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By John Lee.

Iraq's State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO) reportedly announced on Tuesday that it has concluded all contracts and obligations with buyers of oil produced in the Kurdistan Region. The company emphasised that resuming exports from Kurdistan would restore Iraq's role as a key supplier to the European market.

SOMO Director General Ali Nizar al-Shatri [Shatari] told the state-owned Iraqi News Agency (INA) that current issues in Kurdistan are matters of operational arrangements, noting that Iraqi law applies to all parties. He explained that the federal Ministry of Oil and the Kurdistan Regional Government's Ministry of Natural Resources operate under a single framework, with differences only in the relationship between the regional government and producing companies.

Al-Shatri added that the federal and regional governments, along with producing companies, need to finalise the 2025 budget law implementation mechanism. Advanced understandings have been reached, and efforts continue to allow crude oil flows to Turkey's Ceyhan port for export.

He noted that Kurdish crude is currently consumed locally, with excess quantities planned for export under the 2025 budget law. SOMO has completed all contractual obligations and is ready to receive oil once production resumes. He highlighted that Iraqi oil closely matches Russian crude quality, positioning Iraq as a key alternative supplier amid the Russian-European supply gap. No oil has yet been delivered to SOMO from the Kurdistan Ministry of Natural Resources, and contractual relations remain between the ministry and producing companies.

(Source: INA)

By John Lee.

National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji met on Tuesday with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu and his accompanying delegation, in the presence of the Russian Ambassador in Baghdad.

Al-Araji welcomed the visit, noting that Iraq is pursuing wider cooperation with all countries to serve mutual interests. Discussions focused on strengthening bilateral relations and continuing collaboration across multiple fields.

The meeting comes ahead of the expected talks between Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the Arab Summit in Moscow, which will be chaired by al-Sudani.

Talks also covered the exchange of expertise, technology transfer, training in border security, cybersecurity, counter-terrorism, and combating narcotics. Both sides discussed recent regional developments and efforts by their governments to halt the conflict in Gaza and seek diplomatic solutions.

Al-Araji emphasised Iraq's commitment to developing security, economic, strategic, and investment ties with Russia. Shoigu expressed gratitude for the warm reception and reiterated Russia's desire to enhance cooperation with Iraq in all areas.

In an interview the previous day with Russia's Interfax news agency, Shoigu emphasised that Russian-Iraqi trade increased by 30% over the past year and a further 35% in the first half of the current year.  He added that Russian companies investment in Iraq has surpassed $20 billion.

Russia and Iraq maintain regular contact between their defense, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, he said, adding that Russia is open to strengthening military-technical cooperation.

Full Interfax interview here (Russian)

(Sources: Office of the National Security Advisor, Interfax)

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Turkey Ends ITPA- Submission to Blackmail or Preservation of Iraqi Sovereign Rights and National Interests

The Turkish government officially ended, on 21 July 2025, the Iraqi Turkish Oil Pipeline Agreement-ITOPA, effective on 27 July 2026.^[1] A couple of days later, the Turkish Minister of Energy proposed amending and expanding- ITOPA.^[2]  Obviously, the Turkish formal position is inconsistent with ITOPA' "2010 Amendment".

So far, no formal position was announced by the Iraqi government on the Turkish move. ^[3]

The Turkish act was the topic of a debating event, in Arabic, that was convened by "Al-Mushtarac Platform" on 1 August 2025.* Below is a brief of my presentation, with minor updating.

My intervention at the debating event covers the following themes:

1. 1. A brief background on ITOPA, focusing on its latest amendment in 2010, which expires in 2026.
2. An analysis of the Turkish position in light of the agreement's legal frameworks on the one hand, and the very complex set of economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic considerations on the other.
3. 3. The impact of the Turkish decision on Iraq: A critical analysis of what Iraq should have done since 2023, what Iraq have done, and the alternatives currently available for Iraq.

First: A brief background on ITOPA and its latest amendment

ITOPA was signed on August 27, 1973. The pipeline on the Turkish side consists of two parallel lines: a 40-inch line, which is the first expansion of the system that was completed in 1984, and a 46-inch line, which is the second expansion, completed in 1987. This brought total design pumping capacity to 1.6 Mbpd. ITOPA latest amendment was signed in 2010 and became effective in July 2011.

In November 2013, KRG completed the laying of an oil pipeline from Khormala to the metering station at Fishkhabur for the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, then connected it to the 40-inch pipeline on the Turkish side. In the same month, KRG and Turkey signed 50-year agreements regarding KRG oil export.

