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Ahmed Mousa Jiyad

Federal Oil and Gas Law: Viability, Coherence and Functioning Perspectives

Federal Oil and Gas Law: Viability, Coherence and Functioning Perspectives

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya@online.no).

 

Introduction.

The meetings between the federal and KRG delegations held in Baghdad in the last days of October 2011 resulted in an agreement to base their discussion on the February 2007 version of the federal oil and gas law-FOGL.

Detailed, thorough and article-by-article assessments of the February 2007 draft of the law have been done and published by known Iraqi oil professionals, including this writer. The consensus among them indicates the draft suffers from many very serious flaws that ought to be addressed, revised, and redrafted. Moreover, essential and fundamental provisions are, by now, have been overtaken by events that render them outdated, irrelevant and dysfunctional.

What is needed then a very serious look into every article and the entire proposed law from substantive, format and operational aspects to insure its viability, coherence and proper functioning. It would be a grave mistake to consider the “law” as “political deal” since all had learned that most if not all political deals, in Iraq, are easily forgotten and short live!

This intervention aims to shed light on the most important issues and matters of concerns, which should be taken into considerations during the process of negotiating and finalizing a proposed draft of this law.1

  1. Time factor effects

Many very important developments have taken place since February 2007, which makes it imperative to revise seriously various articles in the law since these provisions have been overtaken by events and thus became almost obsolete or redundant.

First: Among these developments are the bid rounds concluded by the MoO that led to concluding long term service contracts. These have generated many major consequences, which have direct implications on the proposed law.

Second: All major oilfields (except few such Kirkuk, Bai Hassan, East Baghdad among others) have been already contracted for re-development and/ or development with IOCs involvement. Consequently, there could be no need to offer any of the remaining fields for IOCs in whatever way or method. These remaining fields could be legally (by this proposed law) earmarked for INOC (to be reinstated), as suggested below.

Third: The concluded service contracts with IOCs, if implemented as envisaged, together with the production from other fields would bring Iraq’s production and export capacities to very high and unprecedented levels, even at partial success of half the contracted production targets. The implications is that there are no compelling reasons for Iraq to expand the production capacities any further at least in the next 15-20 years. The law may suggest a moratorium on any “new” development of oil fields for no less than 15 years. Moreover, the law ought to emphases the proper development of the contracted fields in the most optimum way to ensure the constitutional principle of “highest benefits to the Iraqi people”. Accordingly, the field development plans (initial and final) are of paramount importance that they should be formulated by technically competent petroleum team, approved by and constantly monitored by petroleum central authority;

Fourth: All the bid rounds were based on a service contract type and modality. The law should clearly extend support and preference to this type of contracting by making it mandatory to use this type of contracting. To prevent any misinterpretation it might be advisable to have a specific article in the law to make it unlawful and unconstitutional to conclude Production Sharing Contract- PSC in petroleum upstream sub-sector. The law ought to prohibit PSC in any phase of exploration, or development and production activities, in compliance with constitutional basic principles of collective ownership of petroleum resources and the best interests of the Iraqi people.

Fifth: The service contracts have already established significant milestones that are superior to those envisaged under February 2007 version of this law regarding, interalia, fiscal regime, conservation measures particularly those relating to gas utilization, good vs. best international business practices, dispute settlement modalities etc. Accordingly, good number of articles in this proposed law need revision on the lights of what actually have been concluded and evolved since February 2007.

Sixth: The relationship between this law and the proposed laws for the Ministry of Oil, INOC, Revenue Sharing and finally the General Commission for Observing the Allocation of Federal Revenue have to be well coordinated and considered to ensure harmony and coherence.

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ExxonMobil-KRG deal: A puzzling move at a critical time

ExxonMobil-KRG deal: A puzzling move at a critical time

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The news of ExxonMobil’s venture by signing 6-blocks PSCs with KRG could have very serious ramifications as the move is rather puzzling, it occurred and became known at critical time, and consequently caught the Iraqi government off-guard.

