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By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The American - Israeli War Against Iran, the Unprecedented Severe International Energy Crisis and Detrimental Impacts on Iraq

On Friday evening, April 10th, the esteemed "Al-Mushtarak" platform graciously organized a debating event in which I discussed the implications, complexities, and consequences of the above topic. Here is a brief report on the event.

I began the PowerPoint presentation by asserting my conviction that the US-Israeli aggression against Iran has created and continues to create an unprecedented severe international energy crisis. The longer the aggression persists, the deeper the "energy crisis" becomes, and its cumulative consequences could potentially lead to an "energy catastrophe" on a global scale. I argued further that the world may witness and suffer from a form of "Imperialism of capture and control over resources through military means" in tenuous international law and relations.

The first part of my presentation analyses the components, indicators, and developments of the energy crisis. It begins by presenting the reasons that lead to the belief that what we are witnessing is an unprecedented, severe, and impactful international energy crisis. This is followed by identifying key terms for understanding the sequence, hierarchy, and cumulative nature of an international energy crisis: Availability, Reliability, Durability, Accessibility, Deliverability, Affordability, Ramifications, and Actions. Through the dynamics of the energy multiplier, accelerator, and deepener, the energy crisis of today could be worsened into an energy catastrophe on the global level.

Because oil price exhibits the most significant direct consequences of the war, the mechanisms impacting oil price movements -- market fundamentals, market sentiments, and the new America-specific TACO (Trump Always Chicken Out) Trading -- were analysed, along with their potential to cause stagflation in economic activity. This constitutes the heavy "political cost" of launching and continuing the aggression, especially for Trump.

While the focus, in the prevailing narratives, is on West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent crude prices, I observe that the price levels of other crudes -- Dubai, Oman, and Urals/Russian -- have been and remain significantly higher than those of WTI and Brent. Since the prices of Dubai and Oman crudes are the benchmarks for pricing, with premium, the Arabian Gulf crude oil destined for East Asian markets, and because East Asian refineries are important sources of exported petroleum products to Europe and America, the impact of increased prices of petroleum and petrochemical products on the final consumer reflects the prices of crude oil imported from the Arabian Gulf countries and Russia more, and far greater, than the increase in WTI and Brent crude prices. Hence, there is a need for a mindset shift when considering oil price consequences. This section was premised on information, data, and statistics compiled from reliable international sources.

The second part addressed the repercussions on Iraq's oil sector and the measures taken by the authorities to mitigate them.

It began by discussing the importance and necessity of activating the contractual clauses related to force majeure by all Iraqi companies affiliated with the Ministry of Oil. This is vital to avoid potentially very high costs Iraq could incur if force majeure were not invoked, particularly in the upstream petroleum projects under the concluded bid rounds and other modalities. The Ministry's companies have not yet invoked the article in a contractual, standardized, and comprehensive manner.

This part presented and discussed possible and available alternatives proposed by the authorities for exporting crude oil and fuel oil via pipelines and trucks, highlighting the non-availability, limitations, and lack of economic viability of such alternatives.

Data on Iraqi oil exports indicates very low generated revenues during March due to a thin export volume through the southern outlets. The price levels of Basra Medium and Basra Heavy crude oil in the US markets were higher than those of WTI and Brent crude, since SOMO uses another benchmark -- ASCI -- for pricing its exports to the American market.

The section also discussed the chronic problem of Iraqi refineries, which is characterised by high fuel oil production and limited production of gasoline and diesel/gas oil. The extent to which official directives disregard this chronic reality by calling for increasing refinery production at maximum capacity, without considering the lack of sufficient storage capacity for the fuel oil surplus production, was also discussed.

The problem of associated gas shortages due to halting oil production was also addressed, along with its repercussions on cooking/heating gas -- LPG production -- and electricity generation activities. This is a chronic dilemma that Iraq has suffered from for decades, and it will only worsen further with the approaching summer, characterised by soaring temperatures.

The Ministry has taken a number of belated and limited measures that cannot compensate for its failure in previous years to take sufficient precautionary measures to confront the consequences of a well-known and highly probable crisis.

The third part includes a number of other important and relevant considerations of geopolitical, geomilitary, geostrategic, and international relations dimensions, as well as concluding remarks.