On 21 May 2014, the first shipment of KRG oil was loaded for export from the port of Ceyhan. That loading prompted the Ministry of Oil-MoO to invoking arbitration clause of ITOPA amendment before the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce-ICC on 23 May 2014, and ICC award was delivered on 23 March 2023.

A formal document entitled, "Amendment to the Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement signed on August 27, 1973, and the following related agreements, protocols, minutes of meetings, and annexes between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Government of the Republic of Turkey," signed on September 19, 2010. The amendment entered into force in July 2011 and expires in July 2026.^[4]

The "Amendment" document consists of 16 pages and includes 11 articles: 1- Definitions. 2- General Provisions. 3- Pumping Capacity and Minimum Obligated Pumping Capacity. 4- Transit Tariffs and Payments. 5- Recovered and Wasted Crude Oil. 6- Ownership of Crude Oil Filling Pipelines and Tank Flors. 7- Iraq Office in Ceyhan Port. 8- Other Issues. 9- Force Majeure. 10- Dispute Settlement. 11- Duration of the Amendment and Date of Entry Into Force.

According to Article 11, the duration/term of "Amendment" is 15 years effective from July 2011, with time-framed four options: 1- amendment, 2- new agreement, 3- automatic extension for five years and 4- end of the amendment term.

Second: Analysing Turkish' action and position

The following analysis is premised on the legal frameworks of ITOPA amendment on the one hand, and the very complex economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic considerations on the other.

From a legal perspective related to international bilateral agreements, Turkey's move does not violate Article 11 of the Amendment, Turkey chose the fourth option. But why?

Theoretically and analytically, Turkey could have waited another five years for ITOPA amendment to expire, and during that period, it could use the pipeline, which has become ready to be operational. However, Turkey may have found that the current overall circumstances-domestic and regional economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic- are conducive to making the decision to terminate the agreement. So, what are they?

The Turkish energy balance indicates the country is oil and gas import dependent. Petroleum consumption-production gap was 800 kbd, and 56% of its gas imports was from Russia and Iran (in 2022). ^[5]

This is a geopolitical vulnerability if the situation continues in 2025, considering Trump's threatening to energy imports from these two countries.

However, Turkey worked for years to becoming an important transit country and oil and gas pipelines hub from central Asia to Europe, in addition to pipelines from Iraq (including KRG).

Also, Turkey succeeded to making important discoveries offshore (in the Mediterranean and Black Sea) and onshore, especially Gabar oilfield in eastern mountainous area of the country, which was connected to the ITP. ^[6]

The Iraqi oil through the pipeline have been either very low or was outage for years. This makes Turkey accustomed to the absence of the Iraqi oil. But, on the other hand, Turkey benefits twice; by gaining the minimum-throughput transit fee, i.e., pump-or-pay (PoP) and by charging a much higher transit fee on KRG oil that is pumped through the 40 Inch pipeline of (ITP).

The political reconciliation and agreement with the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan/PKK, have reduced the tremendous security burdens on the Turkish government, and thus discounts or minimise the Kurdish related political and security risk.

The political and geopolitical consequences of the military situation in the Middle East and the USA/Isreal attack on Iran have weakened Russia and Iran geopolitical standing and, consequently, enhanced Turkish regional strategic importance and positioning.

The Turkish President Erdogan is known for his pragmatism and real politic, and such political attitude is probably enhanced by the US President Trump views, policies and actions.

Turkey might find some encouragement by the recently expressed US views regarding the end of "Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916" Middle East boarders.  Also, there seems to be an echoing sentiment in Turkey hinting to end 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

In addition to the agreements signed between Turkey and KRG, the latter had offered, in 2016, the sale of many oilfield and exploration blocks to Turkey.^[7]

Finally, ICC award might have been triggering the timing of the Turkish action. The award comprises many decisions, some in Iraq's favour while others in Turkish favour and others of operative nature relating to interest rates that both countries are directed to apply and calculate.

Decisions 2, 3 and 5 compel Turkey to pay ca. $1.998billion to Iraq. Decisions 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 award Turkey a total of ca. $5.266billion, mostly related to PoP provisions. Thus, Turkey should pay Iraq a net of $1.471billion.

Decisions 16, 17, 18 and 19 are related to the calculation of accrued interest rates that the countries should follow and apply, without stating the timeframe, how and who to finalise this matter.

While the award was a financial victory for Iraq, many in Turkey interpret it as only related to unauthorised KRG oil pumping to and loading in Ceyhan terminal; this could be avoided by different means in the future.

