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By John Lee.

Washington has renewed a waiver for Iraq to continue importing Iranian electricity, a US State Department official said.

"The Secretary granted this brief extension of the waiver to allow time for the formation of a credible government," the official said, referring to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and added that the waiver would expire on May 26, according to Reuters.

Washington has repeatedly extended the exemption for Baghdad to use crucial Iranian energy supplies for its power grid, for periods of 90 or 120 days.

Earlier this month, Iraq's president named intelligence chief Mustafa al-Kadhimi as prime minister-designate, the third person tapped to lead Iraq in just 10 weeks as it struggles to replace a government that fell last year after months of deadly protests.

"Once that government is in place, the Secretary will reassess whether to renew the waiver and for how long," the US State Department official said.

The official added that the waiver applied only to electricity and referred to the Treasury Department for transactions related to Iranian natural gas imports.

Electricity Minister Luay al-Khatteeb told S&P Global Platts last week that Iraq needs three to four years to complete projects that would provide the necessary natural gas for its power stations.

(Sources: Tasnim, Reuters, S&P Global)

By Ahmed Tabaqchali, CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund. This article was originally published by the LSE Middle East Centre.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq's Power Conundrum: How to Secure Reliable Electricity While Achieving Energy Independence

Iraq remains in a bind regarding how to secure energy independence within its geopolitical constraints - most pertinently the American sanctions on Iran. The US is continuing to maintain pressure on Baghdad by extending 'final' waivers on the purchase of Iranian gas for only another 30 days, as part of its new tougher stance.

Iraq, in response, could produce credible plans to eliminate its dependence on Iranian imports, which it accelerated with the approval in January of the fifth round of gas exploration contracts. However, achieving this would not end the need for Iranian imports, nor would it secure any kind of energy independence. More importantly, it will not change the shortages in the provision of electricity, which have served as a lightning rod for public anger over the failings of the post-2003 system.

Appreciating the dependence on Iran for the provision of electricity means delving into the extraordinary mess that is Iraq's power grid, consisting of the power plants that generate electricity; transmission system that transport this electricity to population centres; and distribution networks which then distribute this electricity to end users. Decades of conflict have damaged most parts of the grid and, coupled with poor maintenance of the parts that escaped damage, this has rendered the grid impotent.

Rebuilding the grid post-2003 was hampered by the rolling dysfunction of successive governments, in which significant capital expenditures were neutralised by mismanagement, lack of coordination between ministries, and the county's corrosive corruption. The public's frustration over this impotence extends beyond the inadequate provisioning of electricity throughout the year, as the summer's intense heat creates a particularly acute need for electricity, exposing the grid's shortcomings.

These start at the generating stage with the gap between nameplate capacity, i.e. the maximum sustainable power output under ideal conditions, and actual output. While a gap always exists between these two, in 2018 the nameplate capacity was 30.3 gigawatts (GW), while effective capacity through the year was a mere 11.9 GW. A primary reason for this gap is the lack of appropriate fuel supply, in this case gas, which leads to substitutions by fuels such as crude or heavy fuel oil with the result that plants run at less than 60% of capacity - in 2018 only 62% of operating gas-powered plants actually used gas. Other reasons include poor maintenance and lack of cooling in high ambient heat. Moreover, up to 20% nameplate capacity in 2018 was non-operational.

In turn, this increases the gap between demand and supply - in 2018 average demand was 17.7 GW vs. effective generated power of 11.9 GW. But this gap is only part of the story, as the electricity generated to meet demand does not mean that it was actually delivered to end users. The total electricity generated in 2018 was 105.4 terawatt-hours (TWh), but only 43.7 TWh reached end users for a loss of 58.5%. Most of these losses take place at the distribution stage, with technical losses stemming from age, conflict damage, poor maintenance accounting for two thirds, and non-technical losses, mostly electricity theft, accounting for a third. Technical losses are natural, however they occur at an extremely high rate in Iraq, as do non-technical losses. Stolen electricity - still consumed but not billed - is estimated at 17 TWh, and so the electricity delivered would rise to 61 TWh, equating to a loss of 42.2%. This dynamic can be seen below.