The event included discussion, comments, and questions after my presentation. The full recording of the event, in Arabic, can be viewed and downloaded through the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_dBrKmWxiFQ [Arabic]

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

"Deleting the Zeros" -- What Iraq Actually Said, and What It Means for Your Investment

Few phrases in the Iraqi dinar speculation world generate more excitement than "deleting the zeros." It surfaces in forums, YouTube videos, and "guru" intel calls as a signal that something transformative is imminent -- that the Iraqi government is quietly preparing a currency reboot that will reward patient holders of physical dinars.

The problem is that this excitement rests on a fundamental misreading of what the phrase actually means, a misreading that is, in some cases, deliberately encouraged by the people selling the currency.

Here is what the record actually shows.

Two Different Things, One Deliberate Confusion

The confusion starts with terminology. "Revaluation" and "redenomination" are not interchangeable, despite being routinely treated as such in dinar promotion circles.

Revaluation, as defined by standard monetary economics, is a calculated upward adjustment to a country's official exchange rate -- the currency actually becomes worth more relative to other currencies. This is what dinar holders are hoping for: a decision by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) to declare that the dinar is suddenly worth, say, one US dollar instead of 0.076 cents. That would, in theory, multiply the dollar value of a dinar holding by over a thousand times.

Redenomination, by contrast, is a purely administrative process. It changes the face value printed on banknotes without changing what those notes can actually buy. As Wikipedia's entry on the subject states plainly, redenomination "is considered symbolic as it does not have any impact on a country's exchange rate in relation to other currencies." If Iraq removes three zeros, your 1,000,000 dinar note becomes a 1,000 dinar note -- but a loaf of bread that previously cost 1,000 dinars now costs 1 dinar. Nothing has changed in real terms. You have not made a penny.

What Iraq Has Actually Said

Iraq's "delete the zeros" plan has been discussed, announced, postponed, and re-discussed for well over a decade. As far back as June 2011, the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq was explicit: "Deleting zeros from the currency of Iraq had nothing to do with the price and exchange rate." He went further: "Some imagine that the state wants to influence the price or exchange rate by deleting the zeros -- this is invalid."

That was 2011. By 2012, the project had already been pushed back to 2014, with a parliamentary committee member noting the Iraqi environment was "currently unprepared for this operation." 2014 came and went. So did every year since.

Governor Ali Al-Alaq has described it as an ongoing internal technical project. No new banknotes have been printed. No public education campaign has launched. No timeline has been announced. The Central Bank has explicitly linked any future redenomination to achieving economic stability first -- not the other way around.

Then, in November 2025, the CBI went further still. It issued a formal public statement rejecting rumours of any exchange rate change, stating there is "no intention whatsoever to amend the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar," and explicitly calling such rumours "speculation aimed at disrupting the market and undermining economic stability." The statement added that any external claims about changing the exchange rate "do not express the Central Bank's position."

It is difficult to imagine a clearer official denial. And yet the forums continue.

What Redenomination Actually Does -- And Doesn't Do

To understand why "deleting the zeros" is not good news for foreign speculators, it helps to look at how it has worked elsewhere.

Turkey's redenomination in 2005 is the example most often cited as a success story. Turkey removed six zeros from the lira -- one million old lira became one new lira. Before the reform, a cinema ticket cost 7,500,000 lira. After, it cost 7.50. Inflation fell, the banking system modernised, and the economy strengthened. But someone holding old Turkish lira notes outside Turkey did not become wealthy. Their purchasing power was preserved, not multiplied.

Brazil's 1994 currency reform is another frequently cited case. With inflation running at over 2,000 percent, the government introduced a new currency, the Real, alongside significant fiscal tightening. The reform worked because it addressed root causes -- not because holding old notes suddenly became lucrative.

Zimbabwe, by contrast, redenominated twice in 2008, with inflation ultimately reaching 231 million percent, and eventually abandoned its currency entirely. The lesson: redenomination is a tool for accounting tidiness and psychological reset. It is not, by itself, a source of value. As a standard accounting and monetary analysis confirms: "In all cases, no legitimate income effect was recorded from the act of redenomination itself."

The "Guru" Interpretation

This is where the deliberate exploitation of the confusion becomes visible. A common claim in dinar speculation communities is that redenomination will actually benefit foreign holders of old-format notes -- that Iraq will somehow offer above-market exchange rates, or that the transition period creates a window for profit.