Third topic: How Could Iraq React to Turkish Decision

Upon the ICC award, I proposed for the MoO to: 1. Implement the award, especially what relates to interest rate issue. 2. Carefully examine the award and learn from its deliberations and consequences. 3. Evaluate Turkish potential future options and how to confront them to preserve Iraq's interests.^[8] I have not received feedback or seen any action from the government, the ministry or any information regarding these recommendations. ^[9]

In my view and as mentioned above, the possibility of the pipeline agreement expiring in July 2026 is included in the amendment document, and therefore Iraq should have been planning since 2014 to confront such eventuality in 2026 or, in the best-case scenario, in 2031.

From my perspective, regarding the strategic importance and geopolitical risks of all Iraqi export outlets, the best alternative is to modernize and expand export capacities at the southern outlets, while simultaneously modernizing and expanding the "strategic pipeline" for transporting northern oil, including KRG oil, to the south. The matter becomes even more urgent after the signing of the Kirkuk field development agreement with BP and the Hamrin field development agreement with the US' HKN.

I am fully aware of the MoO's efforts on these two directions, but the actual facts and statistical data do not indicate at all that sufficient work has been done to complete these two strategic export essential projects. This failure has been the responsibility of the MoO since 2014.

Moreover, the North Oil Company-NOC announced, for a while, that the restoration of the Kirkuk-Feshkhabur pipeline has been completed and that three tests have been conducted, indicating that the pipeline is ready for pumping oil. If this is the case, why hasn't it been operational before July 21, 2025? And why hasn't Turkey taken this into consideration? What's even more surprising is that in recent months MoO has been busy contracting numerous mini projects it classifies as "strategic", in a manner that lacks proper planning and implementation priorities.

The worst and most damaging action Turkey could take and do after July 2026 includes any or all of the following alternatives/possibilities:

1. Activating the secret agreements with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), including those reported by wikileaks.org.
2. Allocating a portion of the capacity of the Turkish section of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to exporting KRG oil or laying a new pipeline exclusively for KRG oil, parallel to the existing two pipelines.
3. Proposing and negotiating a new agreement with the Iraqi government aimed at achieving a range of Turkish interests at the expense of Iraqi national interests.

What can the Iraqi government do regarding these three possibilities above? Iraq has two alternatives: submitting to the blackmail or preserving sovereign rights and national interests.

I believe the Iraqi government should adopt the second option, and take the following actions:

1. Regarding the two Turkish possibilities (1) and (2) above, it is preferable to resort to activating the tools of international law related to relations between states, the Vienna Convention, the bilateral agreements between Iraq and Turkey, especially the 1946 bilateral friendship treaty between the two countries, and numerous international law instruments.
2. There should be a concerted move towards the relevant international bodies for this purpose. The responsibility for such move is entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with ongoing, serious follow-up by the Council of Ministers.
3. I see no point in talking about or negotiating any new agreement, as discussed below, if the Turkish side insists on the two possibilities (1) and (2) mentioned above.

Turkey's latest proposals and comments

The Turkish Energy Minister reportedly said, on 29 July 2025, that his country is proposing:

(1) A framework for ongoing negotiations to expand the bilateral agreement in the energy sector.

(2) A "mechanism to ensure full utilization" of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline.

(3) Expanding the amendment to the pipeline agreement to include cooperation in the fields of gas, electricity, and petrochemicals, in addition to oil.

(4) The possibility of extending the pipeline to southern Iraq, as the path to full capacity necessarily begins from the south.

(5) Linking all this to the "Development Highway" project from Basra to the Turkish border and then to Europe.

My preliminary remarks on the reported proposals.

First: Turkey should have submitted these proposals in July 2024, in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 of ITOPA Amendment of 2010 referred to earlier, instead of giving note, in July 2025, ending the validity of the ITOPA.

Article 11 stipulates that either party has the right to propose amendment or a new agreement two years prior to the end of Amendment term/duration.

Therefore, by choosing one option while violating other options of Article 11, this actually reflects inconsistency, by intention or omission, of the Turkish authorities.

Second: Such proposals, whether general or multi-purpose, should be presented within the "Iraqi-Turkish Joint Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation", which has been in operation for more than 50 years. This Turkish proposal could be a base for a "Frame Agreement," resulting from it, if needs be, a series of "specific agreements" for the topics mentioned in the Turkish minister proposal. It is worth mentioning that this Joint Committee has been one of the most active bilateral committees Iraq has with other countries.

