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From the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Any opinions expressed are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Iraq launches the Updated Nationally Determined Contribution

Under the patronage of Prime Minister H.E. Mr. Ali Al-Zaidi, Iraq today officially launched its Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), setting out a strengthened framework for climate action through 2035.

Coordinated between the Ministry of Environment and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the updated NDC raises Iraq's climate ambition while linking climate action with economic diversification, energy and water security, resilience, investment and sustainable development.

Submitted to the UNFCCC [UN Framework Convention on Climate Change] in November 2025, the updated NDC raises Iraq's unconditional emissions-reduction target to up to 3 per cent below business-as-usual (BAU) by 2030 and establishes a new unconditional target of up to 5 per cent by 2035. A further conditional reduction of up to 17 per cent by 2035, subject to international climate finance, technology transfer and capacity-building support, brings the potential total reduction to up to 22 per cent below BAU.

Speaking on behalf of Prime Minister H.E. Mr. Ali Al-Zaidi at the launch, Dr. Ihsan Al-Awadi emphasised the national importance of the Updated NDC, saying: "We view this document as a national priority and a practical pathway to link climate action with economic and social development."

"Iraq's Updated NDC marks an important step from climate ambition towards implementation. The priority now is to translate these commitments into investment, stronger institutions and practical solutions that improve resilience, protect water and livelihoods, and support Iraq's development." said H.E. Ms. Sarwa Abdulwahid Qader, Minister of Environment.

"Iraq's Updated NDC provides an important framework for turning climate ambition into concrete action. Its success will depend on strong national leadership, coordinated implementation and sustained international partnership. The United Nations stands ready to support Iraq in this next phase." said Peter Hawkins, United Nations Resident Coordinator in Iraq.

The NDC covers mitigation across energy, oil and gas, electricity, transport, industry, agriculture and waste, while prioritising adaptation in water resources, agriculture, health and Iraq's special ecosystems, including forests, mountains and the Mesopotamian Marshes.

"Iraq has outlined a more ambitious climate course. The priority now is implementation: translating commitments into investment, strengthening institutions and mobilising the finance, technology and partnerships needed to deliver measurable results for Iraqi citizens." said Mehdi Khalili, UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in Iraq.

For more than a decade, UNDP has supported the Government of Iraq in advancing its climate agenda, Policy, Strategies and strengthening national action on climate change. Most recently, UNDP provided technical support throughout the NDC updating process, with financial support from the United Kingdom under the Climate Promise Initiative, as part of a broader United Nations effort. The next phase will focus on implementation, climate finance, investment and partnerships, alongside stronger climate data, monitoring and measurement systems.

The launch marks the beginning of Iraq's next phase of climate action, translating national ambition into implementation and tangible development results.

By John Lee.

Three strategic high-voltage electricity substations are under development in Karbala, Najaf and Baghdad as part of Iraq's power transmission upgrade programme.

Progress on the projects was reviewed at a meeting between the General Company for Electricity Transmission in the Middle Euphrates and Siemens, which is delivering the work under Phase Two of a cooperation principles agreement.

The meeting, attended by representatives of Siemens in Iraq and the German loan management team, along with officials from the ministry's technical and investments and contracts departments, reviewed implementation timelines against agreed contractual schedules.

The projects cover the construction of 400kV substations at Al-Dhafaf in Karbala, Al-Abbasiya in Najaf and Al-Karkh in Baghdad, intended to strengthen grid readiness and improve interconnection across the Middle Euphrates provinces.

The meeting was chaired by the company's Director General, Engineer Mohammed Abdul Aziz Youssef.

(Source: Ministry of Electricity)

By Ahmed Mousa Jiyad. Any opinions expressed are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Iraq Business News.

Qs & As Regarding Al-Zaidi Government' Views on Petroleum Issues

Interest in the Iraqi petroleum sector has intensified lately, particularly from energy-focused Western media sources. In response to my articles and presentations since the US-Israeli war against Iran, I have received, through emails and direct discussions on Zoom and Microsoft Teams, many questions and requests for comments and clarification. All of them want to know and understand what the current Al-Zaidi government intends to do on a variety of issues pertaining to the Iraqi petroleum sector. Western inquiries focus on upstream petroleum and the prospects of IOCs, while Iraqi concerns focus on oil export prices, discounts, and the impact and consequences of the continued war on Iran.