One forum post from as recently as April 2026 makes the argument that during redenomination, Iraqis will be forced to bring their dinars to banks to exchange for new notes, and that this somehow benefits external holders. It doesn't. A redenomination exchange is exactly that -- an exchange at the redenomination ratio, not a windfall. And as multiple official sources have confirmed, any redenomination would apply within Iraq, for Iraqis, using domestic banking infrastructure. Foreign holders of physical banknotes are not part of the plan, and there is no mechanism by which they would benefit.

Why Iraq Is Actually Discussing It

The legitimate reason Iraq keeps revisiting redenomination is straightforward and has nothing to do with enriching foreign speculators. As a senior CBI advisory panel member explained as far back as 2011, there are currently trillions of dinars in circulation represented by enormous volumes of physical banknotes of varying small denominations. This creates genuine practical problems: Iraqis making large purchases -- a car, for example -- resort to using US dollars rather than carrying bags of cash. The Central Bank wants to reduce that dollar dependency, streamline accounting across government and commerce, and modernise the payments infrastructure. Redenomination, when Iraq is ready for it, is a housekeeping measure.

The CBI's current position is that it is building the preconditions -- expanding digital payments, strengthening the legal framework, improving banking sector oversight -- before any redenomination could realistically proceed. This is sensible central banking. It has no bearing on the investment thesis being sold to dinar holders outside Iraq.

The Bottom Line

Iraq has been discussing removing zeros from its currency for at least fifteen years. Every time it has come up, the Central Bank has said the same thing: this is an administrative reform, not a revaluation, and it will not change the exchange rate. The most recent official CBI statement, issued in November 2025, went out of its way to reject even the rumour of an exchange rate change and to condemn speculation as harmful to Iraq's economic stability.

If and when Iraq eventually redenominates its currency, it will be good news for Iraqi businesses, Iraqi accounting departments, and the Iraqi banking sector. It will not be good news for people holding physical banknote bundles in other countries, waiting for a life-changing windfall.

The confusion between these two things is not accidental. It is the engine that keeps the dinar speculation industry running.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor -- not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

Top 10 Dinar Articles from March

Dinar-Dollar Demand Shifts as Import Dynamics Adjust

You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?

Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of March:

1. You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?
2. Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?
3. Dinar-Dollar Exchange Rate: Iran War has Little Impact
4. IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar
5. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
6. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
7. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
8. One Year of Trump: Iraqi Dinar Speculators Still Waiting
9. Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]
10. Iraqi Dinar Prospects: Reality Check After Six Months of Trump

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

You Bought Iraqi Dinars. Now What?

You made the purchase some time ago -- maybe a few years back, maybe longer. You heard the pitch: Iraq sits on some of the world's largest proven oil reserves, the dinar is trading at a fraction of what it once was, and when the country finally gets its act together, holders of today's cheap banknotes will be rewarded handsomely. So you bought. And now, with a regional war disrupting Iraqi oil exports and Baghdad struggling to pay its own civil servants, you are wondering what to do next.

This article is not going to tell you that Iraq is a basket case. It isn't. But it is going to be honest with you about what the numbers say -- and what your actual options are.

What You're Really Holding

Let's start with a basic fact that dinar dealers tend to gloss over. The Iraqi dinar is not a traded currency in any conventional sense. Major banks do not offer exchange in Iraqi dinars. The currency is only available for purchase or sale by selected brokers or money exchangers, and since no formal exchange exists for the Iraqi dinar, dealers can charge whatever they want to buy and sell it.

This matters enormously when you think about getting out, because dealers who sell IQD will only buy it back at drastically lower rates. As a concrete example, buying one million Iraqi dinars from one online platform costs $1,220 -- but selling one million dinars back to the same platform returns only $625. That means the dinar's value against the US dollar would need to increase by approximately 95% just for a buyer to break even.

Read that again. You need a near-doubling of the dinar's value just to recover your original outlay. The "investment" was compromised the moment you handed over your money.

Brokers typically charge a fee of 30% or more over and above the authorized exchange rate when selling dinars, and bid 30% under the formal exchange rate when buying them back. Purchasing and selling IQD could therefore lead to a loss of 50% or more without any movement in the exchange rate whatsoever.

The "RV" That Isn't Coming

The pitch for the dinar has always rested on the idea of an imminent "revaluation" -- a sudden, dramatic official increase in the dinar's exchange rate. Online forums buzz with excitement over every piece of Iraqi economic news, with each development analyzed for signs of the imminent RV that will supposedly occur overnight, catapulting dinar holders into wealth.

