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By John Lee.

Private universities, colleges, and institutes in Iraq subject to tax assessment are to be required to settle outstanding income tax and direct withholding tax liabilities, under a decision by the Council of Ministers.

Institutions that pay their principal tax liability and complete the tax assessment process within four working months of the Cabinet decision's issuance will receive a 100% waiver on penalties and surcharges. Those that complete payment and assessment in the following four-month period will receive a 50% waiver.

Any institution that fails to complete the tax assessment and payment process within the specified periods will not benefit from the exemption, and existing penalties and legal measures will be applied.

The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research is to take legal and administrative action against private universities, colleges, and institutes that do not comply with their tax assessment obligations.

(Source: Council of Ministers)

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

The Iraqi Dinar Caught in the Crossfire: What a Trump-Iran Military Conflict Would Mean for Iraq's Currency

The Middle East is once again on the edge. The United States has assembled its largest concentration of naval and air power in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, two carrier strike groups, dozens of warships, and hundreds of warplanes now positioned within striking distance of Iran.

Negotiations between Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian officials in Geneva have reportedly yielded "significant progress", but the ultimate outcome may hinge on whether Iran is prepared to offer concessions significant enough for Trump to call a victory. With diplomacy fragile and military options on the table, one often-overlooked casualty of any escalation would be Iraq's currency, the dinar.

Iraq: The Battlefield Between Two Worlds

To understand what a US-Iran military conflict would do to the Iraqi dinar, you have to first understand Iraq's precarious geopolitical position. The country is simultaneously a close security partner of the United States and an economy deeply enmeshed with Iran. Iraq spends roughly $900 million monthly on Iranian goods, a major portion of this historically going to electricity and gas. Iranian-backed militias are embedded within Iraq's state institutions. US troops remain on Iraqi soil. Iraq's government walks a tightrope between US alliance and Iranian influence, and its currency walks the same tightrope with it.

The Iraqi dinar's journey has been one of the most dramatic in monetary history. The currency dropped substantially from 3 IQD per USD before 1991 to about 1,310 IQD per USD today. Decades of war, sanctions, and corruption have slowly eroded its value. In recent years, Iraq has made modest progress: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided structural guidance, oil revenues have been strong, and the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has maintained a managed peg to the dollar. Iraq's position as OPEC's second-largest oil producer and strong international support drive steady economic improvements. But all of that relative stability would face severe pressure the moment US bombs begin falling on Iranian soil.

Scenario One: A Limited Strike

The most likely immediate military scenario, and the one that has been most openly discussed in Washington, involves a targeted, time-limited campaign against Iranian military and nuclear infrastructure. Trump may order a targeted attack on select military sites inside Iran to pressure the country's leaders into agreeing to an acceptable deal, demonstrating US threats of action are real. The targets could include ballistic missile sites, facilities connected to Iran's nuclear program, or buildings used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

In this scenario, the Iraqi dinar's fate would be shaped by several competing forces. On one hand, oil prices would almost certainly spike, and for Iraq, higher oil prices are a lifeline. Iraq's state budget is overwhelmingly dependent on petroleum revenues, and a sudden surge in global crude prices triggered by conflict fears would, in theory, fill state coffers. A better-funded government can defend its exchange rate more effectively.

On the other hand, a limited strike would almost certainly trigger Iranian retaliation, and Iraq would be squarely in the blast radius. Iran's kinetic retaliation plan relies on a reconstituted arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles capable of striking US bases and allied territory across the region, and many of those bases are in Iraq. US embassies in Iraq and other Arab states began to evacuate personnel in response to Iranian threats on American bases as far back as the lead-up to last year's Operation Midnight Hammer. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias like Kataib Hezbollah have already issued explicit warnings: leader Ahmad al-Hamidawi warned that any strike on Iranian soil would trigger a "total war" involving militias across the Levant.

For the dinar, this translates to a severe confidence crisis. When violence erupts on Iraqi soil, even if Iraq is not the primary combatant, foreign capital flees, domestic savers rush to convert dinars to dollars, and the black market premium widens dramatically. The Central Bank of Iraq, which sells dollars at auction to defend its peg, would come under enormous pressure. Its foreign exchange reserves, while substantial, are not unlimited, and a sustained capital flight could force a de facto devaluation.

