Putin has forged a fragile consensus with Iran and Turkey on cease-fires in Syria, and he can’t afford to lose either Iran or Turkey, or both, and maintain his position. There is no Russian military muscle to flex in Iraq, as it has in Syria, especially compared with the assets of Turkey and Iran there. As we wrote here earlier this summer, the referendum has revealed the limits, rather than the extent, of Barzani’s influence and leverage with Baghdad and the region. If the Kurdistan Region faces hardship or conflict as a result of the referendum, Barzani could be blamed or weakened in the ensuing fallout.
Putin has much at risk, but is not without options, in contemplating his next moves. If he misplays his hand in northern Iraq by banking on a weakened Barzani, he may end up finding himself exposed and on defense in both Syria and Iraq, and at odds with Iran and Turkey — the worst of all worlds. Or he can tactfully shift toward the Iran-Turkey alignment, which is gaining traction and strength, quietly distancing himself from dependence on Barzani while opening discussions with Baghdad to pursue Russia’s energy interests in northern Iraq.
As this column observed in August, Putin’s grip on events in Syria increasingly depend on Turkey and especially Iran. “Russia might therefore undertake an outwardly passive and inwardly supportive role that allows the regional parties to take the initiative against the Syrian Kurds or others,” we wrote. The same can be said for his approach to the Iraqi Kurds.
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