A survey conducted in early 2025 revealed that more than half of respondents expected the dinar to revalue by at least 1,000 times within the first 100 days of the new US presidential term. Such expectations are not grounded in reality.

The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has stated repeatedly that no such revaluation is planned, and anyone with a basic understanding of economics would know that it would be impossible, yet speculative revaluation claims continue to circulate.

There is also a persistent and deliberate confusion being exploited by promoters between two very different things. Many promoters confuse a revaluation -- a rare, dramatic jump in a currency's value -- with a redenomination, which adjusts the currency by removing zeroes without increasing purchasing power. Iraq has publicly discussed redenomination, not revaluation, multiple times. If Iraq removes three zeroes from its currency, your one million dinars becomes one thousand new dinars -- worth exactly the same amount. You have not made a penny.

The Kuwait Comparison Doesn't Hold Up

The origin story of dinar speculation is worth understanding, because it explains the persistence of the myth. The speculation originated from a misunderstanding of why the value of the Kuwaiti dinar recovered after the First Gulf War, leading to an assumption that the Iraqi dinar would follow suit. However, there are substantial differences in economic and political conditions between Iraq now and Kuwait then.

The main reason the Kuwaiti currency recovered was that its money supply had not been compromised, and it had a clear path back to normal. Iraq, on the other hand, had printed vast quantities of dinars; the comparison was always flawed, and two decades of non-revaluation have confirmed it.

So What Are Your Options?

If you are holding dinars right now, there are three realistic paths forward. None of them involves getting rich.

Option 1: Sell now and cut your losses.

This is the option most financial advisors would recommend, and the math supports it. You will take a significant loss on the spread, but you will recover something -- and you can redeploy that capital into an investment that has a realistic thesis behind it. The dinar's buy and sell rates differ widely depending on where and how you sell, and transaction fees can be substantial, so it pays to shop around before committing to a sale. Look for a licensed, regulated dealer and compare multiple buyback rates before you transact.

Option 2: Hold, but set a hard exit date.

If you cannot bring yourself to sell at a loss, at least impose discipline on yourself. Pick a date -- say, twelve months from now -- and commit to selling regardless of what the forums are saying. The psychology of dinar speculation shares characteristics with other speculative bubbles: confirmation bias leads believers to interpret any news as supporting their thesis while dismissing contrary evidence, and the sunk cost fallacy makes it psychologically difficult to admit error after years of waiting. A hard deadline is the only reliable defence against both.

Option 3: Treat it as a collectible and write it off mentally.

Some people buy dinars in quantities small enough that the loss, while real, is not life-altering. If that describes you, you can simply regard the notes as a curiosity -- they are, after all, legal tender in a real country with a real history -- and stop thinking of them as an investment. This is not a financially productive approach, but it is an honest one.

What Iraq Actually Looks Like Right Now

To be fair to Iraq: the country has real economic assets and genuine momentum in some areas. Iraq's foreign exchange reserves stood at approximately $94-97 billion in mid-2025, and the economy is forecast to grow by 4.4% in 2026. Iraq issued 1,867 licences for new industrial projects during 2025 alone, spanning the whole range of industry sectors. These are not the indicators of a collapsed state.

But a growing economy and a revalued currency are two entirely different things. The Iraqi dinar is expected to remain range-bound and largely flat, with no credible indicators of a sharp revaluation. The currency's fixed exchange rate, limited accessibility, and dependence on oil exports constrain its potential for significant appreciation. Iraq's economic recovery will benefit Iraqis, but it will not deliver a windfall to foreign holders of physical banknotes.

A Word About the People Selling You the Dream

Multiple US state agencies have issued formal warnings to investors that there is no place outside Iraq to exchange the dinar, that it is typically sold by dealers at inflated prices, and that there is little evidence to substantiate the claims of significant appreciation due to revaluation.

The forums, the "gurus," the YouTube channels, the "intel calls" -- these are not news services. They are, at best, communities of wishful thinkers reinforcing each other's hopes. At worst, some of them are actively profiting from keeping you in the trade: every month you hold is another month a dealer is not asked to buy back your dinars at the price they sold them to you.

The Bottom Line

Iraq is a country worth watching, and its long-term economic trajectory could be very exciting. But the specific proposition that holders of physical Iraqi dinars outside Iraq will one day see a dramatic, overnight increase in their currency's value has no credible economic foundation, has been explicitly denied by the Central Bank of Iraq, and has been waiting to come true for over twenty years.

