In Anbar, tribal and governmental leaders of localised resistance to ISIL have done what was a rarity under the Maliki administration and called for much greater government support, to include the feared Shi’a militias. For some tribes, it is anyone but ISIL.
That was the eventual mentality of many Sunnis who once fought alongside al Qaeda to rid the country of the US, who had toppled a man seen by many Sunnis (but not all) as their breadwinner leader (Saddam). Most of these tribes eventually calculated that ultimately the Americans were better than al Qaeda and rose up against the group, at first on their own in 2005 in Al Qaim.
That uprising was short lived, until the US and key tribes forged deeper ties, and the “tribal revolt” became unstoppable. If more tribes back the government now (some will no doubt remain on the fence or stay anti government), it will not be the end of the terrorists. But it will be a critical step. ISIL know this, and are stepping up their genocidal campaign to now target Sunni resistance.
If history is anything to go by, this will reap a tribal typhoon against the group. But only if Abadi can make tribal--Iraqi army cooperation a cornerstone of Iraq’s strategy. Luckily for now, that is his plan.
In Hit, Ramadi and Haditha in Anbar, tribes have worked with Iraqi security forces against ISIL, not a replica of the successful US strategy in 2006-2007, but potentially something far more enduring: a genuine alliance of Sunni tribes and the government, rather than the artificial stability of Sunni tribes allied to US army units, but not allied to the Iraqi government. Make no mistake, even if this has limited success it will be a bloody, difficult path. Abadi knows it is the only path.
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