Third: Regarding the crude oil pipeline, I suggest there should be a specific agreement for oil pipeline consisting of two parts: the first is relating to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (i.e., the agreement that Turkey have suspended recently-ITOPA), and the second is relating to the proposed new Basra-Ceyhan pipeline, in the event of an agreement have been reached on the implementation, timing and funding of this pipeline and its integration with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.^[10]

Fourth: The integration of the Kurdistan Region's oil pipeline with the Kirkuk-Ceyhan/Basra-Ceyhan pipeline, with pumping, transporting, and loading of oil falling under SOMO mandate exclusively.

Final remarks

Until recently, the Oil Minister's statements indicated Turkish side's readiness to operate the pipeline. Furthermore, in her recent meeting with parliamentarians, the Minister of Finance did not mention anything related to the Turkish side as a reason for the delay in submitting the budget schedules thus far. Furthermore, the Director General of SOMO recently confirmed the current readiness to export oil through the pipeline, if KRG deliver the oil. Have the Iraqi authorities, the government, and the Ministry of Oil fallen into what can be described as a "trap of deceptive statements" by Turkey and their naive trust in these statements??

While the Turkish decision had actually prompted numerous reactions inside and outside Iraq, including my initiative to convene this event, the matter was not mentioned in the Cabinet meeting on July 29, and not in the regular meeting of the Council' follow-up on oil projects on July 31^[11], and not in the seventh session of the Opinion Board held on Wednesday, July 30, at the Ministry of Oil.^[12]  Nothing relating to the Turkish decision was published on the websites of the Ministry of Oil, SOMO, and the North Oil Company (all of which are executing parties specifically mentioned in the Amendment document of 2010.( Do these Iraqi authorities have no official position on the Turkish move??

I believe that official bodies must stop adopting the policy and practice of "ignoring and turning a deaf ear."

A closing call or cry is due now: To strengthen Iraq's negotiating position, ensure economic security, and protect the national interest, I emphasize the need for the Iraqi government to give immediate and absolute priority to modernizing and expanding oil export capacities at the southern ports and expediting the implementation of the Basra-Haditha pipeline within the concept of a "strategic pipeline" to transport northern oil, including regional oil, to the south.

A dim light at the end of a tunnel still there; recent statements by the Iraqi side, namely by the Minister of Oil^[13] and the DG of SOMO^[14] indicating eminent resumption of ITP operation, conditional though, upon KRG and its contracted IOCs making enough oil for pumping!!

* The virtual event uses Zoom facility, and its full recording is accessible through the following link: https://youtu.be/RBBlIMjnlzI The Platform uses AI to transfer "sounds into text". Hence, the text of the recording is accessible through the following link: https://www.mushtarek.org/groups/679b938b7fd0bd55baff8b70/posts/post/6890ac39fad20450657e90b8  The Arabic text can be translated into English and other languages by clicking the Translate icon    therein. The presentation comprises map, charts, tables and images; they are not included in this brief article. The PowerPoint slides are available upon request in MS or Pdf.

Norway

10 August 2025

Endnotes

[1] https://www.economy-news.net/content.php?id=57729

[2] https://www.economy-news.net/content.php?id=58058

[3] Except a brief statement by unnamed official from the Ministry of Oil to (INA), which was removed later, but till accessible through this link. https://arabic.rt.com/business/1694792

[4] I do possess scanned copies of the Agreement and related formal Iraqi documents, and they are the base of analyses.

[5] Based on data from, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/country/TUR

[6] My articles, "Once Again, Turkey Violates the Pipeline Agreement" https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2024/06/25/jiyad-once-again-turkey-violate_the-pipeline-agreement/?swcfpc=1 and in Arabic,

https://www.sahat-altahreer.com/author/62/

[7] The secret documents were published by Wikileaks.org, but they are not available now. Luckily, I saved them in my database.

[8] My articles, ICC Awards, FSC Decisions and The Three-Years State Budget, https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2023/05/29/icc-awards-fsc-decisions-and-the-three-years-state-budget/?wcfpc=1

https://www.mushtarek.org/groups/6135da07aac957001377773e/posts/post/646d0f04d73eb199b4402e78 May 2023

[9] However, an IOR article dated 30 September 2023, "Iraq presses claim to enforce arbitration award against Turkey", provides information on an Iraqi filed case before a US court.

[10] Actually, such a pipeline was proposed in 2012, but the idea did not materialize since then, and I have referred to it in my previous writings many times.