The question is not whether the RV is coming. The question is what you are going to do while you wait for something that is not going to happen.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are holding Iraqi dinars and considering your options, consult a licensed, regulated financial advisor -- not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

Is the Dinar Your Retirement Plan?

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq's Payroll Cliff: Why the Dinar Can't Be Your Retirement Plan

For two decades, promoters of the Iraqi dinar as an investment have pointed to the country's oil wealth and whispered of an imminent revaluation -- an "RV" -- that would transform modest stacks of Iraqi banknotes into life-changing fortunes. The pitch has always depended on a single assumption: that Iraq's oil revenues would eventually give Baghdad the financial muscle to dramatically revalue its currency upward.

Today, that assumption is under more stress than ever, and the cracks are showing in the most concrete way possible: the Iraqi government may soon be unable to meet its own payroll.

A Quarter of the Country on the State's Books

Understanding the scale of the problem requires stepping back from currency speculation for a moment and looking at Iraq's fiscal architecture. More than 10.5 million Iraqi citizens, roughly a quarter of the nation's total population, receive a monthly salary from the state, according to a report from Iraq's Parliamentary Finance Committee. The Ministry of Finance must secure 8 trillion Iraqi dinars every single month to cover the salaries of government employees, retirees, and social protection beneficiaries.

This is not a new problem, but it is an accelerating one. More than 40 percent of Iraq's workforce is employed in the public sector or state-owned enterprises, which consumed 59 percent of all federal government expenditures in the first half of 2025. In 2023 alone, the federal government added more than 800,000 people to the public payroll, either hiring them into an already swollen public sector or enrolling them in social benefits programs.

The political logic behind this expansion is not hard to follow. Iraq's power-sharing arrangement divides key governmental positions among political parties representing Arab Shia, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds, and partitions rents from public funds and contracts among those same parties. Ministries are often treated as party fiefdoms, primarily serving the interests of their respective parties rather than the public good. Hiring is patronage. Payroll is political glue. And cutting it, as one prime minister discovered, triggers mass protests.

When Oil Money Runs Short

All of this might be sustainable if oil revenues stayed high. They haven't. The oil price required to balance Iraq's budget has risen to $84 per barrel, according to an IMF estimate, while oil prices had been hovering around $67. Iraq's petroleum revenues, which account for more than 93 percent of total government income, are no longer sufficient to cover planned expenditures.

Now add a war Iraq didn't start. The US and Israeli strikes on Iran have effectively halted Gulf oil shipping, including Iraqi exports, and the immediate fiscal consequences for Baghdad are severe. Informed sources have told local outlets that Iraq's financial resources are no longer sufficient to secure public sector salaries and pensions, that state-owned banks have significantly depleted their liquidity, and that payment delays are increasingly likely unless urgent solutions are found. Iraqi Kurdish officials have warned that Baghdad could fail to meet its public-sector payroll within weeks.

The real-world consequences of payroll failures are already visible: teachers and school administrators have gone on strike in protest of non-payment, leaving students out of class. Health workers have walked out, limiting services to emergency care. Doctors, facing financial pressure, have turned to private practice, hollowing out the public hospital system for patients who can't afford private care.

What This Means for the Dinar, and for "RV" Believers

This is where the currency speculation community deserves a direct and honest word.

The fundamental argument for a massive dinar revaluation has always been that Iraq's oil wealth would eventually force the Central Bank to jack up the dinar's value, rewarding patient holders with stratospheric returns. The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has repeatedly stated it has no plans for a major revaluation. Such statements are routinely dismissed by true believers as disinformation designed to conceal the secret until the big announcement. This is faith-based investing, not analysis.

The economics work against it at every level. For the dinar to experience a dramatic increase in value, Iraq would need to undergo an extraordinary economic transformation. The large money supply means that any attempt to revalue the currency would require a substantial reduction in the number of dinars in circulation, a move that is logistically and economically unfeasible.

Promoters frequently argue that Iraq's oil reserves guarantee dramatic revaluation. The reality is that while Iraq has significant oil reserves, they rank fifth globally, not first, and oil reserves alone don't determine currency strength. Kuwait has oil. Venezuela has oil. Currency strength is built on institutions, diversification, rule of law, and fiscal discipline, none of which Iraq has yet consolidated.