The company has been negotiating with KRG, directly or through intermediaries, for many months leading to signing agreement(s) in October. International sources say the Iraqi government was notified on the matter, and the Ministry of Oil had issued three letters to the company stressing that, according to regulations of the central government, any company which signs deals with the KRG wouldn’t be allowed to work in the center and south of the country, meaning ExxonMobil would risk its (with Shell) West Qurna 1 giant oilfield.

Also reliable source says, the six blocks were originally offered to Shell and ExxonMobil three each, but Shell declined the offer, and KRG gave ExxonMobil a 48 hours ultimatum before the deal was finally signed in London.

It is expected the Iraq council of Ministers meet urgently to discuss the matter and decide on the fate of the West Qurna 1 contract with ExxonMobil.

What motivated ExxonMobil to make this move despite the warning from the Ministry of Oil is a matter the company alone can answer, others could only speculate. But why a company that has the highest contract- in barrels-term, and has the leading position in a major water injection project would risk these two lucrative projects and, possibly any other future opportunities? Only time will tell!

The timing is also critical and unfavorable for the Iraqi government. American forces are, and would be fully, leaving the country by the end of the year. The government is obviously preoccupied with the implications and consequences of this withdrawal at least from security perspectives.

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A Special Issue: Oil in Iraq

A Special Issue: Oil in Iraq

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The international Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies-IJCIS has just released it is special issue on “Oil in Iraq”.

Many prominent Iraqi and non-Iraqi scholars have contributed articles to this timely and important volume, which makes it an invaluable scholarly work to understanding the complexities of oil in Iraq.

The following is my introduction, as the guest editor of this special issue of IJCIS.

Three unprecedented and interrelated developments have taken place in the Iraqi petroleum sector since the 2003 invasion. Wide openness of all petroleum sub-sectors (upstream, midstream and downstream) for foreign investment; offering, through three bid rounds, the most prized oil and gas fields for an international auction resulting in contracting almost 60 per cent of the country’s proven petroleum reserves for at least 20–25 years; and finally, these contracts would expand oil production and export capacities by fivefold in less than seven years.

Such an opening could lend support to the notion that, ‘the invasion was all about oil’ and provoke legitimate questions on why a country, with incomplete sovereignty due to the presence of occupying forces and still under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter takes such unwarranted drastic actions; how it is going to manage such a massive undertaking; and what is it going to do with the influx of huge revenues, and mitigate the consequences.

Though many, and for variety of convincing reasons and powerful arguments, doubt very much the feasibility of attaining such production targets at such a fast pace under structural weaknesses and prevailing conditions in the country. However, even with half-success, this would, by all standards, be very significant indeed, and with far-reaching implications domestically, regionally and internationally.

Expanding production (and by logic, intentions and necessity) and export capacities would lead to a tremendous augmentation of the economic rent (or windfall) for the state due to expected higher oil prices, with or without the Peak Oil argument, in relation to the comparatively low production (or extraction) cost.

Domestically, such a huge influx of foreign exchange is bound to face three interrelated and theoretically enforcing hurdles: absorptive capacity limitations, Dutch disease and resource curse attacks. Each has its own dynamics and requires policy options to mitigate consequences. Thus, Iraq needs to devise sound development policy and modalities to mange effectively the plenty generated from its depleting natural resources.

In addition to the above macroeconomics structural difficulties, weak institutional capacities, ambiguous legal and constitutional frameworks, lack of suitable infrastructural facilities and fragmented political climate, all represent formidable domestic determinants.

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New Draft Oil Law – Expert Analysis

New Draft Oil Law – Expert Analysis

On Sunday 28th August the Council of Ministers approved the draft oil and gas law prepared by the Ministry of Oil, considering it the only text that represent the council’s view, and treating all other previous versions as invalid. Also the council decided to send the proposed draft to the parliament and request to table the proposed law for discussion in the parliament.