This brief article provides answers to the questions and requests, which focused on the following topics*:

• The new higher oil production target.
• The increasing presence of US companies in Iraqi petroleum projects.
• IOCs' dominant role in upstream petroleum.
• The availability of enough resources to support a two-digit production level.
• Matters relating to bureaucracy and transparency in petroleum contracting and awarding decisions.
• The ongoing US war on Iran and its impacts on Iraq.
• New pipeline proposals to diversify export routes.
• Monetising associated gas.
• The prospect of Turkish involvement in the Iraqi petroleum sector.
• SOMO's high discounts on its official selling price.

Before answering the questions, I expressed, through direct communications, my readiness and delight to cooperate and respond professionally and objectively to the related parties. I highlighted that I have an elaborate, well-organised and updated database that covers more than three decades of development in the Iraqi petroleum sector in particular and the national economy in general. I have published numerous articles in Arabic and English, and authored seven books in English documenting the development of the Iraqi petroleum sector. Links to my publications were provided for easy access when needed. Therefore, everything I say or write in due course is verifiable and evidence/fact based. Below are the questions (Qs) and my answers (As).

Q1. On the oil side, Al-Zaidi initially said that the country's goal is to grow oil production to 7 million barrels per day (mbd) from the pre-US-Iran war level of over 4 mbd, most recently upping this target to 8-9 mbd and giving a timeline of six years. Is this feasible?

A1. Based on available data, Iraq (excluding the KRG) currently has an installed oil production capacity of ca. 5 mbd, while actual utilised capacity fluctuates. During the period 2014-2025, the maximum actual production was in 2019: 4.576 mbd (Ministry of Oil (MoO) data) or 4.678 mbd (secondary sources used by OPEC). The annual average during 2025 was 3.775 mbd and 4.011 mbd according to MoO and OPEC data respectively.

Yes, but Al-Zaidi proposed escalating targets reaching 10 mbd within six years! In my view this is unrealistic and probably unattainable.

1. Since the signing of the first bid round in 2010, Iraq's installed production has almost doubled, reaching ca. 5 mbd in 2025.
2. From 2019, actual production, according to MoO data, declined from 4.576 mbd to 3.775 mbd at the end of 2025.
3. Almost all of the production increase is attributable to oilfields offered under the first two licensing rounds.
4. Apart from the impacts of COVID-19, geopolitics and market fundamentals, the absence of a coherent, integrated and comprehensive Energy Policy has contributed to complicating and hindering progress in actual oil production. The Al-Zaidi government demonstrates no resolute orientation in its programme to remedy the situation.
5. So, if it took the country 15 years to increase its installed capacity from ca. 2.3 mbd to 5 mbd, how is it possible to reach 10 mbd in six years?

Q2. Al-Zaidi appears to know the path to achieve it - bring in US and other international operators to develop legacy and new fields. Does he?

A2. I am not sure he knows the path well! He has absolutely no experience in oil matters, let alone the political economy of international oil contracting with IOCs and the recent historical experience of US IOCs in Iraq.

Materially verifiable evidence suggests the US "Big" oil companies had the "lion's share" in Iraqi upstream petroleum through:

1. The Memoranda of Cooperation (MoCs) concluded between IOCs and the Ministry of Oil during 2004-2008.
2. The list of IOCs qualified to participate in the bid rounds (2009-2024).
3. The companies that participated in the first two bid rounds (2009-2010).

Yet none of the US "Big" oil companies won a contract, as operator, in the open, competitive and transparent bidding events. Through the "back door", yes, but in only one case, which did not last long.

Q3. Foreign-operated fields in Federal Iraq (excluding Kurdistan, where 100% of working fields are in the hands of international oil companies (IOCs)) already account for 75% to 80% of total oil production in the country. Is this so?

A3. Correct, and it could be more than 80%. The number of oilfields operated by "National Efforts" is declining because some of them have been offered to IOCs, such as NOC's four producing oilfields (Kirkuk, Bay Hassan, Jembour and Khabaz) contracted to BP, the Ratawi/Artawi oilfield offered to TotalEnergies, the Himreen oilfield to HKN, and the Nassiriya and Balad oilfields offered to Chevron, among others.