Meanwhile, the practical obstacles for investors are punishing even before geopolitics enter the picture. The Iraqi dinar has extremely poor liquidity. Dealers who sell IQD will only buy it back at drastically lower rates, meaning the dinar's value would need to increase dramatically just for investors to break even, let alone profit. Since no formal exchange exists for the Iraqi dinar, dealers can charge whatever they want to buy and sell it. The spread alone will eat your returns.

Confused about the difference between "revaluation" and "redenomination"? You're in good company, and that confusion is deliberate. Scammers regularly misinterpret Iraq's discussions about removing zeros from the currency as evidence of impending revaluation. Removing zeros is an administrative process that changes the face value of currency without changing its actual worth; if Iraq removed three zeros, 1,000 old dinars would become 1 new dinar, but purchasing power remains identical. You'd still be holding the same value. The casino didn't change the denomination on your chips.

Iraq Isn't Going Away, But Your Investment Logic Might Be

None of this is to say Iraq is a failed state. It is a resilient country that has survived invasion, occupation, civil war, the rise and fall of ISIS, and grinding political dysfunction while still producing oil, holding elections, and maintaining a functioning, if strained, central bank. Iraq's economy is projected to return to positive growth in 2026, and the government holds significant foreign reserves. These are real assets.

But a country managing a payroll crisis, dependent on oil revenues for over 90 percent of government income, caught in a regional war it didn't choose, and carrying a public-sector workforce that consumes the majority of its budget is not a country primed for a currency moonshot. It is a country focused on keeping the lights on and the salaries flowing,  month by month, increasingly on a knife's edge.

For those holding dinars, 2026 will likely unfold like previous years: a mixture of hope, disappointment, and moving goalposts as predicted revaluation dates come and go. The promoters will find new reasons why next year is the year. The forums will buzz. The "gurus" will post. And somewhere, a retiree with savings in a shoebox full of Iraqi banknotes will wait for an announcement that the Central Bank has explicitly said is not coming.

Iraq deserves better analysis than it gets from the dinar speculation community. And investors deserve better than the false hope being sold to them.

This article does not constitute financial or investment advice. If you are considering any currency investment, consult a licensed financial advisor, not an online forum.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

By John Lee.

In his latest monthly investment report for Iraq Business News, Ahmed Tabaqchali shows that the gap between the parallel and official exchange rates for the Iraqi dinar (IQD) had already been rising before the U.S.-Israel war on Iran started, due to domestic customs policy changes making it harder for informal importers to transfer money across borders.

When the war began, the gap barely reacted (only a 2.5% spike), and has since settled back in line with that pre-existing trend, suggesting the war had little lasting impact on this particular exchange rate dynamic.

Click here to read Ahmed Tabaqchali's full report.

See also:

IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

Top 10 Dinar Articles from February

Central Bank Advances Iraqi Banking Reform, Eases Foreign Transactions

The following were the ten most read dinar-related articles on Iraq Business News for the month of February:

1. Iraqi Dinar Speculation "Misplaced" -- CBI Boss
2. Iraqi Dinar Falls Against Dollar
3. 2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?
4. Central Bank Advances Iraqi Banking Reform, Eases Foreign Transactions
5. The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims Exposed
6. Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"
7. Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]
8. One Year of Trump: Iraqi Dinar Speculators Still Waiting
9. Dinars to Dollars - Tabaqchali Explains Market Gap
10. IQD in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Conflict Could Mean for Iraq's Dinar

The previous month's listing can be viewed here.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

By Neville Teller for Eurasia Review. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Power-Bid In Iraq: Will Maliki Return?

On January 27 US President Donald Trump declared on his Truth Social media platform that Iraq would be making a "disastrous mistake" if Nouri al-Maliki was re-installed as prime minister.

He argued that "last time Maliki was in power, the country descended into poverty and total chaos" and that this "should not be allowed to happen again."

Click here to read the full article.

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The Iraqi Dinar Caught in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Military Conflict Would Mean for Iraq's Currency

The Middle East is once again on the edge. The United States has assembled its largest concentration of naval and air power in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, two carrier strike groups, dozens of warships, and hundreds of warplanes now positioned within striking distance of Iran.

Negotiations between Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian officials in Geneva have reportedly yielded "significant progress", but the ultimate outcome may hinge on whether Iran is prepared to offer concessions significant enough for Trump to call a victory. With diplomacy fragile and military options on the table, one often-overlooked casualty of any escalation would be Iraq's currency, the dinar.

