Maliki has rejected calls for a national unity government, and has some grounds for doing so since he has won the most votes of any Iraqi politician and has rallied support of the main Shi’a parties (with the exception of the Sadrists). But we may yet see Maliki find other ways to reach out to the Sunnis. The question is, is it too late? Talk of a foreign move to rally Iraqi parties and oust the PM are fraught with complication.
Meanwhile, ISIL would almost certainly prefer to die fighting than cut any deal, but there is already talk of a new political-military strategy to replicate the Anbar Awakening and “flip” insurgents to the government side, or even leave the problem of ISIL to be dealt with by an autonomous Sunni region.
Such a strategy faces a huge question mark in Baghdad regarding the political will to revive the Sahwa or divide Iraq: Maliki was (and most likely still is) nervous about a heavily armed paramilitary force only miles from the International Zone, preferring commanders he has personally appointed. Many former Sahwat are loathe to fight for Maliki, as much as they may detest ISIL.
Meanwhile, Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq remain wedded to the Iraqi flag, even if versions of nationalism often compete. In the KRG, Barzani is leading an independence charge, but even this is fraught with risk, mostly of the financial kind. Amid these tensions, the well equipped and disciplined Kurdish Peshmerga have not fully committed to the fight, instead trying to consolidate control over disputed areas and secure the KRG, while skirmishing with ISIL.
In Baghdad, many Sunnis might hate Maliki and his allies, but there is no guarantee they will let ISIL walk back into their neighbourhoods. A similar mentality pervades countless Sunni majority areas across Iraq, with the JRTN insurgent spokesman recently calling ISIL “barbarians”, and yet allies for now.In Huwija, another Sunni insurgent group, the Islamic Army of Iraq dismissed claims that it was loyal to ISIL as “sick dreams and fantasies”(see @inteltweet).
This begs the question: how long can ISIL sustain territorial control? Regardless of whether more insurgent infighting happens, ISF morale must hold up.
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