Regretfully, there has been a tendency by the last three governments, of Al-Kadhimi, Al-Sudani and now Al-Zaidi, to offer nationally operated oilfields and exploration blocks to IOCs.

Q4. Does Iraq have a sufficient number of explored fields in place to offer to international oil companies to support 8-9 mbd of production? One could suspect the Majnoon/West Qurna 2 oilfields will be central in achieving this goal, but maybe you can point to other fields that may be instrumental in achieving it? Do you think the goal is realistic at all?

A4. To answer this question, we have to remember that after concluding the contracts for the fields under the first two bid rounds, Iraq's plateau production target/capacity (PPT) was to reach 12 mbd by ca. 2017. The PPTs were revised downwards, and the contracts were revised accordingly in 2014/15.

Iraq, in my humble view, has many options to reach the 10 mbd threshold. But is it advisable to develop a production capacity of such a level while ignoring, as has been the case since 2010, the required parallel expansion of export infrastructure and outlets, associated gas utilisation, international market conditions, OPEC/OPEC+ compliance, and the absence of a coherent, comprehensive national petroleum policy?

That said, Iraq could increase oil production through the following options:

1. Expedite oilfield development under the contracts concluded in the first four bid rounds.
2. Revise the amended contracts back to, or close to, their originally contracted PPTs.
3. Quick and timely conversion of exploration block contracts into oilfield contracts for already discovered oilfields. Exploration Block 10 to the Eridu oilfield is the most obvious example, with its huge discovery and the high possibility of its boundaries extending beyond the contracted area. Another example is the Salman oilfield in Exploration Block 12.
4. The agreement with BP could enhance NOC's oil production, gradually.
5. The Majnoon and West Qurna 2 oilfields could have significant impacts, but there are legal hurdles in offering them to IOCs under a different contract type and basic fiscal conditions.

As it stands today, Iraq has enough oil.

But the country needs to do more: first, to utilise associated gas, and second, to develop the gas fields, namely Akkas, Mansuria and Siba. Moreover, Iraq is a relatively under-explored country, particularly in its western part.

Evidence suggests a high exploration success ratio. Hence, the focus should be on exploration activities, with priority given to areas with promising natural gas prospects. The required exploration could be done by Iraqi national efforts, with some external assistance when needed.

Q5. It appears from Iraqi news that Al-Zaidi is making strong efforts to cut domestic bureaucracy and simplify the approval process for IOCs, as well as to increase the transparency of tenders and other governmental dealings. More often than not, exemptions from existing regulations are being granted by the Cabinet of Ministers to speed up approvals. So, the question to you is whether you think bureaucracy is indeed becoming less of an obstacle for IOCs, and whether there is a need to implement a wider reform/overhaul of existing regulations/laws to avoid such individual/per-case exemptions, instead putting more robust legislation in place to replace these regulations and laws?

A5. The increasing number of exemptions could reveal different forms of high-level corruption, irregularities or favouritism. This pattern of exemption intensified under ex-PM Al-Sudani. For example, exempting an oil company (x), because it is American, from the qualification criteria and process usually applied by the Ministry of Oil is counterproductive and undermines an established system of qualification.

Moreover, there has been a dangerous lack of transparency, particularly during the last ten years. No basic information has been disclosed regarding the fiscal, economic and legal regime of any contract or agreement the government has signed. Neither the Ministry of Oil nor the related IOCs have disclosed the regime of the signed contracts during the last ten years.

Logically, it is rather unreasonable to expect less bureaucracy in a strictly non-transparent working environment. Lack of transparency covers corruption, inefficiency and rigid bureaucracy.

So far, the Al-Zaidi government, as far as the oil sector is concerned, has not publicly and openly disclosed the basic details of any contract or agreement, or even the status of previously concluded deals. The Oil Ministry website usually shows more photos and a few words on any meeting it reports on; absolutely no substance on the subject matter.

And by the way, Iraq is obliged under the provisions of the EITI to disclose contracts and agreements in the extractive activities of the petroleum sector. And the Minister of Oil is the chair of the Iraqi EITI!!!

Finally, laws in Iraq are promulgated and amended according to the Constitution and through an established process and procedure. But "exemptions" are usually pursued by the executive branch, for justifiable reasons or otherwise, though mostly on unjustifiable premises.