Iraq: The Battlefield Between Two Worlds

To understand what a US-Iran military conflict would do to the Iraqi dinar, you have to first understand Iraq's precarious geopolitical position. The country is simultaneously a close security partner of the United States and an economy deeply enmeshed with Iran. Iraq spends roughly $900 million monthly on Iranian goods, a major portion of this historically going to electricity and gas. Iranian-backed militias are embedded within Iraq's state institutions. US troops remain on Iraqi soil. Iraq's government walks a tightrope between US alliance and Iranian influence, and its currency walks the same tightrope with it.

The Iraqi dinar's journey has been one of the most dramatic in monetary history. The currency dropped substantially from 3 IQD per USD before 1991 to about 1,310 IQD per USD today. Decades of war, sanctions, and corruption have slowly eroded its value. In recent years, Iraq has made modest progress: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided structural guidance, oil revenues have been strong, and the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has maintained a managed peg to the dollar. Iraq's position as OPEC's second-largest oil producer and strong international support drive steady economic improvements. But all of that relative stability would face severe pressure the moment US bombs begin falling on Iranian soil.

Scenario One: A Limited Strike

The most likely immediate military scenario, and the one that has been most openly discussed in Washington, involves a targeted, time-limited campaign against Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure. Trump may order a targeted attack on select military sites inside Iran to pressure the country's leaders into agreeing to an acceptable deal, demonstrating US threats of action are real. The targets could include ballistic missile sites, facilities connected to Iran's nuclear program, or buildings used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In this scenario, the Iraqi dinar's fate would be shaped by several competing forces. On one hand, oil prices would almost certainly spike, and for Iraq, higher oil prices are a lifeline. Iraq's state budget is overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum revenues, and a sudden surge in global crude prices triggered by conflict fears would, in theory, fill state coffers. A better-funded government can defend its exchange rate more effectively.

On the other hand, a limited strike would almost certainly trigger Iranian retaliation, and Iraq would be squarely in the blast radius. Iran's kinetic retaliation plan relies on a reconstituted arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles capable of striking US bases and allied territory across the region, and many of those bases are in Iraq. US embassies in Iraq and other Arab states began to evacuate personnel in response to Iranian threats on American bases as far back as the lead-up to last year's Operation Midnight Hammer. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah have already issued explicit warnings: leader Ahmad al-Hamidawi warned that any strike on Iranian soil would trigger a "total war" involving militias across the Levant.

For the dinar, this translates to a severe confidence crisis. When violence erupts on Iraqi soil, even if Iraq is not the primary combatant, foreign capital flees, domestic savers rush to convert dinars to dollars, and the black market premium widens dramatically. The Central Bank of Iraq, which sells dollars at auction to defend its peg, would come under enormous pressure. Its foreign exchange reserves, while substantial, are not unlimited, and a sustained capital flight could force a de facto devaluation.

Scenario Two: Sustained Military Campaign or Regime Change

Current contingency planning in the Pentagon is configured for sustained, weeks-long operations against Iran if so ordered by Trump. A broader campaign aimed at degrading Iran's military capacity, or worse, one that tips into regime change, would represent a qualitatively different shock to the Iraqi economy.

Iraq's energy dependence on Iran is the most acute vulnerability. If war disrupts those supply lines, through Iranian cut-offs, infrastructure damage, or US sanctions enforcement, Iraqi power grids would come under renewed pressure. Blackouts would damage industry, commerce, and ordinary life. Economic output would contract sharply, and the government's ability to pay civil servant salaries and maintain social order would erode. In such conditions, the dinar would face significant downward pressure regardless of what the oil price is doing.

There is also the migration and refugee dimension. A major war with Iran, a country of over 90 million people, could produce refugee flows that would dwarf anything the region has seen since 2003. Iraq, which shares a long border with Iran and already hosts displaced populations from earlier conflicts, would be on the front lines of that humanitarian wave. The fiscal and social cost could be immense.

For currency markets, the historical parallel is instructive. During the 2003 US invasion of Iraq itself, Iraqi currency markets experienced extreme dislocations. Capital flight, hoarding of hard currency, and the collapse of normal economic activity all preceded any formal devaluation. A war next door, one that also engulfs Iraqi militias and potentially Iraqi territory, could produce similar dynamics even without Iraq being the primary target.

