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By John Lee.

Eni has reportedly reached agreement with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to cut the final production target at Zubair oil field to 850,000 bpd.

Iraqi Oil Minister Abdul Kareem Luaiby [Elaibi] told reporters that he has agreed to the drop from the original target of 1.25 million bpd, and that Eni has agreed to maintain the new level of production for 15 to 20 years.

Russia's Lukoil had already struck a deal to reduce the target for West Qurna-2 to 1.2 million bpd, instead of the earlier-agreed 1.8 million bpd.

BP and Shell are also pursuing talks with the Iraqi oil ministry to reduce final production targets of the Rumaila and West Qurna-1 oil fields respectively.

(Source: Dow Jones)

Turkish officials are dismayed hearing about US concerns that Turkey’s decision to sign an agreement with ExxonMobil in northern Iraq is perceived as a threat to Iraq’s unity.

Noting that it is ExxonMobil, a US company, that is going to do the exploration work in the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) area, the Turkish side is curious why the Obama administration would want Turkey — a country that is more than 80% dependent for its energy needs on outside sources — to turn its back on newly rising opportunities in its neighborhood that will help it to diversify its energy portfolio, while giant US oil and gas companies are exempt from such criticism.

According to the Turkish side, it is primarily these giant oil companies that decide how and when these hydrocarbon reserves will come on the market, and that when they make their move it is best to be on board from the beginning. As ExxonMobil took a step in that direction by exploiting the northern Iraqi resources, Turks are saying that it is not even serious to paint Turkey as a country attacking Iraq’s territorial integrity.

“We have a fast developing economy and industry. We have a large population and we don’t have our own homegrown energy resources to match our needs to keep up with the growth,” a Turkish official told Al-Monitor. “ So what it is exactly that the United States wants us to do — that we don’t work with Russia, Iran and Iraq! So, who should we buy our energy from?”

The Wall Street Journal, however, reported on May 14, “US officials fear setting a precedent to let regional governments strike independent resource deals could destabilize [Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki’s government during a time when sectarian violence in Iraq is mounting.”

The Wall Street Journal also went on to write:

"'Our position on energy trade from Iraq has been consistent and remains unchanged: The United States doesn’t support oil exports from any part of Iraq without the appropriate approval of the federal Iraqi government,' said Caitlin Hayden, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council."

Turkish officials, however, argue that if the Obama administration is worried about rising sectarian conflict in Iraq, they should point fingers at themselves and take responsibility as the former occupier of the country — but not blame Turkey for anything that goes wrong in Iraq. “The problem is in Baghdad, not in Ankara,” one Turkish official told Al-Monitor.

The signing of the agreements does not mean that these resources will be available for consumption on the market tomorrow. It is going to take time, and much can change in Baghdad’s relations with the Iraqi Kurds before then. “We are just watching out for our best interest.”

Tulin Daloglu is a contributor to Al-Monitor's Turkey Pulse. She has also written extensively for various Turkish and American publications, including The New York Times, International Herald Tribune, The Middle East Times, Foreign Policy, The Daily Star (Lebanon) and the SAIS Turkey Analyst Report. On Twitter: @TurkeyPulse

By Madeleine White, educationalist, writer and Head of Strategic Partnerships, Whizz Education.

"Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world."

 - Nelson Mandela

I have seen many weapons in the last few days.  A meat cleaver, brandished by a blood-covered young man in Woolwich, London - caught on a homemade video celebrating the horrific killing of a young soldier in the name of religion. Words as weapons on banners in Iraq, brandished by tens of thousands of Iraqis who want to see the creation of a separate Sunni sovereign region. In this month’s blog I therefore want to add a weapon that empowers everyone equally – that of education.

Of course our received expectation as to what education should be is based on children being taught in bright shiny classrooms, by teachers who always smile and know everything. It is nice, lovely, kind and caring and always successful, leading to great jobs. Knowledge is easily passed on and flows like a stream from a tap that is shiny and ever-available. There is no dirt, hunger, hardship or discrimination…

This kind of idealisation will never be realised. In a world full of anger, hunger and hate it is also utterly irrelevant.  To serve the needs of individuals, communities and nations education must instead be disruptive. It needs to challenge existing ideas and structures. It is not static or complete in itself – instead it is dynamic and alive. Education is a way of transmitting the nature of human thought, helping individuals become aware of themselves but also transmitting a fundamental sense of regional, national and global consciousness.

