In parts of Diyala and Salahaddin, similar efforts are underway, sometimes involving ad hoc arrangements between Sunni and Shi’a fighters, as seen in Duluiyah. At other times these efforts have been centrally commanded by the government. This happened only tentatively during Maliki’s tenure, but Abadi seeks to make it pillar of Iraq’s security policy, alongside the retraining of at least 20,000 Iraqi soldiers in conjunction with the foreign advisory effort.
This new policy, the formation of a local Sunni National Guard (which faces a degree of political opposition) is already being launched on the local level by Sunnis determined to keep ISIL at bay.
In the farmland around Abu Ghraib, so vital to the defence of Baghdad and the capital’s airport, local tribes have once more voiced opposition to the Salafist fanatics. These tribes, intimidated by ISIL and brutalised by al Qaeda before them are determined not to go under even if it means an alliance with the government, something they have been wary of in the past.
Such tribal efforts received a boost recently, although the circumstance was decidedly morbid. ISIL massacred over 300 tribesmen in Hit, and separately north of Ramadi, when they recently took control of the isolated town. It was a move calibrated to instil terror and counter the organisation’s worst nightmare: another widespread Sahwa style movement.
But this atrocity formed the basis of the revered holy figure Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call for the government to help the Sunni tribes against ISIL. This is not the first time the Ayatollah or other significant holy figures have called for reconciliation. Won’t such efforts simply fail again? The recent outrage in Hit may galvanise Sunni opposition in ways ISIL may not be prepared for. Furthermore, this time the political factor in parliament could be decisive.
This is because in 2008 you would have found the commander of Iraq’s 6th army division in Abu Ghraib arresting members of the anti-al Qaeda Sahwa, rounding up what he called a “cancer.” Security in the town began a gradual but catastrophic decline which has only recently been halted. Essentially, in town after town local level Sunni attempts to wipe out al Qaeda were curtailed by a lack of national level reconciliation.
This crisis is often said to have worsened dramatically after 2010. A closer analysis suggests this was more of a slowly building disaster, with some limited political attempts to avert chaos after the US withdrawal. Abadi seeks to alter the political landscape of this recent turbulent period.
The Rise of Abadi:
This brings us to the key development that makes Iraq today crucially different to the 2006 / Surge environment: the rise of PM Haider al-Abadi.
Abadi has set to work taking on a myriad of Iraq’s challenges in the security, political and economic domains. This requires leadership that not only understands the political dimension of terrorist violence but also someone with a strong background in management and business. Luckily for Iraq, Abadi has both of those qualities.
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