Scenario Two: Sustained Military Campaign or Regime Change

Current contingency planning in the Pentagon is configured for sustained, weeks-long operations against Iran if so ordered by Trump. A broader campaign aimed at degrading Iran's military capacity, or worse, one that tips into regime change, would represent a qualitatively different shock to the Iraqi economy.

Iraq's energy dependence on Iran is the most acute vulnerability. If war disrupts those supply lines, through Iranian cut-offs, infrastructure damage, or US sanctions enforcement, Iraqi power grids would come under renewed pressure. Blackouts would damage industry, commerce, and ordinary life. Economic output would contract sharply, and the government's ability to pay civil servant salaries and maintain social order would erode. In such conditions, the dinar would face significant downward pressure regardless of what the oil price is doing.

There is also the migration and refugee dimension. A major war with Iran, a country of over 90 million people, could produce refugee flows that would dwarf anything the region has seen since 2003. Iraq, which shares a long border with Iran and already hosts displaced populations from earlier conflicts, would be on the front lines of that humanitarian wave. The fiscal and social cost could be immense.

For currency markets, the historical parallel is instructive. During the 2003 US invasion of Iraq itself, Iraqi currency markets experienced extreme dislocations. Capital flight, hoarding of hard currency, and the collapse of normal economic activity all preceded any formal devaluation. A war next door, one that also engulfs Iraqi militias and potentially Iraqi territory, could produce similar dynamics even without Iraq being the primary target.

The Oil Price Paradox

One of the most important, and often misunderstood, dynamics in this scenario is the double-edged nature of oil prices. A major US-Iran conflict would almost certainly send crude prices sharply higher, at least initially. Iran is a significant oil producer, and any conflict that threatens the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of the world's oil supply passes, would trigger immediate panic buying in global energy markets.

For Iraq, this creates a cruel paradox. Higher oil revenues would, in theory, improve the government's fiscal position and its ability to defend the dinar. But the same conflict that pushes oil prices up would simultaneously disrupt Iraq's own oil export infrastructure, close off Iranian energy imports that keep the lights on, trigger militia violence, scare away foreign investment, and force emergency spending on security. The net effect on the dinar would almost certainly be negative, as the costs outweigh the revenue windfall.

The Sanctions and Banking Dimension

Any escalation would also intensify the already complex sanctions environment that shapes how the Iraqi economy interfaces with the global financial system. The Trump administration focuses on selective sanctions against Iraqi banks while conditioning waivers for Iranian energy purchases. This policy could soon affect Iraq's economic partnerships and currency stability. Banks found to be facilitating Iranian transactions face being cut off from dollar-clearing networks, a potentially devastating punishment in an economy that relies so heavily on the greenback.

This creates a further squeeze on the dinar. If Iraqi banks are penalised for maintaining ties with Iran, ties that are partly economically necessary and partly politically unavoidable, the result is a fragmentation of Iraq's banking sector, reduced access to dollar liquidity, and a wider spread between the official and parallel exchange rates. Ordinary Iraqis, who already prefer to hold savings in US dollars rather than dinars, would accelerate that dollarisation, further undermining confidence in the local currency.

Historical Lessons: What 2003 Tells Us

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq offers a partial precedent, though the situations differ significantly. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the Iraqi currency market experienced extreme volatility. The old Saddam-era dinar was eventually replaced with a new currency, and a managed peg to the dollar was established. Over time, with massive oil revenues and international support, the new dinar stabilised.

But the early years of post-invasion Iraq were characterised by exactly the kind of dynamics a new conflict would recreate: capital flight, dollarisation, black market currency trading, and a gap between official and street exchange rates. The key difference now is that Iraq is not the direct target of military action, but it is the unavoidable collateral victim, geographically, economically, and politically sandwiched between the two combatants.

What Investors and Observers Should Watch

For those tracking the dinar, whether as currency speculators, businesses operating in Iraq, or observers of the wider regional economy, the key indicators to monitor are:

The Central Bank of Iraq's foreign exchange auction volumes and reserves. A sharp drop in reserves or a sudden suspension of dollar auctions would signal that the peg is under existential pressure. The spread between the official exchange rate and the parallel market rate. Historically, this spread widens during periods of political and security stress, and a significant widening would be an early warning of impending devaluation. The status of Iranian energy supplies to Iraq. If gas flows are disrupted and the lights go out, the economic fallout would be rapid and severe. And crucially, the behaviour of Iraq's Iranian-backed militias. If they activate in response to US strikes on Iran, Iraq would transition from bystander to active warzone, and the dinar would face its most serious crisis since 2003.

Conclusion: A Currency with No Good Options

The Iraqi dinar is, at its core, a hostage to forces far beyond Baghdad's control. Iraq's government has limited ability to insulate its currency from a major military confrontation between the United States and Iran, a conflict whose epicentre would be on its doorstep and whose shockwaves would run directly through its energy sector, banking system, and political fabric.

Administration officials have been unclear about what their objectives are as they confront Iran, and that uncertainty itself is a risk factor for the dinar. Markets hate ambiguity, and a conflict with no clear endgame is the worst of all possible scenarios for a currency already carrying the weight of decades of instability.

In the best case, a short, sharp military strike followed by a rapid return to negotiations, the dinar would likely suffer a temporary shock: a flight to dollars, a widening of the parallel market premium, and a drawdown of central bank reserves, but ultimately a manageable correction. In the worst case, a sustained campaign, militia activation across Iraq, energy supply disruption, and a regional war, the dinar would face its most severe test since the 2003 invasion. The outcome would depend not just on what the US military does to Iran, but on whether Iraq can remain a bystander in a war that, by its very geography, it cannot escape.

This article reflects the geopolitical and economic situation as of late February 2026. It does not constitute financial or investment advice.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

If Trump Strikes Iran: Mapping the Oil Disruption Scenarios

Dinar Weakness: CBI "Not Responsible"

Iraqi Banks Restricted from US Dollar Transactions: FULL LIST [Amended]

2026: The Year Iraqi Dinar Speculators Finally Strike Gold?

Dinar Explainer 1: Why Iraq has Two Exchange Rates

Donald Trump and the "Great Iraqi Dinar Revaluation"

(Picture: The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), currently on route to the region).

By John Lee.

Iraq's Ministry of Oil has issued exclusive invitations to several major US oil companies to submit bids for taking over the operatorship of the West Qurna-2 field.

The Ministry said it is pursuing a transparent, competitive process based on approved criteria for awarding oilfield development contracts. Direct negotiations are under way with the invited companies, which will be allowed to submit offers and compete openly.

According to the statement, transferring management of West Qurna-2 to a leading US operator would support Iraq's production stability, safeguard its market share, and ensure the continuity of state revenues. It would also strengthen Iraq-US economic relations, facilitate technology transfer, and broaden the international expertise working in Iraq's oil sector.

The Ministry added that greater participation from major US firms reflects Iraq's strategic importance in global energy markets and contributes to long-term economic and strategic sustainability.

Russia's Lukoil, the operator of the field, said on 14th November that it was in negotiations with several potential buyers for its international assets, following restrictions imposed earlier that month. The United States subsequently issued a sanctions waiver allowing continued operations related to Lukoil until 13th December.

See also:

Lukoil in talks with Iraqi PM as US issues Sanctions Waiver

US Treasury Department statement

Lukoil statement

Jiyad: Oil Ministry should Brace for Russia's Coerced Exodus

(Source: Ministry of Oil)

By John Lee.

The United States has issued a sanctions waiver allowing continued operations related to Russia's Lukoil until 13th December, following restrictions imposed earlier this month.

Lukoil said on 14th November that it is in negotiations with several potential buyers for its international assets, adding that a deal will be announced once agreements and regulatory approvals are finalised. The company said it aims to maintain uninterrupted operations and energy supplies during the transition and is in regular contact with authorities in all countries where it operates.

Today [Monday] in Baghdad, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani met with Lukoil's former President, Vagit Alekperov, to discuss mechanisms to stabilise oil production despite the impact of US Treasury measures on the company's investment contracts. Lukoil produces around 480,000 barrels per day (bpd) at the West Qurna-2 field.

Al-Sudani reaffirmed Iraq's commitment to stable global oil markets and to maintaining steady national output levels.

Industry sources previously told Reuters that Lukoil had declared force majeure at West Qurna-2, while last week Switzerland's Gunvor Group withdrew its proposal to acquire Lukoil's international assets following US opposition.

See also:

US Treasury Department statement

Lukoil statement

Jiyad: Oil Ministry should Brace for Russia's Coerced Exodus

(Sources: PMO / Lukoil / US Treasury / Reuters)

DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, has announced that Birgitte Wendelbo Johansen has been appointed Chief Financial Officer effective 1 November 2025, replacing Haakon Sandborg who is stepping down following 24 years in the role.