Q6. Another key issue is the Strait of Hormuz and the US-Iran war. While grand plans are announced in Baghdad and IOCs are invited to Iraq, the country is having major issues with oil production/exports. These issues may drag on for months, if not years, as the US-Iran confrontation may last a long time. So, this poses the question of whether you think Iraq and Al-Zaidi remain hostage to the situation in the Middle East, and whether, until there is permanent peace/stability in the region, IOCs may be slow or reluctant to commit billions of dollars of new investment to the country?

A6. Many important issues are relevant for consideration regarding this topic.

First, the Strait of Hormuz remains strategically important not only for seaborne oil transport but also for other petroleum and petrochemical products, LNG, and a wide range of trade and supply chains. It will open again, fully or partly. The question is not if but when, depending on the geopolitical and military standoff prevailing since the end of last February.

Second, I recently proposed a southern-bound joint pipeline: Basrah-Kuwait-Bahrain-Qatar-Saudi Arabia-UAE-Oman, with terminal options on the Gulf of Oman or the Arabian Sea. This new, outside-the-box pipeline could provide a "necessity option" for exporting oil through terminals bypassing, but in addition to, the Strait of Hormuz.

Third, it is helpful to know or remember some data on the current status of Iraq's export outlets. The highest volume through the southern export terminals and the SPMs was 3.627 mbd in December 2018; this tells a lot about the infrastructural limitations on the country's export capacity and, consequently, the time and magnitude of investment needed to expand that capacity if Iraq aims to boost oil production to a much higher level than it has today.

As for exports through Turkey, Iraq, under current domestic and regional conditions and geopolitics, is unable to provide the 758 tbd envisaged by the transitional commercial arrangement, let alone provide 1.5 mbd by next July!

Q7. The pipeline proposals to diversify routes and connect Basrah/southern fields to the existing Iraq-Turkey pipeline and the rebuilt Iraq-Syria pipeline may take several years to complete. So, do you think the diversification of export routes should be completed (or at least started) before major Western investment can start coming into oil developments and higher production?

A7. As I mentioned above, Iraq needs to formulate and implement a harmonised, integrated petroleum policy that coordinates the parallel development of the four sub-sectors of petroleum: upstream, midstream, downstream and international marketing.

Iraq should always have some sort of "Dynamic Oil Material Balance" covering and aiming at the optimisation of oil production, oil exports and domestic requirements (for the refining sub-sector, electricity generation and other uses), which should be reviewed regularly - weekly, monthly or quarterly.

An IOC's attention is usually and mainly "project-focused"; the Ministry's approach should be "sector-wide", i.e., covering the four sub-sectors. Hence, contractual provisions, particularly "Take or Pay", should always be kept in mind when considering upstream petroleum projects.

Q8. Another question is about monetising associated gas. Al-Zaidi has emphasised that a priority is ending Iraq's reliance on foreign natural gas imports, notably from Iran. Do you expect any quick progress on this plan? With decades of gas flaring, declarations on eliminating gas flaring do not appear that easy to implement - and may take years to complete, delaying the desired ramp-up in oil production. But maybe you have your own opinion on the associated gas programme to share...

A8. Gas flaring is, and has been, one manifestation of the MoO's failure so far. The MoO has not published data on associated gas production, utilisation and flaring on its website since the last quarter of 2016.

Data from the World Bank's Zero Routine Flaring Initiative still shows Iraq among the top four countries in gas flaring: Russia, Iran, the USA and Iraq.

Gas provisions in the contracts for oilfields offered under the second bid round were not properly observed, or were even ignored, by the MoO in many oilfields, particularly Majnoon, West Qurna 2 and Gharraf.

Moreover, there are cases indicating confusion and inconsistency in awarding associated gas projects to companies while the related oilfields are operated by other companies.

Basrah Gas Company (BGC), a joint venture comprising SGC, Shell and Mitsubishi, which is supposed to utilise associated gas from six oilfields (Rumaila, West Qurna 1, Zubair, and the three Missan Province fields of Buzorgan, Faqah and Abu Gharab), has not yet reached its contracted target, even after 11 years in operation that followed 7 years of negotiation to finalise the JV agreement.

