Is the Islamic State "losing?"

But ISIL now face a severe dilemma: in order to face down offensives by a strengthened and now combat tested alliance of Kurdish groups, Shi'a militias, some Sunni tribes and the Iraqi army (including Yazidi and Christian militias) ISIL must concentrate manpower and coordinate movement.

But doing that means that they must use electronic communication which can be intercepted and triangulated. It means they must move in formations visible from the air, a point illustrated by ongoing successful air strikes against ISIL convoys which have continued recently.

The alternative for the group is to simply avoid pitched battles--not really an option in the face of thousands of Peshmerga, Iraqi soldiers and Hashd al Shabi (overwhelmingly Shi’a paramilitaries). Fights such as the Tikrit battle will also drain dwindling ISIL fuel and ammunition, even if the Tikrit offensive stalls.

ISIL could overcome some of these setbacks if they could easily move men into Western and Northern Iraq, but a number of key Kurdish victories at Sinjar and Kiske in Iraq (and on the Syrian side of the border) mean that ISIL's main supply line into Iraq is now through Al Qaim, far from Mosul.

This greatly diminishes their regenerative power. As the group take scores, even hundreds of casualties a week, this is more bad news for Baghdadi.

IOCs are therefore once again back to the stage where Iraqi bureaucracy and wrangling over national level revenue deals (rather than security) is the old enemy, a problem compounded by delayed payments following the price collapse and Iraq's sudden war economy.

Meanwhile, debates over Kirkuk oil production and the difficulty of the KRI reaching it's agreed output through SOMO under last year’s agreement has real potential for more deadlock.

Despite the pain caused by the price collapse, Genel and DNO's recent announcements suggest they are bullishly pressing ahead with their plans after Western Zagros' tribulations. In the South, there is the prospect of more contractual wrangling for IOCs, (in addition to the ongoing payments problem) as the Iraqi government recently announced to Exxon their desire to re-structure deals.

Also in the Southern provinces, a major issue foreign investors must be aware of (as my report makes clear) is a rise in kidnapping spurred by proliferation of decentralised militia groups, some of which have little accountability.

This is yet another headache for Abadi, as security resources are concentrated in the Centre and North of the country.

Furthermore, while the South and KRI are widely considered to have an acceptable security risk (with the right precautions in place) IS setbacks mean the group may shift tactics and target economic infrastructure.

While they have extremely limited ability to do this in Basra or Erbil, the group are characterised by the ability to switch priorities, so attacks in these areas targeting foreigners cannot be ruled out.