The internet of course speeds the whole thing up. In fact, we could liken the high speed, high tech world we inhabit much of the time to a fourth dimension, beyond the other three that currently exist on the ‘physical’ world.  If the internet provides the environment I would like to argue that Educational Technology providers create the tools that enable people to reach and shape this new dimension.  Therefore, if we are to use education as a weapon, we must recognise the real battlefield  and so embrace technology and new teaching ideas and techniques – making use of all the things that can help us as part of our arsenal.

By Madeleine White, educationalist, writer and Head of Strategic Partnerships, Whizz Education.

As I have mentioned previously, education is never just about a school building. A school is a function or a service, set within a suitable building that is able to support people to reach their full potential.  In order for this to happen there are many stakeholders. These include funders such as corporations who benefit from the right kinds of skillsets to drive forward their innovation and productivity. It includes government as strategists, able to connect the needs of all participants and of course also includes the wider community – parents, organisations, smaller business and employers.

My theme this month therefore is one of connection and sharing. Schools are a central point of connection for many communities. The three short stories I am focusing on below are designed to focus on what schools actually mean and indeed how they are the base-line for skills, connections and ideas that allow a young person to reach their full potential – serving individual, community and national need in the process.

Building schools

The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) is set to announce the results of January’s Expression of Interest Request for provision 2000 school buildings in Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Dohuk and Garmian. The focus is to be on building 250 furnished schools in each of the two initial years and the remainder of the total number of 2,000 furnished schools to be distributed over the remaining 10 years.

The results are due to be announced in May, so opportunities for education providers to become involved when the builders have been announced are potentially huge and of course come back to the question of what education is actually trying to achieve.

Educational service providers such as Whizz Education will be looking to explore how to make the educational pipeline meaningful – allowing educational technology to drive progress by aligning the  measures and reports with the wide access the cyber environment is able to provide in order to support learning and teaching needs. It could be argued for example that this kind of a shared, collaborative learning environment prepares young people and their communities for exactly the kind of skills required to serve future national and employer need and should thus be integral to school provision. These contributions and ideas are crucial if the progamme is to serve the needs of long term human capacity development.

By John Lee.

Russian news agency RT reports that Rosneft is considering a joint venture with ExxonMobil in Iraq.

Company President Igor Sechin (pictured) told reporters:

"We will work with anyone who offers good terms, we'll work with ExxonMobil too."

An Iraqi oil ministry delegation will visit Moscow on 10th May to discuss the deal.

(Sources: RT, Reuters)

By John Lee.

Lukoil Chief Executive Officer Vagit Alekperov (pictured) has said that the Russian company expects to produce around 150,000 bpd of oil from the West Qurna-2 field by January:

"The program of developing the oilfield infrastructure is proceeding according to schedule and work is ongoing at all the sites ... From 1st January we will be ready to produce 150,000 barrels per day."

According to the report from UPI, the field is estimated to hold as much as 14 billion barrels of recoverable reserves, making it among the largest undeveloped fields in the world.

Lukoil has a 75 percent stake in the project, with Iraq’s South Oil Company (SOC) owning the remaining 25 percent.

(Source: UPI)

A state-owned Russian company is said to be in talks with Iraqi officials on the resumption of work at the Yusifiya power station of southern Baghdad.

According to a report from AIN, a company identified as "Ross Tej" (sic) said:

"The talks included the cooperation in the electric power sector and the possibility of resuming the establishment of the second phase of Yusifiya electro-thermal station.

"The project also involves the installation of six electric generators of 210 megawatt each."

The first phase of the project has already been completed at cost of $ 550 million.

(Source: AIN)

By Tom Walker, Director, Assaye Risk

COUNTRY OVERVIEW

After a brief week-long hiatus the intensity and number of high impact attacks against political and sectarian targets increased with bombings countrywide as Iraqis prepare to go to the polls on Saturday to vote for members of provincial councils in a ballot that will be a measure of the political stability and  Al-Maliki’s true political clout across the sectarian divides.  This increase in attacks follows a predictable pattern of intense activity followed by re-supply and preparation, normally spanning 10-14 days. This week the number of combined ISF and civilian fatalities was higher at 158; bringing the total number of fatalities this year to approx. 1306.