Finally, by definition and logic, associated gas is a by-product of oil. The exact relationship depends on the Gas-Oil Ratio (GOR) of each type of crude oil. There is, naturally, a strong statistical correlation/regression between the two, with gas dependent on oil. Therefore, if Iraq is unable to utilise associated gas at the current oil production level, it will not be able to utilise the higher volumes of associated gas resulting from higher oil production levels. Unless current gas flaring is ended, new oil production capacity (over 5 mbd) would augment the malpractice of gas flaring and all the negative consequences such flaring causes.

Q9. A question about Turkey. Turkey has strong ambitions of becoming a large regional oil hub by securing 2 mln bpd or more of Iraqi oil transiting the country. It also wants a guaranteed supply of 1 mln bpd to Turkey's refineries. Ankara is ready to jump on this opportunity to increase its regional importance as an oil hub, after securing natural gas transits and imports/exports. Do you think the interests of Baghdad and Ankara align? Do you think that in the long term Turkey may rival the US and China in Iraqi oil and gas developments and influence?

A9. The one-year transitional commercial agreement concluded on 1 August includes a 750 tbd throughput, rising to 1.5 mbd once the comprehensive new agreement is reached by the end of the current transitional commercial agreement.

Many important issues will need to be resolved, depending on what the comprehensive new agreement covers. No specific information has been revealed so far, and there is a good deal of confusion and contradiction even in what has been revealed.

Iraq has to optimise the allocation of oil exports between the four outlet options: Turkey, Syria, the Strait of Hormuz and the southern joint pipeline mentioned earlier.

I do not believe that Turkey has the strength and capacity to rival the US or China in Iraqi oil and gas developments and influence. China already has a strategically consolidated position in the Iraqi petroleum sector; Turkish companies do not pose any challenge to the Chinese.

As for US companies, it is rather early to assess their possible standing in Iraqi petroleum, since what has been concluded so far is a few framework agreements, not definitive contracts. But again, Turkish companies are no match for US "Big Oil" capabilities.

Currently, Turkish involvement in Iraqi upstream petroleum development projects is confined to two fields, through TPAO: a minor (7.5%) participating interest in the Badra oilfield, and a 40% interest in the Siba gas field. But some Turkish companies have a role in the petroleum sector as service companies or sub-contractors, such as in drilling activities.

Nevertheless, in a comparative sense, Turkey has an edge in its negotiations with Iraq: the water issue, the Development Road, the PKK and Turkish military forces in northern Iraq, and trade relations, all in addition to oil matters, including direct links with the KRG.

Q10. Why does SOMO offer high discounts while international oil prices are soaring, markets are tight and seaborne oil trading has been seriously interrupted by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz?

A10. This is an important, timely and complex topic that was raised by different parties, especially from inside Iraq, including journalists, parliamentarians and oil professionals, among others.

To begin with, offering discounts or imposing premiums on oil prices is normal practice for all oil exporters, depending on how they assess market conditions, geopolitical risks, their pricing mechanism/setting formula, their market share and their need for oil export revenues, among other considerations.

The recent discounts in question are primarily related to geopolitical risks that have increased tanker insurance, fuel and operating costs to unprecedented levels. Moreover, "dark" transits of the Strait and "ship-to-ship" round-trip practices increase oil tanker costs, which are compensated for by further discounts.

That said, the main issues in the Iraqi case are the magnitude of the discounts, their duration, which markets they apply to, why, and what the fiscal consequences of these discounts are.

SOMO-based information indicates discounts increased from $14 a barrel to $25/b during July and August respectively, while international sources give a much higher threshold of $30/b for mid-August deals.

Trading sources and Reuters report that SOMO offered September crude at discounts of $15 to $20.80 per barrel to its official selling prices, and some cargoes were sold at even larger discounts. Vitol and ADNOC have been active in concluding Iraqi oil liftings at such discounts; they purchased a total of 70 million barrels for September loading.

The above discounts are themselves significant, as are their fiscal magnitude and ramifications for Iraq's oil export revenues, and assessing them requires real, full and accurate data. But SOMO does/did not disclose the relevant data needed on the following related matters.

First, the reference Official Selling Price (OSP) to which the above discounts applied.

Second, Iraq exports two types of crude from the southern export outlets: Basrah Medium and Basrah Heavy. While the exported quantities of the two types are published occasionally, their prices are not, either in aggregate or for different market destinations.