Our Expert Blogger, Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, has prepared a detailed analysis of this new version of the oil law, and you can download it now by clicking here.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya@online.no).

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

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Expert Analysis of the New Version of Iraq’s Oil Law

Expert Analysis of the New Version of Iraq’s Oil Law

On Wednesday 17 August 2011 the Iraqi parliament began the first reading of a new version of oil law proposed by the oil and energy committee-OGC of the parliament itself. The timing and the procedure of the debate created confusion and prompted significant walkout of many parliamentarians members of influential political groups. The debate was postponed until after Ramadan Eid, when the House convene again in 6th September.

Our Expert Blogger, Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, has prepared a detailed analysis of this new version of the oil law, and you can download it now by clicking here.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. Jiyad is regular contributor to MEES publications. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya@online.no).

The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

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Detailed Analysis of South Gas Deal with Shell/Mitsubishi

The attached document is a detailed analysis of the joint venture between South Gas Company and Shell & Mitsubishi, prepared by our expert blogger Ahmed Mousa Jiyad.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with Centre for Global Energy Studies-CGES, London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. Jiyad is regular contributor to MEES publications. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya@online.no).

Please click here to download the document.

The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

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Al-Ahdab Oil Contract has Many Flaws

Al-Ahdab Oil Contract has Many Flaws

Ahmed Mousa Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES). He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN. He is now based in Norway.  The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

A recent ceremony for Al-Ahdab oilfield commencement of commercial production was attended by former minister of oil Dr. Shahristani, now the deputy prime minister for energy affairs, and his successor, Mr. Abdul Karim al-Luaibi. This is significant development from more than one aspect:
  1. The contract for this oilfield was converted from a production sharing contract-PSC concluded under former régime in 1997 into a service contract concluded in November 2008.  Practically, the contract serves as a base, with modifications, for the “model” service contracts that followed for the three bid rounds concluded so far. Thus an end to the PSCs in Iraq’s upstream petroleum was consolidated;
  2. It also signifies a needed achievement for the ministry and the Shahristani strategy of opening of the sector before the IOCs, as the ministry been heavily criticized for not delivering substantial results;
  3. The early local resentments seems to be fading away and this field alone would secure three important privileges for the governorte/province of Wasit: more revenues through the known “petrodollars” allowances for every barrel of produced oil; the oil and gas produced from the oilfield will be used for generating power in the Zubeidiyah power station which is being set up by China, also in Wasit; and a place at the Federal Oil and Gas Council when this council is established under the proposed Federal Oil and Gas Law currently under consideration.
That said and though it is surely welcoming and encouraging news to see the development of this oilfield is coming on stream, however, AlAhdab contract with CNPC requires serious attention with highly justified revision.


I have since January 2010 reputedly exposed the weaknesses and problems with Al-Ahdab contract and how, in comparative sense, it works against the Iraqi interests. Credible information indicates that the negotiating team at that time was “instructed” from the office of the prime minister to accept these unfavourable terms.


To be specific, this contract has many flaws regarding the following variables, which has significant financial implications for the Iraqi interests:


The “signature bonus” was extremely insignificant amount (of only 3 million dollars) that is not commensurate with the corresponding signature bonus paid for the oilfields under the second bid round taking into consideration the envisaged Production Plateau Target-PPT, as measure of proportionality.



With original 115 thousands barrels per day-tbd PPT for AlAhdab, which is between 110 tbd for Najmah and 120 tbd for Qaiyarah oilfields, CNPC should pay 100 million dollars NOT 3 million dollars. Upgrading the PPT to 200 tbd as recent data indicates, the signature bonus should be even higher. This is the least to ask, considering that another Chinese oil company had paid $2.2 billion signature bonus for two exploration blocks only in Angola.

