with savings in a shoebox full of Iraqi banknotes will wait for an announcement that the Central Bank has explicitly said is not coming.

Iraq deserves better analysis than it gets from the dinar speculation community. And investors deserve better than the false hope being sold to them.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are considering any currency investment, consult a licensed financial advisor, not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"