[11] https://www.economy-news.net/content.php?id=58154

[12] https://www.oil.gov.iq/?article=2783

[13] Tareek Al-Shaab, 7 August 2025 and https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2025/08/06/iraq-to-resume-oil-exports-via-turkiye-this-week/

 

Click here to read the full article in pdf format.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.

By John Lee.

The eight OPEC+ countries, including Iraq, have agreed to the continuing of their phased rollback of 2.2 million bpd in voluntary cuts that began in April.

According to a statement from OPEC, the decision, taken during a virtual meeting on 3rd August, reflects confidence in current oil market fundamentals, including low inventory levels and a stable global economic outlook. The countries reiterated that the adjustment aligns with the 5th December 2024 agreement, which allows for a gradual and flexible return of production, with the ability to pause or reverse adjustments depending on market conditions.

The group also stressed the importance of compensating for any overproduction since January 2024 and confirmed their collective commitment to the Declaration of Cooperation, which is being monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC).

Regular monthly reviews will continue, with the next meeting scheduled for 7th September 2025.

Full statement from OPEC:

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman reaffirm commitment to market stability on current healthy oil market fundamentals and steady global economic outlook and adjust production

The eight OPEC+ countries, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023, namely Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman met virtually on 3 August 2025, to review global market conditions and outlook.

In view of a steady global economic outlook and current healthy market fundamentals, as reflected in the low oil inventories, and in accordance with the decision agreed upon on 5 December 2024 to start a gradual and flexible return of the 2.2 million barrels per day voluntary adjustments starting from 1 April 2025, the eight participating countries will implement a production adjustment of 547 thousand barrels per day in September 2025 from August 2025 required production level. This is equivalent to four monthly increments as detailed in the table below. The phase-out of the additional voluntary production adjustments may be paused or reversed subject to evolving market conditions. This flexibility will allow the group to continue to support oil market stability.

The eight OPEC+ countries also noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. The eight countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that were agreed to be monitored by the JMMC during its 53rd meeting held on April 3rd 2024.

They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024. The eight OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation. The eight countries will meet on September 7, 2025.

(Source: OPEC Secretariat)

By Simon Watkins for OilPrice.com. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Chevron, SLB Deals Signal US Return to Iraqi Oilfields

There are two distinct superpower strategies at play to capture the very heartland of the Middle East - Iraq.

On the one hand, China and Russia want to end the semi-independent status of Kurdistan in the north, have it rolled into the rest of Iraq as a regular province, and then expel all Western firms from the then-unified country.

On the other hand, the US and its allies want to bolster the independence of the Kurdistan region to act as leverage to extend their influence in the rest of Iraq to the south.

Click here to read the full report.

From the Atlantic Council:

The Atlantic Council announced that Victoria J. Taylor, former deputy assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran, will be the new director of the Iraq Initiative within its Middle East Programs.

Taylor brings a distinguished background as a national security leader with over two decades of experience in the Middle East and Europe. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Taylor also served at US Department of State as the director for North African Affairs, as the deputy director for Western Europe, in the Office of Iranian Affairs, and on the Turkey Desk. She also served at the National Security Council as the director for Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea Affairs, and abroad as the deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Croatia, as well as in postings in Tunis, Tbilisi, Islamabad, and Lahore.

"At a moment of significant regional change, Iraq's security and economic development remain critical for regional stability and for advancing broader US interests in the Middle East," Taylor said. "I'm excited to join the Atlantic Council team and build on the Iraq Initiative's work to strengthen the US-Iraq partnership and help build a sovereign, secure, and prosperous Iraq."

As director of the Iraq Initiative, Taylor will lead the Council's work on Iraq, providing policy recommendations and analysis to US and regional policymakers and business leaders that advance Iraq's regional integration, stability, and democratic and economic development, as well as broaden Washington's understanding of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and Iraq's minority communities.

"The Atlantic Council is well-positioned to shape the conversation around the future of a critical MENA country like Iraq and the future of bilateral relations between Washington and Baghdad," said William Wechsler, senior director of the Atlantic Council's Middle East Programs. "Under Taylor's leadership, we will be able to become one of the main conveners of policy discussions and producers of thought-leadership on Iraq in a time of important regional upheaval."

Taylor hails from Springfield, Missouri. She holds a bachelor's degree in international relations and diplomatic history from the University of Pennsylvania and a master's degree in development studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She speaks French, Mandarin, Russian, and Urdu.