The increase in losses from 2014 onwards can be attributed to the ISIS conflict, which damaged 20% of the transmission system and 5.0 GW of generating capacity. 2019 saw meaningful improvement as effective capacity increased from 11.9 GW to 14.3 GW, and crucially during the summer months peak generation was 19.3 GW vs. peak demand of 27.5 GW. This gap of 8.2 GW has narrowed from 2018's 10.0 GW gap when peak supply was 16.5 GW vs. peak demand of 26.5 GW.

Electricity generated from Iranian electricity and gas imports accounted for 20.7% of that generated throughout 2019, and probably a much higher percentage during the peak summer months. These contributions from electricity imports from 2010 and gas imports from 2017 can be seen below.

The importance of Iranian electricity imports as a percentage of the total have steadily decreased, even though they increased in absolute levels; nevertheless, the decline in summer of 2018 was large enough to ignite the demonstrations in Basra. Imports in 2019 returned to the trend line and averaged 1.1 GW for the year. Plans for other regional imports include 0.5 GW to be imported from Kuwait by the end of 2020, rising to 1.9 GW over subsequent years, including planned imports from Jordan and Turkey.

Iranian gas imports were 7.0 billion cubic meters (BCM) in 2019, up from 4.1 BCM in 2018, and accounted for 31% of total gas consumed - up from 24% in 2018. Plans for increased domestic production include increasing captured flared gas to 16-19 BCM by end of 2021 from 12 BCM in 2019. Additionally, the fifth round of gas contracts call for replacing Iranian imports in three years, i.e. generating 7.0-10.0 BCM over that period from the current 3.5 BCM.

Assuming that the government executes these plans, in three years' time this would replace the current electricity produced by Iranian imports. But demand is set to increase by 20% from current levels, meaning that the current the gap between supply and demand would increase by up to 20%. Moreover, planned capacity additions require additional fuel, which under existing plans is earmarked to replace imported gas. However, maintaining Iranian imports would significantly decrease their importance in power generation from the current 20.7%, and in the process Iraq would add meaningful capacity to address demand.

The goal posts are moving much faster than Iraq's ability to approach them, and as such the US's insistence on eliminating Iranian imports, far from achieving energy independence for Iraq, would instead exacerbate its energy vulnerabilities. Compounding these vulnerabilities is the massive investment spending needed to expand the grid's capacity, currently unaddressed in the government's structurally unbalanced budget, but which is ever more critical following the collapse of oil prices.

Iraq's pathway out of this predicament, even at much higher oil prices, involves electricity tariff reform and the removal of energy subsidies, both the source of monumental waste and substantial market distortions. However, this requires a popular buy-in and for the increasingly alienated population to renew their belief in the post-2003 system's legitimacy. It is here where the international community can help Iraq achieve energy independence.

Sources

The figures and charts used in the article are the author's estimates, and are based on data from the Ministry of Electricity's annual reports and conference presentations, the IEA, BP, MEES, Oxford Energy, and publicly available news sources. However, all errors and omissions are the author's own.

The data used in the article exclude electricity demand and generation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). However, figures for locally produced and consumed gas include the KRI, and as such the Iranian-origin percentages of total gas consumed would be somewhat higher than the 31% and 24% used if the KRI was excluded.

Disclaimer: Ahmed Tabaqchali's comments, opinions and analyses are personal views and are intended to be for informational purposes and general interest only and should not be construed as individual investment advice or a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell or hold any fund or security or to adopt any investment strategy. It does not constitute legal or tax or investment advice. The information provided in this material is compiled from sources that are believed to be reliable, but no guarantee is made of its correctness, is rendered as at publication date and may change without notice and it is not intended as a complete analysis of every material fact regarding Iraq, the region, market or investment.

By Bryant Harris for Al Monitor. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq likely to continue importing Iranian natural gas under US waiver renewal

Iraqi officials have indicated that the United States is likely to renew a key Iran sanctions waiver that will allow Baghdad to continue importing Iranian natural gas to fuel its electricity needs, the AP reported.

The three-month waiver is set to expire Thursday.

Iraq relies on Iranian imports to meet the lion’s share of its electricity needs in the face of shortages that have helped provoke widespread protests in recent years.

Click here to read the full article.

