Is the Shiite Revival Here?

The year 2003 was decisive in reshaping the Middle East, as Iran opened the door wide to Iraq, economically, politically and religiously — Iran opened an embassy in Iraq before any Arab country did, and many still haven't — and made many agreements in various domains. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has refused to accept the change and dealt with the new Shiite reality in Iraq with suspicion and mistrust.

Following the IS threat, Iran was one of the first that volunteered and supported all Iraqi parties, including the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the central government and the Sunni factions fighting against IS alongside government forces. In the absence of a prominent presence of the regional Sunni power represented by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, it goes without saying that this path would lead to a greater Iranian influence in Iraq in the post-IS era.

In Syria, the Arab-Iranian opposition was scattered between the Salafist opposition and the Syrian government. Time has shown that the project supporting the Salafist opposition failed and that the project supporting the Syrian government has succeeded brilliantly. Since the Syrian conflict broke out, everyone expected Assad’s regime to fall, like in Libya, Egypt and other Arab Spring countries.

But Assad still remains in office to this day — his government being the only one that has not fallen following the Arab Spring. Moreover, international pressure on Assad has significantly decreased, and Western leaders have even started talking about opening the door for negotiations with Assad, as US Secretary of State John Kerry recently admitted.

In Yemen, things are similar to the situations described here, particularly that of Iraq. Saudi Arabia has repeated the same mistake of showing defiance and not dealing with the new reality, while Iran has opened up to change and provided unlimited support for the increasingly emerging Shiite force in Yemen. Saudi Arabia included on March 7, 2014, the Shiite Houthis on its terrorist list, and has refrained from dealing and talking with them. This is despite the common Saudi Arabian and Houthi interest in fighting al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen.