But a hard line on the KRG could backfire for Turkey. Fehim Tastekin writes that the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey considers a terrorist group, could benefit if Barzani is weakened.
“Boosted by the Kurdish autonomy drive in northern Syria and its defense of Sinjar’s Yazidis against the Islamic State (IS), the PKK stands a chance of gaining a greater foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan. Existing power balances and traditional politics based on kinship ties prevent the PKK from getting mass popular support, but things may change if sanctions weaken Barzani’s administration. The PKK has been organizing silently in Kirkuk lately, which Ankara must have noted. According to Al-Monitor’s sources in Kirkuk, the PKK’s presence there is no more than 500 people, but the sympathy net might expand in the event of turmoil. Hence, a scenario where the PKK fills a vacuum in the area should be also factored in as a counterweight in the calculations.”
If this were not enough, it is Iran, rather than Turkey, that will be the final arbiter of Putin’s ambitions in Iraq and the region. Like Turkey, Iran will seek to prevent the Iraqi Kurdish model from spreading to its own Kurdish population. Tehran may be ready and willing to commit its Popular Mobilization Units to back Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi if he decides to deploy forces to Kirkuk.
Such a move by Abadi would be popular among Arab Iraqis and likely stave off the political challenge of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Indeed, if events take this course, one might even imagine a state of emergency and a postponement of Iraq’s general elections scheduled for April 2018. It goes without saying that Iran has little interest in supporting Russian efforts to expand Russia's share of the international gas market via Rosneft’s deal with the KRG.
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