Third, SOMO announces, on a ministerial monthly basis, the OSP setting formula for the two Basrah crudes destined for the three major international markets: East Asia, Europe and the Americas. The price formula for each market has its own "marker crude", which differs from market to market. Data from international sources indicates a wide margin of variation between the prices of the marker crudes used.

Fourth, Iran has publicly and formally exempted Iraqi oil cargoes from fees or restrictions on transiting the Strait of Hormuz. This implies that SOMO is not compelled to offer discounts when a cargo exemption is on offer.

Fifth, SOMO did not release its Monthly Export Reports for April to July. The August Export Report shows the following: Basrah Medium 55,702,595 barrels; Basrah Heavy 14,052,339 barrels; Kirkuk and KRG oil exported through Turkey 3,932,683 barrels.

The monthly report says nothing about the export price, total revenues, or how much Basrah crude was sold at the reported discount of $25/b during August. If this discount applied to all Basrah crude exports, SOMO lost well over $1.7 billion in August.

The MoO's preliminary estimate of all oil export revenues was $4.5 billion in August, indicating the discount represents 37.8% of oil export revenues. The preliminary average oil export price during August was $64.29 a barrel, indicating SOMO's OSP for Basrah crude could have been $89.29 a barrel at most. Lost oil revenue of more than $1.7 billion in one month is a painful, unacceptable fiscal blow for Iraq.

Sixth, as mentioned above, Vitol and ADNOC have reportedly contracted to lift a total of 70 million barrels during September. Unless oil production and exports from the southern terminals increase above August levels, all oil exports from the south will be earmarked exclusively for Vitol and ADNOC.

The consequences will be both costly and damaging in the short and medium term.

Discounts, if continued at such hefty levels, will remain fiscally heavy, eroding oil export revenues and deepening the fiscal crisis for the current government.

SOMO will not be able to fulfil its "Term Contracts" with all or most of its ca. 40 International Oil Buyers (IOBs); that could damage its reputation as a reliable supplier and could reduce its market share.

Moreover, in-kind payment of IOCs' entitlements could very well be affected, causing further delay in the ramp-up of oil production.

Seventh, the magnitude of the discount in just one month has outraged many inside Iraq, prompting calls to question the MoO on why its affiliated company, the Iraqi Oil Tanker Co. (IOTC), has no capacity to transport Iraqi crude. It has also exacerbated the sharp differences of position that surfaced during August between the Ministries of Transport and Oil when a parliamentary committee debated this issue. More debate is probably forthcoming on two options: offering costly discounts vs. enhancing IOTC's fleet capacity.

*My answers reflect data and information as of mid-September.

Mr Jiyad is an independent development consultant, scholar and Associate with the former Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES), London. He was formerly a senior economist with the Iraq National Oil Company and Iraq's Ministry of Oil, Chief Expert for the Council of Ministers, Director at the Ministry of Trade, and International Specialist with UN organizations in Uganda, Sudan and Jordan. He is now based in Norway (Email: mou-jiya(at)online.no, Skype ID: Ahmed Mousa Jiyad). Read more of Mr Jiyad's biography here.

By John Lee.

Iraq's Minister of Electricity, Ali Saad Wahib, met with Poland's Ambassador to Iraq, Wojciech Bujak, in Baghdad on Monday to discuss expanding cooperation between the two countries in the electricity sector.

The meeting covered opportunities to draw on the technical expertise and capabilities of Polish companies, particularly in the development and rehabilitation of power generation stations.

The two sides also discussed building new partnerships and strengthening coordination between the Ministry of Electricity and the Polish side.

(Source: Ministry of Electricity)

By John Lee.

A new gas processing unit with a capacity of 30 million standard cubic feet per day (mmscfd) has opened at the East Baghdad oil field (southern section). According to the Ministry of Oil, processed gas from the unit will be fed directly to the Bismaya power station via a pipeline constructed by the State Company for Oil Projects (SCOP).

Minister of Oil Basim Muhammad Khudhair al-Abadi said the project forms part of the ministry's strategy to end gas flaring and convert associated gas into productive energy. He added that the unit would contribute to stabilising the national electricity grid, reduce dependence on imported fuel, and cut harmful emissions in the capital.