Ms. Johansen joins DNO from Reach Subsea ASA, an Oslo Børs listed oil services company, where she served as Chief Financial Officer since 2012. Prior to this, she had a successful career in banking, specializing in shipping and energy.

"I am pleased to pass the baton to Birgitte; her experience running a finance team and her energy and enthusiasm will help drive DNO's growth," said Mr. Sandborg.

Mr. Sandborg joined DNO from corporate finance roles at DNB and the Aker oil services group and is DNO's longest serving staffer.

"It's hard to overstate Haakon's contribution to DNO," said Ms. Johansen. "Under his watch, the Company completed 21 successful bond placements with no waivers, no amendments and no defaults."

Mr. Sandborg will remain at the Company in a senior advisory role until the end of the year.

(Source: DNO)

By John Lee.

Iraq's state-owned Rafidain Bank has announced that it has "completed" 87 percent of its foreign debt obligations through high-level legal and financial negotiations, significantly reducing the country's external liabilities.

As part of Iraq's adherence to the Paris Club Agreement and with direct Cabinet approval, the bank concluded major settlements with Dutch and French creditor companies. The most notable was under Cabinet Resolution No. 403 of 2025, which settled three Dutch lawsuits with a waiver exceeding 90 percent of the claimed amounts in favour of the bank.

Additionally, the bank achieved key legal victories in Turkey and Lebanon, recovering over $2.8 million in assets. According to a statement from Rafidain, this highlights the competence of Iraq's legal apparatus in defending state interests abroad.

Rafidain Bank confirmed it is pursuing final settlements to close the remaining debt portfolio, aiming to bolster Iraq's sovereign credit rating and reinforce global confidence in its fiscal governance.

See also:

Govt Denies Destruction of 62 Trillion Iraqi Dinar

Trump & Crypto: Will Bitcoin's Success Translate to the Iraqi Dinar?

Top 10 Dinar Articles from July

(Source: Rafidain Bank)

By Guest Blogger. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraqi Dinar Prospects: Reality Check After Six Months of Trump

Six months into Donald Trump's return to the presidency, the Iraqi dinar finds itself at a crossroads between economic fundamentals and persistent speculation. Whilst the currency's boosters continue to proclaim imminent revaluations, the reality on the ground tells a rather different story-one of mounting pressures on Iraq's economy that suggest further weakening, not strengthening, of the dinar.

The Numbers Don't Lie

Market projections indicate potential slight depreciation, with the exchange rate possibly reaching around 1,318 IQD per USD by the end of 2025. This represents a continued weakening from current levels, reflecting the deteriorating economic conditions that have emerged during Trump's first six months in office.

More optimistic forecasts suggest modest improvements, with the USD/IQD exchange rate might improve from 1,276.640 in March 2025 to 1,217.448 by December 2025, though even these projections show only marginal strengthening that would hardly satisfy those expecting dramatic revaluations.

The gulf between these professional forecasts and the expectations of dinar enthusiasts could not be starker. More than half of respondents expected the Iraqi dinar to revalue by at least 1,000x in the first 100 days of Trump's term -- a prediction that has been thoroughly debunked by events.

Economic Fundamentals Under Pressure

The fundamental drivers of currency value paint a concerning picture for the dinar's prospects. The current account is expected to weaken considerably in 2025 primarily due to declining oil export revenues. The deterioration in the external position is projected to weigh on foreign reserves.

Iraq's foreign currency reserves, whilst still substantial, are showing signs of strain. Iraq's foreign currency reserves are sufficient to finance 13 months of imports, despite a recent decline in coverage, according to the Central Bank. The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) revealed that the country's foreign exchange reserves declined in May 2025, marking a concerning trend as oil revenues continue to fall.

The IMF's assessment is particularly sobering, noting that Iraq's vulnerabilities have increased in recent years due to a large fiscal expansion, precisely at a time when the government's main revenue source-oil exports-faces sustained pressure from both price declines and geopolitical disruptions.

Trump's Policies: A Double-Edged Sword

Leading Iraqi economists have warned that Trump's policies could actively harm the dinar. A leading Iraqi economist has predicted that US President Donald Trump's pressure to reduce oil prices will harm the Iraqi economy, and could lead to a devaluation of the Iraqi dinar.