The Oil Price Paradox

One of the most important, and often misunderstood, dynamics in this scenario is the double-edged nature of oil prices. A major US-Iran conflict would almost certainly send crude prices sharply higher, at least initially. Iran is a significant oil producer, and any conflict that threatens the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply passes, would trigger immediate panic buying in global energy markets.

For Iraq, this creates a cruel paradox. Higher oil revenues would, in theory, improve the government's fiscal position and its ability to defend the dinar. But the same conflict that pushes oil prices up would simultaneously disrupt Iraq's own oil export infrastructure, close off Iranian energy imports that keep the lights on, trigger militia violence, scare away foreign investment, and force emergency spending on security. The net effect on the dinar would almost certainly be negative, as the costs outweigh the revenue windfall.

The Sanctions and Banking Dimension

Any escalation would also intensify the already complex sanctions environment that shapes how the Iraqi economy interfaces with the global financial system. The Trump administration focuses on selective sanctions against Iraqi banks while conditioning waivers for Iranian energy purchases. This policy could soon affect Iraq's economic partnerships and currency stability. Banks found to be facilitating Iranian transactions face being cut off from dollar-clearing networks, a potentially devastating punishment in an economy that relies so heavily on the greenback.

This creates a further squeeze on the dinar. If Iraqi banks are penalised for maintaining ties with Iran, ties that are partly economically necessary and partly politically unavoidable, the result is a fragmentation of Iraq's banking sector, reduced access to dollar liquidity, and a wider spread between the official and parallel exchange rates. Ordinary Iraqis, who already prefer to hold savings in US dollars rather than dinars, would accelerate that dollarisation, further undermining confidence in the local currency.

Historical Lessons: What 2003 Tells Us

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq offers a partial precedent, though the situations differ significantly. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the Iraqi currency market experienced extreme volatility. The old Saddam-era dinar was eventually replaced with a new currency, and a managed peg to the dollar was established. Over time, with massive oil revenues and international support, the new dinar stabilised.

But the early years of post-invasion Iraq were characterised by exactly the kind of dynamics a new conflict would recreate: capital flight, dollarisation, black market currency trading, and a gap between official and street exchange rates. The key difference now is that Iraq is not the direct target of military action, but it is the unavoidable collateral victim, geographically, economically, and politically sandwiched between the two combatants.

What Investors and Observers Should Watch

For those tracking the dinar, whether as currency speculators, businesses operating in Iraq, or observers of the wider regional economy, the key indicators to monitor are:

The Central Bank of Iraq's foreign exchange auction volumes and reserves. A sharp drop in reserves or a sudden suspension of dollar auctions would signal that the peg is under existential pressure. The spread between the official exchange rate and the parallel market rate. Historically, this spread widens during periods of political and security stress, and a significant widening would be an early warning of impending devaluation. The status of Iranian energy supplies to Iraq. If gas flows are disrupted and the lights go out, the economic fallout would be rapid and severe. And crucially, the behaviour of Iraq's Iranian-backed militias. If they activate in response to US strikes on Iran, Iraq would transition from bystander to active warzone, and the dinar would face its most serious crisis since 2003.

Conclusion: A Currency with No Good Options

The Iraqi dinar is, at its core, a hostage to forces far beyond Baghdad's control. Iraq's government has limited ability to insulate its currency from a major military confrontation between the United States and Iran, a conflict whose epicentre would be on its doorstep and whose shockwaves would run directly through its energy sector, banking system, and political fabric.

Administration officials have been unclear about what their objectives are as they confront Iran, and that uncertainty itself is a risk factor for the dinar. Markets hate ambiguity, and a conflict with no clear endgame is the worst of all possible scenarios for a currency already carrying the weight of decades of instability.

In the best case, a short, sharp military strike followed by a rapid return to negotiations, the dinar would likely suffer a temporary shock: a flight to dollars, a widening of the parallel market premium, and a drawdown of central bank reserves, but ultimately a manageable correction. In the worst case, a sustained campaign, militia activation across Iraq, energy supply disruption, and a regional war, the dinar would face its most severe test since the 2003 invasion. The outcome would depend not just on what the US military does to Iran, but on whether Iraq can remain a bystander in a war that, by its very geography, it cannot escape.

This article reflects the geopolitical and economic situation as of late February 2026. It does not constitute financial or investment advice.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

(Picture: The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently on route to the region).

By Clayton Seigle, for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

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