By Alexander Miller, for Eurasia Business News. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Russia eyes new oil deals in Iraq

Russia is actively expanding its oil interests in Iraq, capitalizing on opportunities created by Baghdad's need to modernize its hydrocarbon sector and boost crude exports.

In February, Moscow and Baghdad signed four major energy cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding, signalling a significant escalation in bilateral energy ties.

Click here to read the full report.

By John Lee.

The eight OPEC+ countries, including Iraq, have reaffirmed their coordinated approach to oil market stability and announced a collective production adjustment for August 2025.

In a virtual meeting held on 5 July, the group cited healthy market fundamentals and a stable global economic outlook as the basis for a 548,000 barrels per day increase in production from July levels. This adjustment forms part of a phased rollback of the 2.2 million bpd voluntary cuts initially agreed in April and November 2023, and formally endorsed on 5 December 2024.

The phased increases will unfold over four monthly increments, but the group reserved the right to pause or reverse these measures depending on market developments - a move designed to maintain price and inventory stability.

The countries also committed to accelerating compensation for any overproduction since January 2024 and reiterated full compliance with the Declaration of Cooperation. Compliance and market conditions will be monitored through monthly meetings, with the next scheduled for 3 August 2025 to decide on September output levels.

Full statement from OPEC:

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman reaffirm commitment to market stability on current healthy oil market fundamentals and steady global economic outlook and adjust production

The eight OPEC+ countries, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April and November 2023, namely Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman met virtually on 5 July 2025, to review global market conditions and outlook.

In view of a steady global economic outlook and current healthy market fundamentals, as reflected in the low oil inventories, and in accordance with the decision agreed upon on 5 December 2024 to start a gradual and flexible return of the 2.2 million barrels per day voluntary adjustments starting from 1 April 2025, the eight participating countries will implement a production adjustment of 548 thousand barrels per day in August 2025 from July 2025 required production level. This is equivalent to four monthly increments as detailed in the table below. The gradual increases may be paused or reversed subject to evolving market conditions. This flexibility will allow the group to continue to support oil market stability.

The eight OPEC+ countries also noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. The eight countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that were agreed to be monitored by the JMMC during its 53rd meeting held on April 3rd 2024.

They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024. The eight OPEC+ countries will hold monthly meetings to review market conditions, conformity, and compensation. The eight countries will meet on 3 August 2025 to decide on September production levels.

(Source: OPEC Secretariat)

By John Lee.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has announced sanctions targeting networks involved in transporting and purchasing Iranian oil, including a group of companies led by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said.

The U.S. alleges that Said's network smuggled Iranian oil disguised as, or blended with, Iraqi oil, generating substantial profits while benefiting Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), which is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Several vessels engaged in the covert delivery of Iranian oil were also sanctioned, as the U.S. continues to crack down on Iran's so-called "shadow fleet" of tankers. The actions aim to increase economic pressure on Tehran and disrupt its access to revenue that could fuel destabilising activities.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated, "While Iran has had every opportunity to choose peace, its leaders have chosen extremism. Treasury will continue to target Tehran's revenue sources and intensify economic pressure."

The latest designations were made under Executive Orders 13902 and 13224, which target key sectors of the Iranian economy and entities supporting terrorism. The U.S. Department of State also announced sanctions on six entities and four vessels for significant transactions involving Iranian petroleum products, under Executive Order 13846.

More background on this story can be found here.

Full statement from the U.S. Department of the Treasury:

Treasury Targets Diverse Networks Facilitating Iranian Oil Trade

Today [3rd July 2025], the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action against networks that have collectively transported and purchased billions of dollars' worth of Iranian oil, some of which has benefited Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Among the entities sanctioned today is a network of companies run by Iraqi businessman Salim Ahmed Said (Said) that has profited from smuggling Iranian oil disguised as, or blended with, Iraqi oil. Treasury is also sanctioning several vessels engaged in the covert delivery of Iranian oil, intensifying pressure on Iran's "shadow fleet."

"As President Trump has made clear, Iran's behavior has left it decimated.  While it has had every opportunity to choose peace, its leaders have chosen extremism," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent.  "Treasury will continue to target Tehran's revenue sources and intensify economic pressure to disrupt the regime's access to the financial resources that fuel its destabilizing activities."

Today's action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets those operating in certain sectors of the Iranian economy, including Iran's petroleum and petrochemical sectors, as well as the counterterrorism authority E.O. 13224, as amended.  It marks the eighth round of sanctions targeting Iran's oil trade since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2, directing a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran.