This assessment reflects the reality that Iraq remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil revenues, which constitute roughly 90% of government income. Any sustained pressure on oil prices-whether through Trump's energy policies, sanctions on Iran affecting regional markets, or broader geopolitical tensions-directly undermines the fiscal position that underpins the dinar's stability.

Trump's renewed "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran has created additional complications. The removal of sanctions waivers that previously allowed Iraq to import Iranian energy has forced Baghdad to seek more expensive alternatives, further straining the government's finances and potentially requiring drawdowns of foreign reserves that support the dinar's exchange rate.

The Revaluation Delusion Persists

Despite six months of evidence contradicting their expectations, dinar revaluation theorists show little sign of abandoning their beliefs. The lack of any statement, policy, or indication from Trump regarding the Iraqi dinar has been met with increasingly creative explanations from supporters of the theory.

The fundamental misunderstanding underlying these expectations appears to be the belief that currency revaluations are political decisions that presidents can simply decree, rather than market-driven responses to economic fundamentals. The comparison some make to Kuwait's dinar post-liberation ignores the vastly different economic circumstances and structural reforms that accompanied that currency's strengthening.

Looking Forward: Modest Hopes, Harsh Realities

The most optimistic realistic scenario for the dinar involves gradual stabilisation rather than dramatic appreciation. This would require Iraq to successfully diversify its energy imports away from Iran, maintain political stability, and weather the current period of reduced oil revenues without excessive drawdowns of foreign reserves.

However, several factors work against such optimism:

Fiscal Pressures: With oil prices well below budgeted assumptions and production facing constraints, Iraq's government faces mounting pressure to either cut spending or increase borrowing-both of which could weaken confidence in the dinar.

Regional Instability: Trump's unpredictable approach to Middle Eastern policy creates ongoing uncertainty that typically undermines emerging market currencies like the dinar.

Structural Dependencies: Iraq's overwhelming reliance on oil exports leaves it vulnerable to external shocks, whether from market conditions, sanctions, or regional conflicts.

The Reality Check

For those holding Iraqi dinars in expectation of massive revaluations, the first six months of Trump's presidency have delivered a harsh reality check. Professional market forecasts suggest, at best, modest movements in the exchange rate-nothing approaching the transformative gains that speculators expect.

The economic fundamentals that determine currency values-fiscal position, foreign reserves, trade balance, and political stability-all point towards continued pressure on the dinar rather than the dramatic strengthening that revaluation theorists predict.

Iraq's path to currency stability lies not in presidential proclamations or speculative theories, but in the hard work of economic diversification, institutional reform, and fiscal discipline. Until these fundamentals improve, the dinar's prospects remain constrained by the same structural challenges that have defined Iraq's economy for decades.

The lesson from Trump's first six months is clear: currencies reflect economic realities, not political fantasies. The Iraqi dinar's future depends on Iraq's economic performance, not on the whims of foreign presidents or the hopes of speculative investors.

For more information on the Iraqi dinar, check out IBN's Dinar Page here: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/the-dinar-page/?swcfpc=1 

See also:

Iraqi Central Bank Reduces Supply of Dinars

Trump & Crypto: Will Bitcoin's Success Translate to the Iraqi Dinar?

Top 10 Dinar Articles from July

"Tired of Dinars", Iraq flocks to Dogecoin

By Ahmed Tabaqchali for The Clingendael Institute. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Misery loves company: Iraq and Iran's electricity and gas dependencies

In September 2022, the death of Mahsa Jina Amini marked a major turning point for Iran. The event sparked lengthy nationwide protests across socio-economic classes and population groups whose demands rapidly evolved from discarding controversial hijab regulations to calls for the overthrow the Islamic Republic. The Iranian government responded with repression, killing over 400 protesters in late 2022 and early 2023, according to human rights groups.

The Clingendael blog series 'Iran in transition' explores power dynamics in four critical dimensions that have shaped the country's transformation since: state-society relations, intra-elite dynamics, the economy, and foreign relations. This blog post critically assesses the assumptions underpinning US sanction waivers to Iraq regarding the import of Iranian gas and electricity.

Specifically, it argues that underlying economic realities render these waivers ineffective as instrument of US pressure on Iran and that their revocation is more likely to cause energy supply problems in Iraq.

Click here to download the full report.