The payment “cap” for petroleum cost and remuneration fee was fixed at 100% of the “deemed revenues”. This implies that CNPC gets its investment and remuneration fees first, and unless there is surplus in the deemed revenues, Iraq would not get any revenues from the field. Therefore, the payment “cap” ought to be reduced to 50% of the “deemed revenues”.


Level of “commercial production”, which decides the commencement of payment could be specified at 25000bd (again somewhere between that for Najmah and for Qaiyarah oilfields as reference points) or proportionately higher if the 200 tbd PPT is adopted.


Unpaid dues carry “LIBOR+3” interest. Due to this Iraq paid in July 2010 some $250 million as its 25% share in the investment requirements to “avoid paying the interest”. So far the development cost mounts to $1.5 billion, meaning Iraq has already paid $375 million in cash.


These unmet payments should be interest free, similar to the provisions of the model contracts for rounds 1 and 2. Therefore, the “LIBOR+3” interest on these unpaid dues should be deleted from AlAhdab contract.


The overhead charges for AlAhdab is 2% compared with 1% for all other contracts. Hence this charges should be cut to that paid by other IOCs.


The corporate income tax of (15%) should be amended to become (35%) and the provisions relating to  “stabilization” should also be amended to that effect to be in line with other service contracts.


The R-factor should also be adjusted to be in line with those applied for green- fields offered under the 2nd bid round. The remuneration fee will thus be reduced from the maximum of $6/b to a minimum of $1.2/b, instead of the current minimum of $3/b. The scale of R-factor would also be adjusted from 4 to 5 levels accordingly.


Unfortunately, the parliament had missed good opportunity few months ago to remedy these shortcomings, safeguard Iraqi interests and assert its authority and constitutional role, and thus
continues in pacifying itself and accepting circumvention by the executive branch.


On 27 March 2011 the Parliament voted to abrogate a former law, of 1997, that ratified the Development and Production Contract and the Memorandum of Understanding related to AlAhdab oil field signed in Baghdad on 4 June 1997 between MoO and CNOC and CNI, represented by Alwaha Co. (China).

 

The parliament, in my view, should have insisted that AlAhdab Contract of 2008 must also be revised and if approved then ratified by law, and thus the parliament should have seen that contract before abrogating the old law. Thus, not only the parliament had missed excellent opportunity to set powerful legal precedence for having all other contracts enact by law, the parliament had in fact gave its consent to remain passive and be on the sidelines of effective authority regarding such oil contracts.
Ahmed Mousa Jiyad,
Iraq Development Consultancy and Research (I/DC&R)
Norway.
26th July 2011

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Shell-BGC Contracts: Inked but not yet approved!

Shell-BGC Contracts: Inked but not yet approved!

Ahmed Mousa Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES). He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN. He is now based in Norway.  The opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Media sources provide today (12th July 2011) conflicting reports on the deal with Shell regarding Basra Gas Company (BGC): some say it has been signed today others say the ministry has postponed the signing. However, signed or not, the BGC contracts according to the ministry’s known procedure is subject to the approval by the Council of Ministers.

Industry sources keep stating that Iraq produces 1.5 billion cubic feet per day (cftd) or so, out of which about 700 million cftd is flared for lack of infrastructure. Flared gas is both a waste of valuable finite energy source, and also damaging to the environment. This problem is not a new phenomenon; rather it has been a feature of the oil industry start from the beginning of the industry in the country.

But this must come to an end. Accordingly, there are two camps: a pro Shell-BGC on one side and inquisitive critics on the other.

The ministry of oil, few politicians and oil technocrats are among the pro Shell-BGC camp, while the majority of expressed professional opinions, officials and politicians are on the other camp.

The first camp argues in support of signing the BGC contracts and approving them by the executive branch and authority. The inquisitive critics, on the other hand, argue that any decision regarding such contracts could only be made after the said contracts have been thoroughly analysed and assessed by competent and professional bodies in an open and transparent way, and the federal parliament should be the ultimate authority to accept or reject these contracts.

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