The minister praised the role of Midland Oil Company in managing the field and its partnership with operator Zhenhua Oil (EBS Petroleum). The director of EBS's Chinese operations, Ma Chen, welcomed the ministry's support in completing the project.

Also attending the opening were the Deputy Minister for Extraction Affairs, Nassir Aziz; the Deputy Minister for Gas Affairs, Dr Izzat Saber; the Director General of the General Company for Oil Projects, Ali Ward; the Director General of Central Electricity Production, Muwaffaq Youssef; and the Director of the Fuel Directorate at the Ministry of Electricity, Saad Farih.

The Director General of Midland Oil Company, Mohammed Yaseen Hassan, described the inauguration as a significant milestone for the field and for Iraq's energy security.

(Source: Ministry of Oil)

By John Lee.

Iraq's Ministry of Electricity and Siemens have signed a Principles of Cooperation Agreement on energy in Iraq, covering a fourth phase of collaboration between the two parties.

The signing ceremony was attended by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Al-Zaidi also met separately in Berlin with Siemens Chief Executive Christian Bruch to discuss expanding cooperation in the energy sector. The Prime Minister noted opportunities to upgrade and develop distribution and transmission networks, and to diversify electricity generation sources beyond gas to include other fuel sources.

(Source: Prime Minister's Media Office)

By John Lee.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has attended a German-Iraqi business dialogue forum in Berlin, held under the theme "Economic Bridges for a Common Future", with the participation of German business leaders and representatives of major German companies.

Al-Zaidi presented Iraq's investment map, covering sectors including energy, oil and petrochemical industries, phosphates, clean energy, pharmaceuticals, and automation. He also outlined government plans for financial, tax, and banking reforms aimed at improving the investment environment and supporting economic growth.

Separately, al-Zaidi met German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier as part of his official visit to Berlin. The meeting covered the development of Iraqi-German relations and efforts to expand participation by German companies in development projects in Iraq.

Al-Zaidi stated that Iraq aims to increase crude oil production and exports, raise electricity generation capacity, and accelerate its role as an economic corridor between Asian and European markets through the Development Road project.

(Source: Prime Minister's Office)

By John Lee.

Six memoranda of understanding (MoUs) were signed between Iraq and France at the Élysée Palace in Paris on Monday, covering defence, energy, aviation, and youth and innovation cooperation.

The agreements were signed during a visit by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and were witnessed by French President Emmanuel Macron. According to the Prime Minister's Office, the MoUs cover the following:

• A letter of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and French company Harmattan AI on strategic cooperation in air defence
• A declaration of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the French Ministry of the Armed Forces on the supply of French military equipment within the framework of reconstruction and development of Iraq's defence capabilities
• A declaration of intent between the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs on youth opportunities, research and innovation
• A declaration of intent between the two foreign ministries on strengthening the partnership with the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD)
• A cooperation protocol on a gas supply and sale contract between the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity and TotalEnergies
• A declaration of intent on civil aviation cooperation between the Iraqi and French ministries of transport

(Source: Prime Minister's Office)

By John Lee.

Patrick Pouyanné, chief executive of TotalEnergies, met Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in Paris on Monday to review the company's strategic projects in Iraq, with a particular focus on gas. According to the Prime Minister's media office, TotalEnergies has existing oil investments in Iraq of $12 billion and is planning to increase these to $16 billion.

Al-Zaidi outlined government plans to expand associated gas investment with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency, as well as targets to increase oil production over the next five years to reach 10 million barrels per day. He also indicated that preparations are under way to hold an international energy conference in Baghdad.

Pouyanné confirmed the company's readiness to cooperate with Iraq in the oil and energy sectors.

(Source: Ministry of Electricity)

By John Lee.

Work is under way to accelerate construction of the Samawah solar power station in southern Iraq [Muthanna], to be built in two phases with a combined capacity of 750MW. The project is being carried out by Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina).

According to Iraq's Ministry of Electricity, the first phase will add 250MW of solar capacity, followed by a second phase of 500MW.

A meeting between ministry officials and PowerChina representatives was chaired by Qais Ali Abd al-Hadi, Director General of the General Company for Electrical Power Production in the South, to review project details and measures to speed up implementation.

(Source: Ministry of Electricity)