(Picture credit: Tasnim, under Creative Commons licence)

By Ahmed Tabaqchali, CIO of Asia Frontier Capital (AFC) Iraq Fund. This article was originally published by the LSE Middle East Centre.

Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Demands for the expulsion of US troops following the killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, have scaled down considerably since the initial strident calls. What started as high theatrics in parliament demanding an end to US presence, ended with a typical Iraqi fudge in that parliament passed a resolution requiring the government to cancel the request for global coalition support made in 2014, and for it to work towards ending the presence of all foreign troops.

These were further rolled back as reports emerged that the government’s vision of implementing the withdrawal of foreign forces was for the withdrawal of combat forces only and did not include those conducting training and logistical support. Threats of US sanctions have undoubtedly played a role in deflating the illusions of power, especially by those in the axis of resistance, and contributed to this climbdown.

Iraq’s economy is not only vulnerable to US sanctions, but to any disengagement from the US dollar-based global financial and economic system. In fact, the US could affect far worse damage to Iraq than it did to Iran without the need to implement sanctions, let alone sanctions that would ‘make Iranian sanctions seem somewhat tame’. This vulnerability stems from the failures of successive Iraqi administrations from 2003 to reconstruct the country following decades of conflict, or to create the foundations for a diversified economy driven by the private sector, and not by the state.

Instead, successive administrations have deepened the country’s dependence on oil, pursued policies that fostered a structural imbalance between the government’s current and investment expenditures, in which the public sector consumed an ever-increasing share of government revenues. The sole dependence on oil income for these revenues, and the dreadful twins of a dominant public sector and stunted private sector, are the primary reasons why the country is vulnerable to external shocks.[1]

The extent of the damage to the Iraqi economy would depend on the three broad categories of a US response to a hostile Iraq. The first category would be the imposition of primary US sanctions, and secondary sanctions on non-US entities that conduct commercial or financial dealings with Iraq. Their effects would be along the lines to those suffered by Iran due to the imposition in 2018 of similar US sanctions.

For Iran, these included a major drop in oil exports, a severe economic contraction, a significant drop in the value of the currency, a substantial rise in inflation, a lowering of living standards, and a rise in unemployment especially among the youth and the most vulnerable segments of society.

However, the consequences for Iraq would be on a much worse scale than those suffered by Iran. Firstly, because oil exports constitute the bulk of the Iraqi budget’s revenues (about 90 percent of the 2019 budget) unlike those for Iran’s budget (about 30 percent of its fiscal 2019–20 budget). The loss of this income for Iraq would severely restrict the government’s ability to pay for salaries and pensions, social security, goods and services, in addition to reducing any funds available for the reconstruction of the country, the development of its oil sector or the development of its power generation.

Secondly, Iraq depends almost completely on imports for its consumption of goods and services, unlike Iran which has a well-diversified economy, and a more developed industrial, agricultural and financial sectors. Iraq’s small industrial and agricultural sectors cannot meet even a small percentage of its domestic demand, while its under-developed financial sector cannot provide the financing for the development of these two sectors.

Thirdly, Iraq’s cash-reliant economy depends on access to physical USD notes for it to function. Such a disruption in the supply of USD notes would raise the price of the USD against the IQD, and with it a rise in the value of imported goods. In 2015 the country felt some of these effects due to a restriction in the supply of USD notes from the US Federal Reserve as a result of the US Treasury’s concerns that sanctioned entities (Iran & Daesh) had access to these notes. Any effects of a sizeable loss of access to USD notes would be significantly worse than in 2015. Making things worse is that Iraq cannot access USD notes from a third country, unlike Iran, whose need for notes is met through Iraq.

The second category of US responses would be the loss of waivers for the purchase of Iranian gas, which presents Iraq with a Sophie’s choice. Continue with the purchase of Iranian gas and suffer the consequences of US secondary sanctions, which would be only marginally less painful than any possible imposition of full sanctions, discussed earlier. Or, discontinue buying Iranian gas, lose about a third of Iraq’s domestic power supply and enrage a population that is already incensed over a chronic inadequate supply of power.

A less discussed point is that these waivers were granted on the conditions that Iraq develops a credible plan to reduce its dependence on Iranian gas, and in the long term end those imports. The US could still grant these waivers, but impose more stringent conditions on plans to reduce dependence and a tougher monitoring regime with associated penalties for failures in making progress.