On 12 Apr at least seven people were killed and 25 wounded when a bomb exploded in front of a Sunni Muslim mosque in Diyala province as worshippers were leaving after Friday prayers.  This was followed by car bombs and blasts in cities across Iraq 15 Apr, including two explosions at a checkpoint outside Baghdad's international airport, which killed at least 33 people. The attacks were mostly car bombs, including two blasts that killed two passengers at a checkpoint as they were on their way into the Baghdad airport complex. Attacks on the heavily guarded airport and the fortified International Zone housing many embassies are rare.

Further afield attacks also took place in Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmato and other towns from north to south long the Tigris River Valley. The most deadly attack was in Tuz Khurmato, 170 km (105 miles) north of Baghdad, where four bombs targeting police patrols killed 5 people and wounded 67, officials said.

Later on 15 Apr, a further 10 people were killed by a bomb at a car market in the Baghdad Shi'ite district of Sadr City and a blast outside a cafe in Khalis, a Shi'ite district in Diyala province. As yet no one has claimed responsibility but the capability and sophistication of these multiple attacks points towards the ISI’s continuing campaign against Shi'ites and the government, however this series of attacks could also be in direct retaliation for the attack against a Sunni mosque on 15 Apr. The ISI is regaining ground, especially in the western desert near Syria's border, where it is benefitting from the flow of Sunni fighters opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, especially now that the ISI have joined forces with the al-Nusra Front rebels fighting in Syria. The ISI will continue to tap into Sunni frustrations, with many Iraqi Sunnis feel with many security experts saying the ISI will seek to use the current situation and domestic political uncertainty as a recruiting tool among Sunnis who see themselves as victimized by GoI.

In line with previous weeks reporting the Syrian this week continued to seep into Iraq’s domestic fabric. This seepage was further confirmed by the news that Iraqi Shi'ite militias have begun openly acknowledging they are fighting in Syria in what they see as a worthy battle against rebels seeking to topple President Bashar al-Assad, especially his hardline Sunni opponents.  By doing so Iraqi Shi'ite fighters may gain recruitment momentum to help Assad in a war that is continuously splitting the region along sectarian lines.  In recent months, Iraqi Shi'ite militants have said volunteers are crossing into Syria to fight, often alongside Assad's troops, or to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine on the outskirts of Damascus, a particularly holy place for Shi'ites.  Whilst it was widely accepted that Shiia militias were defending holy sites militia leaders, who have mostly been inactive since U.S. troops left Iraq, had been reluctant to openly acknowledge fighting in Syria, possibly because influential Shi'ite clergy opposed Iraqis joining the battle. Despite this initial reluctance it is likely that many Shiia militias now see a direct need to combat a growing Sunni insurgency and as such have ‘legitimised’ their actions in Syria. Syria's upheaval is a political nightmare for Iraq's Shi'ite leaders who believe a messy fall of Assad would fragment Syria along sectarian lines and bring to power a hostile, hardline Sunni Muslim regime that could stir up Iraq's own combustible Sunni-Shi'ite mix.  This has lead many to speculate how genuine the GoI policy of non-interference in Syria really is, especially when one also considers that it refuses to endorse Western and Arab League demands for the removal of Iran's ally Assad.

By Tom Walker, Director, Assaye Risk

COUNTRY OVERVIEW

 After the elevated levels of violence last week, especially high impact bombings, Iraq has this last week seen a hiatus in insurgent attacks and activity. Whilst the daily churn of violence remains omnipresent and suggest a continued strengthening of the Sunni insurgency, the country has been spared the same levels of violence seen last week, especially in Baghdad and surrounding areas, however it is expected that this continued trend of week on week off spikes in violence will continue, especially through the election season.  By close of play 26 Mar the approx. number of countrywide fatalities was at 112 with estimates of wounded at 216; bringing the total ISF and civilian fatalities this year to approx. 913.

The PKK ceasefire, Iraqi elections, events in Syria and continued frictions in the sectarian domain have dominated the week’s events.  As anticipated the PKK formally accepted a ceasefire with Turkey after the jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan ordered an end to hostilities. Murat Karayilan, the PKK field commander, also accepted the decision.  The declaration from Karayilan, who is based in the remote mountains of northern Iraq from where he directs the PKK insurgency against Turkey, had been expected but was still an important sign the outlawed PKK will abide by Ocalan's orders.  Despite the positive nature of this ceasefire the implications for both Turkey and Iraq are serious.  There are still dangers of division over the terms of a peace deal or between the figures negotiating it. The process could also be complicated by the ambitions of other Kurdish groups across the border in Syria Iran and Iraq.  Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan has taken a considerable political risk in allowing negotiations with Ocalan to unfold in such a public way. Previous efforts conducted behind closed doors over the decades to resolve the conflict have all failed yet the lure of the energy wealth in northern Iraq – at a time of increased energy dependence on Russia – may prove to be the right catalyst for these talks, however there remains a fine balance as Ocalan is reviled by many Turks for leading an insurgency that threatened to partition Turkey in its earlier days.