To browse our comprehensive library of reports on Iraq, click here.

By Padraig O'Hannelly.

As Donald Trump completes his first 100 days in as US President, what effect have his policies had on the Iraqi economy?

Firstly, it's worth noting that the main implications of Trump's policies for Iraq have been the indirect results of decisions not directly targeted at Iraq. Increased tariffs and the resultant drop in oil prices, the slashing of foreign aid across the board, and Trump's 'maximum pressure' policy towards Iran have been the three biggest consequences for Iraq since the change of regime in Washington on 20th January.

Tariffs and Oil Prices

While the United States applied an additional duty rate of 39 percent to imports from Iraq from 5th April, as part of its wider 'reciprocal tariffs' (sic) policy, the new rate does not apply to US imports of oil, which account for almost all of Iraq's exports to the US.

However, Trump's approach to tariffs in general, combined with his unpredictable nature, has led to fears of a significant slow-down in international trade, and undermined the confidence of investors and consumers worldwide. As a result, the price of Brent crude has fallen from around $75 at the start of the month to $65 today; in mid-2024 it was as high as $85.

These drops imply reduced oil revenue for Iraq. Iraq's National Development Plan 2024-2028, launched last summer, but withheld from the public until late December, assumes a price of $74 this year, for example.

(Source: National Development Plan 2024-2028)

But as our Expert Blogger Ahmed Tabaqchali notes, Iraq has the capacity to support its spending plans by selling government debt, and this in turn can help develop the country's bond market, contributing to the evolution of the capital markets in Iraq. So while reduced oil revenue is a negative for Iraq, many expect short-to-medium-term development to continue as planned.

Foreign Aid

By some estimates, more than half of the humanitarian plans in Iraq were funded by the United States, so it should be no surprise that Trump's freezing of foreign aid and shutting down of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) would have a major impact on a wide range of valuable initiatives throughout the country.

According to the Washington-based Enabling Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC), "in fiscal year 2023, U.S. assistance to Iraq amounted to $592.7 million." It says the halt in funding and the stop-work order for USAID has already disrupted lifesaving programs in Iraq.

Our Tenders page on Iraq Business News has seen only a small drop in activity, as many international NGOs have been able to continue with their work, but many programs have been cancelled or scaled back.

Sanctions on Iran

The removal of Iraq's waiver from US sanctions on Iranian energy imports has created immediate economic strain, but it has also accelerated efforts to reduce dependence on Iran. The sudden change of policy risks widespread blackouts, particularly during the extremely hot summer months, but it should also be noted that Iran was already expected to have difficulty supplying Iraq this summer, as it struggles to meet domestic energy demand.

To mitigate the effects of this decision, Iraq has prioritised alternative supply projects, including a gas deal with Turkmenistan, increased electricity imports from Turkiye, and the creation of a floating platform for LNG imports. Iraq also plans to have completely stopped the flaring of associated gas by early-2028.

While the cancellation of the waiver will undoubtedly cause hardship over the coming months, the import of gas and electricity from Iran was always regarded as a temporary solution, and pulling forward projects to replace Iranian supply could be considered a worthwhile investment.

Trump withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Discussions continue regarding a possible new deal between US and Iran, and the final shape of any such deal will have implications for Iraq's economy and politics.

Iraqi dinar

Finally, for the benefit of those who've bought Iraqi dinars (IQD) in the hope of stratospheric upward revaluations, it should be mentioned that has, of course, not happened.

There has been a noticeable increase in interest in this "dinar RV" theory since Trump was elected in November, but not a shred of evidence to support the idea, and no indication from the President that he has any interest in the topic.

In an entirely unscientific online survey we ran in January, more than half of respondents said they expected the Iraqi dinar to revalue by at least 1,000x in the first 100 days of Trump's term, as if this was something that the President could magically bring about, even if he wanted to.

Doubtless the adherents to this theory will find a way to explain why it has not happened as they hoped, consider it a 'delay', and focus on some future timeframe when their faith will be rewarded.

© Iraq Business News

By James Durso for OilPrice.com. Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq's Path to Energy Security is Taking Shape

Iraq is moving to achieve energy security by diversifying its energy sources and reducing reliance on imports of Iranian electricity and natural gas.

A warning that expeditious action is needed was the removal of the U.S. sanctions waiver that allowed Iraq to import electricity from Iran.

Click here to read the full report.