Concurrently, the Department of State is designating six entities and identifying four vessels pursuant to E.O. 13846 for having knowingly engaged in a significant transaction for the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum or petroleum products from Iran.

IRAN-IRAQ OIL SMUGGLING NETWORK

Iraqi-British national Salim Ahmed Said (Said) runs a network of companies that have been selling Iranian oil falsely declared as Iraqi oil since at least 2020.  Said's companies use ship-to-ship transfers and other obfuscation techniques to hide their activities.  Said's companies and vessels blend Iranian oil with Iraqi oil, which is then sold to Western buyers via Iraq or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as purely Iraqi oil using forged documentation to avoid sanctions.  This allows the oil to be sold on the legitimate market and helps Iran evade international sanctions on its oil exports.

Said has bribed many members of key Iraqi government bodies, including parliament.  He has reportedly paid millions of dollars in kickbacks to these officials in exchange for forged vouchers allowing him to sell Iranian oil as if it originated from Iraq.

Said is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.

Said controls UAE-based company VS Tankers FZE (VS Tankers), despite avoiding formal association with the company.  Formerly known as Al-Iraqia Shipping Services & Oil Trading FZE (AISSOT), VS Tankers has smuggled oil for the benefit of the Iranian government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  For example, in 2020, AISSOT reportedly brokered a deal to transport Iranian oil via Iraqi pipelines to be blended and sold as Iraqi oil.

VS Tankers-affiliated ships have assisted Iranian oil exporters in blending Iranian oil with Iraqi to obscure the oil's origins by engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with vessels known to be affiliated with Iranian oil activities. VS Tankers currently claims several oil tankers as part of its fleet, one of which recorded four ship-to-ship transfers with the U.S. sanctioned, Barbados-flagged CASINOVA (IMO 9280366) in April 2024 while located in the Persian Gulf near the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab river, which marks the border between Iraq and Iran. VS Tankers has served as the operator, manager, and beneficial owner of the Marshall Islands-flagged crude oil tanker DIJILAH (IMO 9829629) since 2019.

VS Tankers is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.  DIJILAH is being identified pursuant to E.O. 13902 as property in which VS Tankers has an interest.

In 2023, Said expanded his business holdings to include VS Oil Terminal FZE (VS Oil), which, though registered in the UAE, has its physical presence in Khor al-Zubayr, Iraq.  VS Oil manages six oil storage tanks where Iranian oil is dropped off to be mixed with Iraqi oil.  Vessels carrying Iranian oil also conduct ship-to-ship transfers with vessels carrying Iraqi oil in the vicinity of VS Oil's terminal facilities, and the blended oil is ultimately authenticated by complicit Iraqi government officials.  Vessel tracking data shows that multiple oil tankers known to transport Iranian petroleum products on behalf of U.S.-sanctioned Iranian oil and petrochemical broker Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. and Iranian military front company Sahara Thunder have visited VS Oil.  VS Oil employees smuggle hard currency into Iran via cars and trucks, some of which carry millions of dollars each, as payment for oil.

VS Oil is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.

Said also owns UAE-based VS Petroleum DMCC, formerly Ikon Petroleum DMCC, and Rhine Shipping DMCC (Rhine Shipping) which, in 2022, were implicated in blending Iranian oil to sell as Iraqi oil.  Rhine Shipping was also previously exposed as the manager of the U.S.-sanctioned oil tanker MOLECULE, formerly named BABEL, which loaded oil in the Persian Gulf from an Iranian tanker that had turned off its location transponder to obfuscate the transaction.  OFAC subsequently sanctioned the MOLECULE for its role in shipping Iranian oil as part of the network of Iran-backed Houthi financial official Sa'id al-Jamal.

Said also owns United Kingdom-based companies The Willett Hotel Limited and Robinbest Limited.

VS Petroleum DMCC, Rhine Shipping, The Willett Hotel Limited, and Robinbest Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, directly or indirectly, Said.

Shadow fleet actors

Iran's shadow fleet enables the regime to transport its petroleum to generate revenue.  Iran relies on non-sanctioned vessels to conduct ship-to-ship transfers and receive Iranian oil from sanctioned vessels before shipping the Iranian-origin cargo to buyers in Asia.

The National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) uses Singapore-based Trans Arctic Global Marine Services PTE. LTD. (Trans Arctic Global) to arrange piloting services for NITC vessels transiting through the Strait of Malacca.  Trans Arctic Global has enabled NITC to transport tens of millions of barrels of Iranian oil through the Strait of Malacca for eventual ship-to-ship transfers to vessels waiting in the Singapore Eastern Outer Port Limits.