In Iraq the frictions of the Syrian conflict continue to boil over into the domestic domain.  Despite the fact that the levels of cross border incidents has subsided the after effects continue to bubble over into domestic politics.  Above all the Syrian conflict is directly undermining Iraq security as various groups posture and skirmish, taking advantage of the fluid situation.  For example, the Free Syrian Army assault of last week that resulted in the seizure of Syria’s Yaarabiyah border crossing was reportedly led by Jassim al-Shammari’s Jazeera Freedom Brigade, an Iraqi group. As his surname indicates, the leader of the group belongs to the Shammars, a Sunni Arab tribe. Even though Shammars are also present also in Syria, the tribe is concentrated in and around Mosul.  After a meeting in Mosul on March 3, the Shammar tribe urged the Iraqi government not to attack the elements of the FSA at Yaarabiyah, saying that those were people from their tribe. Given the current tensions between the protest movement and Baghdad any move by the ISF against the FSA will undoubtedly have repercussions across Iraq, especially in the Sunni dominated provinces and Baghdad.  Moreover, the Peshmerga’s recent refusal to let the Iraqi military into Sinjar on March 5 represents another clear dynamic of confrontation, especially when one considers the overt support the KRG provides to Syrian Kurds opposed to the Assad regime, which is in in direct defiance of the GoI support for Assad.

Directly linked with this is the current situation regarding the postponement of provincial elections in Anbar and Nineveh, a situation that continues to stoke debate from all sides of the sectarian divide.  The original reasons for this postponement were given as concerns surrounding the security situations in both provinces and that the elections would open the door for ‘terrorists’ to come to power.  Both arguments have ensured fierce critique and opposition from Shia and Sunni politicians alike as they lack credibility and proof.  Many see an overt and unsubtle attempt by Baghdad to marginalize the two provinces at the centre of the protest movement as part of the wider ‘muscle flexing’ actions of Baghdad as they try to wrest back control. Ironically, it has also been pointed out by politicians that the epicenter of violence these past few weeks has actually been Baghdad and that corresponding levels of violence in the two restive provinces have changed little.

By Tom Walker, Director, Assaye Risk

COUNTRY OVERVIEW

This brief covers an extended reporting period from 11 – 20 March in order to coincide with the anniversary of the Iraqi invasion and a week which has seen heightened levels of violence, especially in Baghdad and surrounding provinces, but also notably in Basra. In line with this, and especially due to the intense levels of bombing in Baghdad, countrywide fatalities increased with a significant number of civilians being killed due to insurgent actions. By close of play 20 Mar the approx. figure of fatalities was at 213 with estimates of wounded ranging from 257 – 400. Unclear reporting and multiple simultaneous events have ensured that a ‘true’ figure may never be reached, however it is clear that the bombings and attacks in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk point towards an emboldened and fortified Sunni insurgency.

The week’s events have been dominated by the anniversary of the Iraqi invasion, developments in the Turkey / PKK roadmap to peace and an increase in sectarian tensions following the attempted arrest of Rafe al-Essawi. In line with this there continues to be a marked increase in the numbers of political and sectarian motivated ‘silent’ attacks (those using silenced weapons and intimidatory tactics), particularly in Baghdad which has seen at least 13 assassinations alone, which is unsurprising given the proximity of the national elections, the fluid situation in Syria (particularly with the reported use of chemical weapons against Sunni rebel groups) and the swelling of the domestic Sunni protest movement aligned with Rafe al-Essawi.

Essawi was until recently the Iraqi Finance Minister and the highest-ranking Sunni politician. Given that he is now on the run from his own government in Al-Anbar province, alleging increased persecution of Sunnis, is the latest sign that persistent sectarian tensions are worsening and undermining any lingering hopes of political stability and national unity in the run up to the forthcoming national elections, thus setting perfect conditions for a advanced split political environment. Mr Essawi and, to a greater extent, Al Anbar continue to act as the fulcrum of an emboldened and rising Sunni resistance against Iraq’s Shiite controlled central government and the government in Syria, with potentially ruinous consequences.