The third category, and the most likely US reaction, would be to gradually end its treatment of Iraq as a close ally and therefore subject to increased US treasury scrutiny its financial system, which would negatively affect the functioning of the Iraqi Central Bank and the banking system. The most obvious result would be a disruption of Iraq’s cash-heavy economy, which relies on the access of physical USD notes for the conduct of commercial and financial transactions as discussed earlier.

Unlike the fictional Duchy of Grand Fenwick, in Leonard Wibberley’s satirical cold war novel The Mouse That Roared, Iraq cannot expect any sort of victory from a conflict or strained relationship with the US.

[1] An upcoming piece by the author examines the structural imbalances in the economy as a inevitable consequence of successive post-2003 political system, i.e, the “Muhasasa Ta’ifia”. This imbalance was first explored in: https://auis.edu.krd/iris/latest-iris-publications/iraqs-investment-spending-deficit-analysis-chronic-failures and subsequently in a series of tweets: https://twitter.com/AMTabaqchali/status/1181559159453564928?s=20 and https://twitter.com/AMTabaqchali/status/1182253543144771584?s=20

By John Lee.

The head of Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) has reportedly said that the bank would stop processing payments for Iranian gas imports if a US sanctions exemption expires next month.

Faisal al-Haimus told AFP:

"As a bank, the most important thing we have is that we are compliant (with international regulations). That's why people trust us."

Iraq relies heavily on Iran to support its struggling electricity sector.

When the United States imposed sanctions on Iran's energy sector in 2018, it granted Iraq a series of temporary waivers to allow it to buy gas from Iran.

More here.

(Source: AFP)

By John Lee.

The US has granted Iraq another 120-day waiver from its sanctions on Iran.

According to S&P Global, a State Department spokesman said the waiver ensures that Iraq is able to meet its short-term energy needs while it takes steps to reduce its dependence on Iranian energy imports.

(Source: S&P Global)

By Mustafa Saadoun for Al Monitor. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Basra protests build in Iraq as sub-standard services persist

In an exclusive interview with Al-Monitor, Iraqi Minister of Electricity Luay al-Khatteeb talked about the situation of Iraq’s electricity sector amid tense US-Iran relations.

He discussed the waiver timeline that Washington granted Baghdad to keep buying Iranian gas and mentioned his fear that some parties are politicizing the electricity sector in Iraq.

Click here to read the full story.

By John Lee.

The Trump administration has reportedly granted Iraq a 120-day waiver from its sanctions against Iran, to allow it to continue importing electricity from the country during the hottest of the summer weather.

The decision followed a phone call on Friday between Secretary of State Michael Pompeo (pictured) and Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi.

The State Dept said it is continuing to work with Iraq to end its dependence on Iranian natural gas and electricity.

(Sources: Bloomberg, The National)

Iran Has Taken Invaluable Steps to Cement Ties with Iraq: Envoy

Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq Iraj Masjedi highlighted the importance of bilateral relations between the two neighboring countries and said Tehran has taken major strides to strengthen ties with Baghdad.

“We are trying to boost our relations with Iraq in all areas,” Masjedi said, addressing an appreciation ceremony for the outgoing Iranian consuls in the Iraqi cities of Sulaymaniyah and Karbala.

“The embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Baghdad, as well as the affiliated organizations and consulates and other governmental agencies of Iran in Iraq, have taken invaluable strides and actions at various political, economic and security levels to strengthen relations between the two countries in recent years,” the diplomat noted.

Masjedi further pointed to historical, cultural and ideological commonalities of the two countries and said closer ties in all fields are in line with the interests of both Iran and Iraq.

Iran and Iraq enjoy cordial political, security and cultural ties but due to some internal and regional problems including Daesh (also known as ISIS or ISIL) terrorism in Iraq, they have not been able to increase their trade volume.

Heading a high-ranking delegation, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif recently paid an official visit to Iraq to boost ties with the Arab country in the sanctions era.

US President Donald Trump’s administration announced plans in March to extend a 90-day waiver for the second time to let Iraq continue energy imports from Iran.

(Source: Tasnim, under Creative Commons licence)