Trans Arctic Global is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.

The Cameroon-flagged VIZURI (IMO 9197909), Comoros-flagged FOTIS (IMO 9306548), and Panama-flagged THEMIS (IMO 9264570) and BIANCA JOYSEL (IMO 9196632), have collectively shipped tens of millions of barrels of Iranian oil and other petroleum worth billions of dollars.

Since mid-2023, the VIZURI has completed multiple shipments of Iranian oil and transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil.  Panama-flagged liquified petroleum gas carrier (LPG) FOTIS has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG and other petroleum to multiple locations.  Panama-flagged THEMIS, which was sanctioned by the United Kingdom on May 9, 2025 for transporting Russian oil, has also transported Iranian oil.

Seychelles-based Egir Shipping Ltd, and Marshall Islands-based Fotis Lines Incorporated and Themis Limited are the respective owners of the VIZURI, FOTIS, and THEMIS.  Egir Shipping Limited, Fotis Lines Incorporated, and Themis Limited are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy. VIZURI, FOTIS, and THEMIS are being identified as blocked property in which Egir Shipping Ltd, Fotis Lines Incorporated, and Themis Limited, respectively, have an interest.

Panama-flagged BIANCA JOYSEL has transported more than ten million barrels of Iranian oil since mid-2024, conducting ship-to-ship transfers with sanctioned vessels owned by the U.S.-designated NITC, including the AMOR and STARLA.

British Virgin Islands-based Betensh Global Investment Limited And Dong Dong Shipping Limited owns the BIANCA JOYSEL.  Betensh Global Investment Limited And Dong Dong Shipping Limited is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.  BIANCA JOYSEL is being identified as blocked property in which Betensh Global Investment Limited And Dong Dong Shipping Limited has an interest.

IRGC-QF oil Sales

The IRGC-QF has used the Al-Qatirji Company to facilitate oil sales to customers around the world, generating hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue for the IRGC-QF.  The Cameroon-flagged ELIZABET (IMO 9216717), which has impersonated a separate vessel, the S TINOS, loaded a cargo of Iranian oil off the coast of Malaysia in August 2024 via ship-to-ship transfer.  The cargo had originally been loaded at Kharg Island, Iran, by the ROMINA (IMO 9114608), a vessel previously identified for its role in transporting Iranian petroleum for the Al-Qatirji Company.  Seychelles-based White Sands Shipmanagement Corp. is the ship manager, operator, and technical manager of the ELIZABET.

The AI-Qatirji Company transported approximately two million barrels of Iranian oil on the Cameroon-flagged ATILA (IMO 9262754) in support of the U.S.-sanctioned Sa'id al-Jamal network.  The ATILA received the oil in a ship-to-ship transfer with the sanctioned vessel ARMAN 114. The Iranian oil carried by the ATILA was disguised as Malaysian oil.  Seychelles-based Grat Shipping Co Ltd is the manager, operator, and owner of the ATILA.  OFAC designated Sa'id al-Jamal pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on June 10, 2021, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.

The Al-Qatirji Company has also used the Palauan-flagged GAS MARYAM (IMO 9108099) to transport Iranian petroleum products in support of the IRGC-QF.  Liberia-based Dima Shipping & Trading Company is the manager, operator, and owner of the GAS MARYAM.

White Sands Shipmanagement Corp, Grat Shipping Co Ltd, and Dima Shipping & Trading Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of the Al-Qatirji Company.  The ELIZABET is being identified as blocked property in which White Sands Shipmanagement Corp. has an interest, the ATILA as blocked property in which Grat Shipping Co Ltd has an interest, and the GAS MARYAM as blocked property in which Dima Shipping & Trading Company has an interest.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.  In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons.  OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis.  OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions.  In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.  The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions.  OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.  For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked today.

(Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury)

By John Lee.

Iraq's Minister of Oil, Hayan Abdul Ghani, held talks in Baghdad on Wednesday with Russian Ambassador Elbrus Kutrashev and a delegation from Russian energy giant Lukoil.

The meeting focused on strengthening cooperation between Iraq and Russia in the oil, gas, and energy sectors.

Also in attendance were Bassem Mohammed Khudair, Undersecretary for Extraction Affairs, and Bassem Tahir, Director General of the Petroleum Contracts and Licensing Directorate (PCLD) at the Ministry of Oil.

(Source: Ministry of Oil)